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Abstract
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a promising cryptographic technique that supports
computations on encrypted data without requiring decryption first. This ability al-
lows sensitive data, such as genomic, financial, or location data, to be outsourced for
evaluation in a resourceful third-party such as the cloud without compromising data
privacy. Basic homomorphic primitives support addition and multiplication on ci-
phertexts. These primitives can be utilized to represent essential computations, such
as logic gates, which subsequently can support more complex functions. We propose
the construction of efficient cryptographic protocols as building blocks (e.g., equal-
ity, comparison, and counting) that are commonly used in data analytics and machine
learning. We explore the use of these building blocks in two privacy-preserving ap-
plications. One application leverages our secure prefix matching algorithm, which
builds on top of the equality operation, to process geospatial queries on encrypted
locations. The other applies our secure comparison protocol to perform conditional
branching in private evaluation of decision trees.
There are many outsourced computations that require joint evaluation on pri-
vate data owned by multiple parties. For example, Genome-Wide Association Study
(GWAS) is becoming feasible because of the recent advances of genome sequencing
technology. Due to the sensitivity of genomic data, this data is encrypted using dif-
ferent keys possessed by different data owners. Computing on ciphertexts encrypted
with multiple keys is a non-trivial task. Current solutions often require a joint key
setup before any computation such as in threshold HE or incur large ciphertext size
(at best, grows linearly in the number of involved keys) such as in multi-key HE. We
iv
v
propose a hybrid approach that combines the advantages of threshold and multi-key
HE to support computations on ciphertexts encrypted with different keys while vastly
reducing ciphertext size.
Moreover, we propose the SparkFHE framework to support large-scale secure
data analytics in the Cloud. SparkFHE integrates Apache Spark with Fully HE to
support secure distributed data analytics and machine learning and make two novel
contributions: (1) enabling Spark to perform efficient computation on large datasets
while preserving user privacy, and (2) accelerating intensive homomorphic computa-
tion through parallelization of tasks across clusters of computing nodes. To our best
knowledge, SparkFHE is the first addressing these two needs simultaneously.
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Modern data-driven applications involve sensitive data such as genome sequences
[164], biometric data including iris scans and fingerprints [169], and users’ location
data [90]. The economical efficiency and ubiquitous accessibility of cloud comput-
ing have attracted many emerging data analytic and machine learning applications
to outsource data and delegate computations to the cloud. For example, biomedi-
cal research may benefit from delegated, joint computations on genome data on a
resourceful cloud [114, 138]. Users may be tempted to share their exact locations
with geosocial networks, which provide useful location-based services (e.g., discov-
ering nearby friends) based on collected locations [16]. Data privacy becomes a
crucial concern when outsourcing sensitive data, especially when these data are hard
to change or replace once exposed. For instance, leaking the genome data of a person
affects not only his privacy but also his family because the DNA data contains infor-
mation about his blood-relative [119]. Moreover, strict data protection regulations,
such as HIPAA [160] and EU GDPR [67], demand provable security of private data
when it is being transmitted, in storage, and being processed. Therefore, privacy-
preserving techniques have to be applied to ensure the appropriate level of protection
for user data while allowing it to be utilized.
1.1 Privacy-preserving Computation
There are different privacy-enhancing techniques that enable an untrusted party to
perform secure computation on private data without having access to its content.
1
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These techniques can be adopted on their own or in conjunction with each other.
Trusted execution environments (TEE) such as Intel SGX [47] with remote attestation
is a hardware-based solution for secure outsourced computations. With this solution,
computations are performed on plain data within the minimized and isolated execu-
tion environments (enclaves). Secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols are
often coupled with secret-sharing [143] or garbled circuits [14] for interactive com-
putations among parties. Differential privacy [64] adds small noise sampled from a
uniform distribution, such as Laplace, to hide the contribution of individuals within
a dataset. Homomorphic encryption (HE) allows computations on encrypted data
without decrypting it first. It is a suitable technique for the secure outsourcing setting
discussed in this dissertation.
Recent HE cryptosystems, lattice-based cryptography, are based on the hardness
of problems believed to be resistant to quantum attacks, which makes HE a strong
candidate for post-quantum cryptography [4, 27]. Due to this quantum-safe assump-
tion, HE gains increasing attention from both governmental and academic bodies.
For example, the communications security establishment (CSE), the Government of
Canada’s national cryptologic agency, has recently called for solutions based on HE
to support secure and confidential rule matching [46]. Several government programs
(e.g., DARPA PROCEED [53], HECTOR [92], and DPRIVE [54]) are established to
investigate practical solutions with HE to compute on encrypted data. Moreover, an
annual iDASH competition allocates a special track for secure genotype imputation
using HE [93], and it is funded by NIH. On the other hand, there is an ongoing effort
for standardizing HE [149]. Likewise, we are motivated in this dissertation by the
promising capabilities of HE.
As mentioned, HE supports arithmetic operations, such as addition and multi-
plication, to be performed on encrypted data. Specifically, given two messages m
and m′ and homomorphic addition and multiplication operations ⊕ and ⊗, we have
Enc(m)⊕Enc(m′) which decrypts tom+m′ and Enc(m)⊗Enc(m′) which decrypts
to m×m′. For simplicity, we will use normal arithmetic operators +,× to represent
homomorphic operations in the rest of our description. Generally speaking, any algo-
rithm that can be reduced to just these arithmetic operations can be homomorphically
evaluated on encrypted data.
The first set of HE schemes [15, 65, 81, 126] are efficient but only realized par-
tial homomorphism, which supports either addition or multiplication on ciphertexts
but not both, such as Paillier [126] and ElGamal [65] schemes. Boneh-Goh-Nissim
scheme [22] supports an arbitrary number of additions and a single multiplication;
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
hence, it is somewhat homomorphic. There are leveled HE schemes that support a
predetermined number of multiplications based on the targeted function. In 2009,
Gentry [76] proposed the first plausible construction to achieve a fully HE (FHE)
scheme based on ideal lattices that can support an arbitrary number of additions and
multiplications.
In lattice-based schemes, the ciphertext contains of a noise element that can prop-
agate with evaluations. Homomorphic addition is performed almost free of cost, but
multiplication significantly grows the noise elements in the ciphertext because the
noise term from multiplying two ciphertexts is the product of the two initial noise
components. Hence, it is important to reduce the multiplicative depth (i.e., consec-
utive multiplications) of a homomorphic function. When the noise growth in the
ciphertext is too large, it is not possible to retrieve the correct message after decryp-
tion. Gentry’s FHE scheme, which was built on a leveled HE scheme, can homo-
morphically evaluate its own decryption circuit in a bootstrapping step [76]. Hence,
it can refresh the embedded noise within an evaluated ciphertext, when the noise
level reaches a predefined threshold, to obtain a fresh ciphertext with small noise. In
practice, the bootstrapping step is computationally expensive; therefore, most appli-
cations can be sufficiently realized by a leveled HE scheme. Also, HE schemes can
be designed to be either symmetric (one secret key to encrypt and decrypt) or asym-
metric (one key pair, a public key to encrypt, and a secret key to decrypt). For clarity,
we will focus our descriptions on the asymmetric HE schemes in this dissertation.
We provide a detailed review of common HE schemes and techniques in Chapter 2.
Moreover, designing a secure protocol for applications utilizing HE techniques can
be based on different system models, and the design requirements may need different
security assumptions. We discuss them in the following sections.
1.2 System Models
The ability to compute while encrypted allows sensitive data to be outsourced for
computations without revealing the private data. When designing protocols for secure
applications, we consider who owns the data and who is performing the computation.
The protocol can be designed based on different system models, as illustrated in
Fig. 1.1. The simplest system model for secure outsourced computation is in a two-
party setting, as depicted in Fig. 1.1a, where Alice (the client) has an input message x
and wants Bob (the evaluator) to compute a function f , which may be a function or a








































Figure 1.1: System models for secure computation
trained machine learning model owned by Bob, on the input without having access to
it. Bob may also contribute by providing a private input y. Alice encrypts her input
as [x] under her public key, where [·] denotes homomorphic encryption of a message,
and sends it to Bob. Then, Bob homomorphically evaluates the function and returns
[f(x, y)] to Alice, who decrypts it using her private key. In this system model, user
data privacy is protected against a passive adversary by encryption as long as the
function f does not leak information about Bob’s input y. For instance, if f(x, y) is
summing the two inputs, then Alice may learn y by simply subtracting her input from
the result. In this case, HE primitives do not prevent leakage.
The two-party setting can be extended to a more general setting, secure out-
sourced computation among multiple parties. As illustrated in Fig. 1.1b, multiple
parties may want to perform a joint computation on their encrypted data without
revealing sensitive data to each other. This computation model is often based on in-
teractive secure MPC protocols, which are characterized by the high communication
overhead and require non-colluding parties to participate during the computation.
This dissertation is interested in the emerging outsourcing system model that sup-
ports non-interactive computations and suits the cloud computing paradigm we have
today. In computation outsourcing to the cloud paradigm, data owners delegate com-
putations on their outsourced data to a private or public cloud, as shown in Fig. 1.1c.
Similar to the previous system models, data owners do not want to reveal their data to
others. Additionally, they do not want to reveal their data to the cloud evaluator. This
additional security requirement dramatically increases the complexity of designing
practical homomorphic algorithms. Our research focuses on this outsourcing system
model in Fig. 1.1c because of its opportunity and challenge. We also study the de-
sign and security requirements for this system model to obtain secure yet practical
protocols.
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1.3 Security Considerations
To design a secure protocol, we need to determine possible threats and attacks that
may target a system. Adversaries who launch attacks often aim to compromise secu-
rity requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. It is essential to
understand these threats and attacks and their impacts on security during threat mod-
eling. Often active adversaries can launch arbitrary attacks that deviates from the
protocol, and it is difficult to protect against every threat. Moreover, some counter-
measures may be computationally-intensive and affect the practicality of the protocol.
Hence, we make security assumptions as a trade-off for efficiency in our designs. For
example, we assume system users are semi-honest, i.e., they strictly follow the proto-
col specifications but may passively collect transmitted inputs and try to infer useful
information about users’ data.
We focus on designing protocols in the semi-honest model, where adversaries
are passive. This model is often used at first then extended to a malicious model with
active adversaries. In selected cases, we will discuss active attacks from users, such
as probing and colluding. Moreover, we will elaborate more on potential attackers’
goals and capabilities for each proposed protocol throughout this dissertation.
The outsourcing system model we discuss in Fig. 1.1c involve multiple parties
who are offloading their private encrypted data to the cloud evaluator. It is important
to consider the security of these data and under which cryptographic key they are
encrypted. We analyse potential threats related to using single and multiple crypto-
graphic keys and how those keys are generated, distributed, and revoked. Although
key management is outside the scope of this thesis, we emphasize that it is vital to
carefully manage keys throughout their life cycles because poor key management
can easily defeat the purpose of using cryptography [69]. For example, in key gen-
eration, we must appropriately choose the cryptographic parameters, such as key bit-
length, based on a sufficient security parameter to protect against known attacks such
as brute-force attacks. Also, the keys should be properly revoked when expired or
changed across the system. Therefore, careful design of the security model is critical
to achieving a secure yet practical protocol for the given system model.
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1.4 Research Questions and Outcomes
Our research focuses on supporting outsourced computations (Fig. 1.1c) on cipher-
texts in the Cloud. Rather than developing a protocol for each application from
scratch, we aim to develop cryptographic protocols to support common building
blocks so they can be used as needed in developing various secure applications. We
formulate our first research question as follows.
RQ1: How to construct practical cryptographic protocols to support outsourced
computations on encrypted data in the Cloud?
As mentioned, any function that can be broken into addition and multiplication
is possible to be evaluated on encrypted data homomorphically without requiring de-
cryption. Logic gates, such as AND, OR, XOR, and NOT, can be translated into arith-
metic forms; for example, XOR(x, y) = x + y − 2xy if x, y ∈ Z and x, y ∈ {0, 1},
or simply XOR(x, y) = x + y if x, y ∈ Z2. These operations can be combined
to build advanced circuits and algorithms, such as testing equality and comparison.
For instance, we can check the equality of two numbers x, y ∈ Z by performing
EQ(x, y) =
∏
XNOR(xi, yi) where xi, yi are encrypted bits of the input numbers and
XNOR(xi, yi) = NOT(XOR(xi, yi)), or simply EQ(x, y) = x + y + 1 if x, y ∈ Z2.
These algorithms serve as fundamental building blocks for different computations
in data processing; e.g., testing equality is an essential primitive for pattern match-
ing algorithms, which are used in different applications such as spam filtering and
biometric authentication [96, 152].
Designing homomorphic algorithms for these building blocks provides a toolbox
for developers to utilize in different secure applications. We constructed algorithms
to perform equality, comparison, and counting on homomorphically encrypted data.
For demonstration, we present two different example applications that leverage our
proposed algorithms as building blocks.
The first application targets data analytics on encrypted data. In particular, we
construct a secure geospatial query application, with details presented in Chapter 3,
that has a prefix matching algorithm at its core to process queries on collected en-
crypted locations according to user-defined privacy preferences. A user defines in the
preferences different levels of privacy for his friend list that control the granularity
of their locations based on whom to share with. Both the precise locations and pri-
vacy preferences are encrypted, hence they are protected against passive adversary.
We observe that our matching algorithm can be used in other applications such as
secure genome sequencing or privacy-preserving spam filtering. Initial results of this
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work [90] has been published in the 10th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy
in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2017). An improved algorithm has been
proposed in our recent manuscript “Universal Location Referencing and Homomor-
phic Evaluation of Geospatial Query” [7], which is accepted for publication in the
Elsevier Journal on Computers & Security.
The second application is more focused on outsourced machine learning (ML) on
encrypted data. Specifically, we leverage our proposed secure comparison and count-
ing protocols to support private evaluation of random forests, which allows multiple
model owners to delegate to the Cloud the evaluation of the random forests, resulted
in a joint evaluation of individual models. Existing works [24,154,166] on this topic
follow a two-party model where the evaluator/cloud owns, or has access to, the ML
model and the client provides encrypted inputs to start the evaluation. Moreover,
some functions used in secure model evaluation (e.g., comparison) are interactive
and require both parties to participate in the computation. This dependency on clients
represses the full benefit of outsourced system model, where clients only need to sub-
mit their input and receive the final encrypted result. Hence, our goal is to enable ML
model owner(s) to delegate their encrypted trained model(s) to a semi-honest cloud
evaluator, who evaluates the model on clients’ encrypted inputs in a blindfolded and
non-interactive manner. Our targeted outsourced system model can be generalized
to other ML techniques. We discuss the details of this protocol in Chapter 4. This
work [9] has been published in the IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing (TDSC 2019). We also investigate the construction of effective activation
functions for homomorphic evaluation of deep neural networks and recently pub-
lished our findings [121] in the IEEE ACCESS 2020.
Our research efforts in [90] and [9] provided an answer to RQ1. However, our
results introduced two compelling research problems. The first problem regards the
privacy of encrypted data from different owners, and the second problem regards
pushing the limits to provide support for encrypted data processing and machine
learning at scale.
In the first problem, multiple parties who delegate their sensitive data or models
to the Cloud want to ensure that the Cloud does not learn anything from the encrypted
data. Similarly, data owners do not wish to reveal their data to others. Encrypting
these data using a single key means all participants have to share the same key; that is,
they can see each other’s private data. To achieve stronger security, we should encrypt
private data from different individuals under their own keys. This security model
allows a group of users to contribute their encrypted data to a cloud evaluator for
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joint computations without giving away their data privacy. In this research problem,
we want to answer the following research question.
RQ2: How to efficiently support secure outsourced computations in which data are
encrypted using different keys of the corresponding owners?
To tackle this problem, we conducted a comprehensive survey on the state-of-
the-art cryptographic techniques and schemes that support computation with different
keys [8], and it is currently under revision for ACM Computing Surveys. Generally
speaking, they can be roughly divided into two categories, single-key and multi-key
approaches. Single-key approaches offer additional functionalities such as switching
to a different key or access control. Proxy re-encryption (PRE) enables transfor-
mation of a ciphertext from the encryption of one key to another without exposing
the plaintext. Identity-based encryption (IBE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE)
schemes provide access control mechanisms where data can be decrypted by autho-
rized keys generated based on the user’s identity or attributes. Yet, computations must
be performed under the same key, and decryption is done with one secret key. Al-
ternatively, multi-key techniques extend HE schemes to support homomorphic eval-
uation with data encrypted by multiple keys, but they can be tricky and inefficient.
Threshold HE (ThHE) produces a joint key from participants’ keys based on the
key additive homomorphism before any computation. Data will be encrypted and
evaluated under this joint key. Multi-key HE (MKHE) supports homomorphic com-
putations on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys without a joint key setup. Ci-
phertexts can be extended “on-the-fly” to a concatenation of participants’ keys. The
size, more specifically dimension, of an extended ciphertext increases with respect to
the number of involved keys. The most efficient construction of MKHE increases the
ciphertext size linearly. In both ThHE and MKHE, users must cooperate to decrypt
the evaluated ciphertext.
We observe that the ThHE technique may not be practical for our proposed secure
outsourced ML protocol (the second application). Suppose we haveN model owners
and P clients. For every client, we need to generate a joint key for this client and
the group of N model owners; that is, we will need to produce and maintain P joint
keys. This requirement also means that each model owner has to provide P copies
of the model, each encrypted under one of the P joint keys, to the Cloud. On the
other hand, the MKHE solution will require each ciphertext to be extended to N + 1
different keys (i.e., the model owners keys plus the key of the requesting client) before
any computation. The efficiency of the system is affected, especially if the number
of model owners is large because it proportionally increases the ciphertext size. To
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address this issue, we propose a hybrid approach that combines the advantages of
both ThHE and MKHE to reduce computation complexity and ciphertext size. We
present this hybrid approach in chapter 5. Results from this research work [5] have
been published at the International Workshop on Privacy Engineering, co-located
with the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019, and presented at the poster
session [6] of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019.
In the other research problem, we seek more practical use-cases where HE can
be leveraged. Many data analysis tasks are now outsourced to the Cloud because of
the unmatched economic efficiency and ubiquitous accessibility [109, 144]. Cloud
computing is becoming indispensable for performing big data analysis and building
machine learning pipelines at scale through massive parallelization of tasks across
large clusters of computing nodes. In data centers, the large number of computing
resources and tasks are managed by distributed data processing frameworks, such as
Apache Hadoop, Apache Spark [173], and Apache Flink [33]. These frameworks
offer data and programming abstractions that ease the development of data analytics
algorithms and provide cluster management and scheduling algorithms that facilitate
efficient resource orchestration and task allocation.
While efficiency in big data processing is achieved, outsourcing computation on
private data to the Cloud often leads to privacy concerns when the data is sensitive.
This issue leads to defining our third research question as follows.
RQ3: Can we extend HE support to existing data processing frameworks to enable
large-scale distributed data processing and machine learning on encrypted data?
We propose a new secure data processing framework, SparkFHE. At its core,
SparkFHE integrates HE into Apache Spark to achieve two goals: (1) leveraging the
capabilities of HE to enable Spark to perform computation on encrypted data with-
out decryption, and (2) mapping homomorphic algorithms to the distributed dataflow
model [3] to accelerate and scale-up homomorphic computation through paralleliza-
tion across large clusters of computing nodes. To our best knowledge, these have not
been done previously. Also, our proposed designs are not limited to Spark but can be
applied to other distributed dataflow frameworks, such as Apache Flink. We provide
details on this proposed framework in Chapter 6.
Results from this work [89] has been accepted at the Privacy Preserving Machine
Learning (PPML’20) Workshop, co-located with Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems (NeurIPS’20).
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1.5 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
information on HE and its techniques and schemes. We address RQ1 and propose
cryptographic protocols for common building blocks and two example applications in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. We discuss our proposed solution for RQ2 on supporting
homomorphic computations with different keys in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 addresses
RQ3 and discusses our proposed SparkFHE framework, which supports large-scale
data processing on encrypted data. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the dissertation
research and discusses future work.
Chapter 2
Background
Recently, lattice-based cryptographic schemes are gaining positive attention in cryp-
tography research for their simplicity, low computation costs, and most importantly,
for their compelling security proofs [112]. They are based on the hardness of prob-
lems like shortest integer solution (SIS) [2] and learning with errors (LWE) [136],
which can be reduced to well-studied lattice problems such as shortest vector prob-
lem (SVP) and closest vector problem (CVP). In this chapter, we provide background
on lattice-based HE schemes and the general homomorphic primitives and techniques
used in them.
2.1 Lattices and Basis
A lattice is a mathematical structure formed of a set of points and corresponds to the
vector space generated by all linear combinations on a set of linearly independent
vectors, called basis [111,136]. For example, the Euclidean space of all integers Z is
a lattice where each point is generated as a result of linear operations (i.e., addition,
subtraction, and multiplication by integer coefficients) on the unit vectors.
Formally, an n-dimensional lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn that
is generated by a set of bases B = {b1, b2, . . . , bk}, which are a set of linearly
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(b) Another basis of Z2
Figure 2.1: Examples of different lattice bases
The rank of a lattice is denoted by k, and its dimension is denoted by n. A
lattice is called a full-rank lattice when k = n. We focus on full-rank lattices, but
the discussion can be easily extended to other general dimensions [116]. A lattice
does not have a unique basis but has infinite number of different bases. Figure 2.1
illustrates two different bases are given for the same 2-dimensional Euclidean space.
The lattice points are illustrated in black, and the basis vectors are highlighted in blue.
In Fig. 2.1a, the two orthogonal bases are considered “good” as they are short and
can easily generate the rest of the points on the lattice. However in Fig. 2.1b, the two
bases are narrower and it becomes tricky to use them as generator of all the points.
Without knowing the structure of the the lattice, problems like finding a short
vector in the lattice can become hard. In fact, lattices provide computationally hard
problems with worst-case security guarantee1, which is extremely useful in cryptog-
raphy as security proofs for cryptographic constructions [129]. Examples of these
problems include the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Closest Vector Problem
(CVP). Figure 2.2 illustrates these two problems in a n-dimensional lattice, where
n = 2. In brief, the SVP states that given a set of bases B (or points) in a lattice
L, find the shortest nonzero vector (highlighted in red in Fig. 2.2a) in that lattice.
As mentioned, a short vector is significant because it can be used as a generator for
all points in that lattice. Well-known algorithms for lattice basis reduction, such as
the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) algorithm [102], have a complexity that is expo-
nential with the lattice dimension [112, 136]. Hence, the problem becomes NP-hard
when the dimension is appropriately large. Moreover, the SVP can become more
complex if the given bases (points) were shifted of the lattice by adding small noise.
In this case, the problem becomes CVP, or finding the closest lattice vector (in red in
Fig. 2.2b) to the shifted one (in green). Solving the CVP means we can also solve
another cryptographic problem called Learning With Errors (LWE), which we define
in the next section.
1In a nutshell, if one can solve any instance then one can solve the hardest instance of the problem.










(b) Closest vector problem
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the two lattice problems, SVP and CVP
2.2 The Learning with Errors Problem (LWE)
Many HE schemes base their security on the LWE problem. We present the formal
definition of the problem and its ring variation as follows.
Definition 2.2.1 (Learning with Errors (LWE) [136]). For a security parameter λ, let
n = n(λ) be a dimension, q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer, and χ = χ(λ) be a distribu-
tion over Z. Sample a vector ai←Znq , s←Znq , and ei←χ. The LWE problem is to
distinguish the pair (ai, bi = 〈ai, s〉+ ei) ∈ Zn+1q from a uniformly sampled (ai, b′i)
from Zn+1q . The LWE assumption is that LWE problem is computationally infeasible.
This is the decisional version of the LWE problem, which aims to distinguish a
vector b that is a result of linear combination of two vectors a and s with error e
from a uniformly sampled vector b′ from the same integer space Znq . In contrast, the
search version aims to find the small vector s based on the given vector b. Solving
this problem is equivalent to solving the CVP and SVP in lattices because we need to
find the vector 〈a, s〉 (without the error) that is closest to b given a without knowing
s. Since solving the lattice problems is infeasible for a large dimension, the LWE
problem is also infeasible.
The LWE problem operates in the n-dimensional integer space Znq and consists of
vectors and matrices where elements are integer modulo q. To achieve more efficient
computations, the problem can be extended to rings of polynomials with integer co-
efficient. This extension is called the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem. The
aim is to significantly reduce the dimension, such that n = 1, and correspondingly
the size of keys and ciphertexts.
Definition 2.2.2 (Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) [108]). For a security param-
eter λ, let Φ(x) = xd + 1 be a cyclotomic polynomial where d = d(λ) is a power of
2, and q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer. Define the ring R over polynomials with integer








Figure 2.3: Example of homomorphic evaluation
coefficients R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)). Let χ = χ(λ) be a discrete Gaussian distribution
over R and bounded by B = B(λ) such that B  q. Let a and s be uniformly
sampled elements from Rq, and let e←χ be a sampled error term. The RLWE prob-
lem is to distinguish the pair of (ai, bi = ais + e) from any uniformly sampled pair
(ai, b
′
i)←R2q . The RLWE assumption is that the RLWE problem is computationally
infeasible.
An amortized version of the RLWE problem [11, 108] shows that it is equivalent
to sampling s from a small distribution χ instead of the ringRq. This yields a smaller
secret key in an RLWE-based cryptosystem, e.g., BGV SWHE scheme [27]
2.3 Homomorphic Encryption Primitives and Techniques
Homomorphic encryption (HE) refers to a family of encryption schemes that support
specific computations directly on encrypted data, typically addition and multiplica-
tion. Given a pair of asymmetric encryption keys (pk, sk) and two messages m and
m′, these two properties holds: Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m) ⊕ Enc(pk,m′)) = m + m′ and
Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m) ⊗ Enc(pk,m′)) = m · m′, where ⊕ and ⊗ represent homo-
morphic addition and multiplication respectively. For most homomorphic encryption
schemes ⊕ tends to be a relatively simple operation, whereas ⊗ tends to be signifi-
cantly more complicated, often involving multi-precision arithmetic of large polyno-
mials. Figure 2.3 shows an illustration of homomorphism.
Generally, an HE scheme is defined as a tuple of Probabilistic Polynomial-Time
(PPT) algorithms, such that HE = (KeyGen,Enc,Eval,Dec).
- HE.KeyGen(p) → (pk, sk): The key generation algorithm takes as input public
parameters p and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
- HE.Enc(pk,m) → c: The encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext m ∈ Rt
and a public key pk and outputs the ciphertext c.
- HE.Eval(f, c, c′) → ĉ: The deterministic evaluation algorithm takes as input a
function (or circuit) f and two ciphertexts and outputs a new ciphertext ĉ.
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- HE.Dec(sk, c) → m: The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext c and a
secret key sk and outputs a plaintext m ∈ Rt.
Note, the HE.Eval algorithm homomorphically performs a defined function f on the
ciphertexts. This function is constructed using HE.Add and HE.Mult which are ho-
momorphic addition and multiplication respectively.
The HE schemes must provide correctness, where the evaluated ciphertext c̄ de-
crypts to f(m,m′) with an overwhelming probability. It must also provide semantic
security, or ciphertext indistinguishability, where no information about the plaintext
message can be learned from its ciphertext. In many HE schemes, semantic security
is achieved through the use of randomness in the encryption algorithm.
2.3.1 Key Switching
In many of the (R)LWE-based HE schemes, the initial output of homomorphically
multiplying two ciphertexts is a longer ciphertext encrypted under a new secret key
element s2. For instance, observe in the BGV scheme [27] presented in Sec. 2.4.1,
the product beween two ciphertexts c, c′ is
c̃mult = c · c′ = (c0, c1) · (c′0, c′1)
= (c0 · c′0, c0 · c′1 + c′0 · c1, c1 · c′1)
= (c̃0, c̃1, c̃2) ∈ R3q
The additional component c̃2 corresponds to the quadratic element s2 resulted
from the multiplication (c0 + c1 · s)(c′0 + c′1 · s) = c̃0 + c̃1 · s + c̃2 · s2.This new
ciphertext c̃mult is not decryptable by the secret key s. Therefore, HE schemes em-
ploy key switching [27] as a transformation technique to reduce the dimension after
each homomorphic multiplication. This transformation is accomplished with the aid
of auxiliary information provided as evaluation key ek which encrypts s2 under s.
The following gadget toolkit is needed to perform key switching:
- Gadget vector: g = (g0, . . . , g`−1) ∈ R`
- Decomp(x): Given an element x ∈ Rq, decompose it into a short vector u =
(u0, . . . , u`−1) ∈ R` such that 〈u, g〉 = x (mod q).
For example, (1, 2, . . . , 2dlog qe−1) is a gadget vector corresponding to the bit decom-
position BitDecomp : x =
∑
0≤i<dlog qe 2
iui 7→ (ui)0≤i<dlog qe. The decomposition
function is (informally) denoted by Decomp = g−1 to remark that 〈g−1(x), g〉 = x
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(mod q) for all x. The function PowersOf2(x) uses the above gadget vector to output
a vector of powers of 2 as (x, 2x, . . . , 2dlog qe−1x).
As discussed above, key switching is a commonly used building block of LWE-
based HE schemes (e.g. BGV scheme) which reduces the dimension of a long ci-
phertext after homomorphic multiplication. Here, we review how to generate an
evaluation key ek and perform the key switching operation on a three-dimensional
ciphertext c̃ encrypted under (1, s, s2).
- EvalKeyGen(s1, s2): In key switching, the evaluation key used is simply an en-
cryption of s1 under the new key s2. In our case, we assume that s1 = s2
and s2 = s. The evaluation key is generated as a set of homomorphism keys
ek = {h0, . . . , hd−1} generated during the scheme setup. Each key hi encrypts
s1 · gi under s2. For example, in the BGV scheme, hi = (bi, ai) is generated by
ai←Rq, ei←χ, bi = −ai · s2 + t · ei + gi · s1 (mod q).
- KeySwitch(ek, c̃): Given an evaluated ciphertext c̃ = (c̃0, c̃1, c̃2) encrypted un-
der the secret element s2, and the evaluation key ek = {h0, . . . , hd−1}, compute
Decomp(c̃2) = (u0, . . . , ud−1). Then, return the ciphertext (c0, c1) = (c̃0, c̃1) +∑
0≤i<d ui · hi (mod q).
This technique can be generalized and used for other purposes beside dimension
reduction. For example, it can be employed in proxy re-encryption to transform a
ciphertext from one encrypting a message m under one key s1 to one encrypting
the same message m under a different key s2. It can also be used to facilitate the
bootstrapping step [31, 76], which accomplishes fully HE scheme from a leveled
SWHE scheme.
2.3.2 Bootstrapping
Following the blueprint proposed by Gentry [76], one can construct a fully HE scheme
from a somewhat HE scheme. Mainly, when a ciphertext reaches the maximum de-
fined level, a bootstrapping technique is applied which recrypts the ciphertext by
homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit and outputting a fresh ciphertext
with minimum noise. Given a ciphertext at the maximum level c and the corre-
sponding secret key sk = s, encrypt them both under the same key pk and ob-
tain a fresh ciphertext by performing č = Bootstrap(Enc(pk, c),Enc(pk, sk)) =
Enc(pk,Dec(sk, c)). Generally, this function has to be of a limited depth to be per-
formed with the somewhat HE scheme. This mean the degree of the decryption
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polynomial must be low for the ciphertext to be bootstrapable [76]. Integer-based
schemes, such as Gentry’s scheme [76], require a squashing technique which addi-
tionally makes a sparse subset-sum assumption to decrease the degree of the decryp-
tion polynomial. Recent LWE-based HE schemes, such as the BV scheme [29], uses
relinearization to reduce the ciphertext dimension after each multiplication. As a
result, the decryption polynomial has a low degree and does not need squashing.
More technically, the two main algorithms from key switching BitDecomp(·, q)
and PowersOf2(·, q) can be used to obtain the bootstrapped ciphertext. Let the binary
decomposition of the secret key s be BitDecomp(s, q) = (u0, u1, . . . , ublog qc). Com-
pute the powers of base two for the ciphertext element c0 such that PowersOf2(c0, q) =
(20c0, 2
1c0, . . . , 2
blog qcc0). The decryption algorithm is then homomorphically eval-
uated under the encryption of the key pk such that c1−
∑blog qc
i=0 ui2
ic0 = c1− c0s =
m mod q (mod t). This technique can be repeatedly applied to support arbitrary
number of homomorphic computations, but it is computationally intensive. How-
ever, recent works in the literature show that bootstrapping can be done in less than 1
second [62] and can be made even faster to less than 0.1 second [44] using different
cryptographic constructions.
2.3.3 Noise Reduction Techniques
As a result of homomorphic computations, the embedded noise in ciphertexts in-
creases in magnitude. For a noise magnitude B, each homomorphic addition dou-
bles the noise as 2B, and each homomorphic multiplication squares it as B2. How-
ever, in BFV scheme (Sec. A.1) the noise growth is dominated by I1B + I2B where
Ii = ∆mi −mi is a factor introduced when we scale up the messages mi with ∆.
To ensure correct decryption of the evaluated result, the noise must not exceed the q2
range. We briefly discuss some of the noise reduction techniques used in HE schemes
and refer the readers to [26, 27, 43] for more details.
Modulus switching Modulus switching is a technique proposed by Brakerski et al.
[27] to scale down the noise after each multiplication. For a L-depth circuit (i.e.,
requires at mostLmultiplications), defineL+1 moduli {qL, qL−1, . . . , q0}. After the
i-th multiplication, we can transform a ciphertext c mod qi into the ciphertext c′ mod
qi−1, where qi−1 < qi, such that the noise scales down approximately by a factor of
qi−1
qi
. This brings the noise magnitude back to B and changes to a smaller modulus.
This is proven to increase the number of supported homomorphic multiplications
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before the need for bootstrapping.
Scale-invariant A following work of Brakerski [26] proposed the scale-invariant
technique which uses one modulus q to homomorphically evaluate L-depth circuit.
This technique completely removes the need for modulus switching, which requires
choosing L + 1 decreasing moduli. In a nutshell, a message is scaled at encryption




, where q is significantly larger than t; hence, the message is
scaled up. After each homomorphic multiplication and at decryption, the ciphertext
is scaled down by a factor of (q/t), resulting in a significant decrease in the noise
magnitude. The original technique was proposed for LWE-based schemes with t = 2,
and was later ported [68] to the RLWE assumption for efficiency.
2.3.4 Distributed Decryption
In many HE protocols based on the multi-party computation (MPC) protocol, the in-
volved parties may be required to help decrypting the final evaluation result. For ex-
ample, in threshold encryption (discussed in Chapter 5), the final result is encrypted
under the combination of all the parties’ keys; hence, each party must participate
to partially decrypt the result with their own secret key. This process becomes a
distributed decryption protocol since the decryption now is executed as an MPC pro-
tocol. Two algorithms are preformed within this protocol. First, a partial decryption
that is performed by each party who locally decrypts the result with their own secret
key and shares the output. Then, a final decryption is performed by the designated
party who aggregates the shared partial decryptions to obtain the final decrypted re-
sult.
Two main security issues have to be addressed for this decryption protocol. First,
the shared partially decrypted ciphertext may leak information on the party’s secret
key; hence, additional security measures, such as noise smudging (or noise flood-
ing), are considered to prevent this leakage. To make sure that no secret shares can
be learned, we need to add larger errors following the Smudging Lemma [12, 115],
which states that adding a large noise “smudges out” the small values in the cipher-
text. Hence, adding a large noise to the decryption component prevents leaking in-
formation about the secret share.
Lemma 2.3.1 (Smudging Noise [12]). Let B1 = B1(λ) and B2 = B2(λ) be two
positive integers and let e0 ∈ [−B1, B1] be a fixed integer. Let e1← [−B2, B2] be
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chosen uniformly at random. Then the distribution of e1 is statistically indistinguish-
able from that of e1 + e0 as long as B1/B2 = ε, where ε = ε(λ) is a negligible
function.
The second security issues is related to the final decryption algorithm, which
may leak the encrypted result. Specifically, an attacker who may acquired the shared
partial decryptions can perform the final decryption by combining the shares and
retrieve the final result.
2.4 Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Early homomorphic encryption schemes from 2009 and 2010, such as the origi-
nal scheme of [77], were extremely inefficient. By 2011, the Brakerski-Gentry-
Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [27] was demonstrating enormous performance im-
provements by building on more efficient primitives (such as RLWE) and using newly
invented techniques, such as modulus switching and key switching [29,30], and more
efficient data encoding techniques [117]. In 2012, Fan and Vercauteren proposed the
BFV scheme [68] building upon Brakerski’s scheme [26], which introduced a tech-
nique called scale-invariance. While the above schemes are designed for encrypted
binary and modular arithmetic, the problem of efficient encrypted real number arith-
metic was addressed by the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme [43], which sup-
ports approximate real or complex number arithmetic. CKKS has been recognized as
a better HE scheme for the need of many practical applications. We present details of
the BGV and CKKS schemes in the following subsections and defer the discussions
on other HE schemes such as BFV and Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) to Appendix A.
Common notation are described in Table 2.1.
2.4.1 Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV)
Brakerski et al. [27], proposed an efficient leveled HE scheme to allow arbitrary num-
ber of additions but limited consecutive multiplications determined according to the
depth of the evaluated circuit. The BGV scheme is based on the original Braker-
ski and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme [29], which is the base of the second generation
of HE schemes that improve the efficiency after Gentry’s breakthrough [76]. The
BV scheme was the first scheme basing its security solely on the hardness of stan-
dard LWE assumption, which has proven to be as hard as solving the shortest vector
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Table 2.1: Notation used throughout the dissertation
Category Notation Description
General
a A vector of n elements where ai = a[i] is the i-th element.
B A matrix of elements where bi,j is the j-th element of the i-th row.
|a| The l1-norm of vector, |a| =
∑n
i=0 ai.
〈a, b〉 The dot-product of the two vectors a, b as 〈a, b〉 =
∑n
i=1(aibi).
N Total number of users in the system.
(R)LWE-specific
Φ(x) A cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xd + 1, where d is a power of 2.
R A ring over polynomials with integer coefficients R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)).
Rt The ring of polynomials with coefficients in Zt, where t is plaintext modulus.
Rq The ring of polynomials with coefficients in Zq, where q is ciphertext modulus.
χ The noise distribution over R or Z with small standard deviation.
HE Scheme-specific
` The bit length, ` = 0, . . . , dlog qe.
pp HE scheme’s public parameters including security parameter λ and circuit depth L.
pki HE public key of the i-th user.
ski HE secret key of the i-th user.
eki HE evaluation key of the i-th user.
[m]i HE encryption of a message m under pki. Also denoted as c.
problem in lattices [107]. With this reduction, the scheme removes the need for
making additional strong assumptions, such as the secret subset sum assumption,
and avoids the squashing technique in bootstrapping. The main construction starts
with a SHWE scheme of depth L, which also considers the depth of its own decryp-
tion circuit, then converts to a fully HE scheme through bootstrapping. The original
LWE-based BV scheme encrypts a message bit m ∈ {0, 1} with the secret s ∈ Znq as
c = (〈a, s〉)+m+2e,a) ∈ Zn+1q , where a ∈ Znq is a random vector and e is a small
even noise. Essentially, we observe the pattern of masking the message with a large
element and some noise to hold the LWE assumption. To decrypt, we use the secret
s and the provided vector a in the ciphertext to compute 〈a, s〉, which effectively
removes the mask and obtains m + 2e. The message is then retrieved by removing
the even noise by computingm+2e (mod 2). In subsequent BV variants, such as the
BGV scheme [27], the message can be an integer in Zt, where t is a chosen plaintext
modulus that is significantly smaller than q. The noise is scaled at-most by t.
The BGV scheme can be instantiated based on LWE or its ring variant RLWE,
which operates on a ring or polynomials and is proven to be more efficient. It also
applies optimizations such as the Smart-Vercauteren [147] batching technique, which
packs multiple plaintext messages into one ciphertext so that computations can be
performed in a Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) manner. We summarize the
ring variant of the BGV scheme as following.
- BGV.KeyGen(pp): Given the scheme’s public parameters pp = (λ, d, q, t), sample
a small element s←χ and a small noise e←χ, where χ is a Gaussian distributions
over Rq. Also uniformly sample a←Rq. Set the secret key as sk = s and the
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public key as pk = (as+ te,−a) ∈ R2q .
- BGV.Enc(pk,m): Given a plaintext message m ∈ Rt, a public key pk = (as +
te,−a), uniformly sample a random r←Rt and encrypt the message m as c =
(c0, c1) ∈ R2q , where c0 = r(as+ te) +m and c1 = −ra. For clarity, we omit the
r associated with the noise rte and write c0 = ras+ te+m.
- BGV.Dec(sk, c): Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q and the secret key sk = s,
set s = (1, s) ∈ R2q and decrypt by computing 〈c, s〉 = c0 + c1s. The decryption
of a ciphertext in the BGV scheme is correct if and only if (m̃ mod t = m).
- BGV.Add(c, c′): Adding two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1) = (ras + te + m,−ra),
c′ = (c′0, c
′
1) = (r
′as+te+m′,−r′a) results in cadd = ((c0+c′0), (c1+c′1)) ∈ R2q
where, (c0 + c′0) = (r+ r
′)as+ t(e+ e) + (m+m′) and (c1 + c′1) = −(r+ r′)a.
Decryption is still correct because−(r+r′)a can be canceled when using the secret
key sk.
- BGV.Mult(c, c′): Given two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q , their homomorphic multiplica-
tion yields first an extended ciphertext c̃mult = (ĉ0, ĉ1, ĉ2) that is encrypted under
the element s2. A special evaluation key must be provided as with ek = (b̂, â) =
(bi = ais+ tei+PowersOf2(s
2, q), ai←Rq) to perform relinearization (using key
switching) as following.
- Apply Bit Decomposition on ĉ2 as described in Sec. 2.3.1.
- Compute u = 〈ĉ2, â〉 and v = 〈ĉ2, b̂〉.
- Output the new relinearized ciphertext as cmult = (ĉ0 + v, ĉ1 + u) ∈ R2q .
Additive homomorphism is straightforward in BV-type schemes, but multiplica-
tive homomorphism is more complicated. Multiplying two ciphertexts c, c′ results
in a higher dimensional ciphertext that is now encrypted under s2 rather than s.
Additionally, the noise within the ciphertext grows significantly (i.e., e2). With-
out control, the noise can grow exponentially with respect to the number of multi-
plications. Hence, two new techniques were proposed, namely relinearization and
modulus switching, to address these two issues. We briefly explain here how relin-
earization works and defer the modulus switching to the next subsection. The core
technique used in relinearization is key switching (described in Sec. 2.3.1), which
will transform the encryption from s2 back into s without decryption. Given the





0c1), and ĉ2 = c1c
′
1. The latter contains the product mm
′ encrypted un-
der s2. Hence, we need an evaluation key ek = (b̂, â), where â = {ai}←Rq,
b̂ = {ais+ tei + PowersOf2(s2, q)}, and i ∈ {0, . . . , dlogt qe}. The evaluation key
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encrypts information about s2 encrypted under s. For stronger security, the secret
s2 should be encrypted under a different secret s′ to avoid making the circular secu-
rity assumption, which states that the security of the secret key is ensured under the
protection of its own public key. The transformation of the ciphertext is done by com-
puting the new relinearized ciphertext as following: (1) apply the Bit Decomposition
algorithm on the element ĉ2 to output the vector ĉ2 = BitDecomp(ĉ2, q); (2) com-
pute the two dot products u = 〈ĉ2, â〉 and v = 〈ĉ2, b̂〉; (3) finally, add the results u, v
to the first two elements and output the new ciphertext as cmult = (ĉ0 + v, ĉ1 + u).
This is essentially a way of homomorphically computing the decryption 〈ĉ2, s2〉 with
secret s2 and embedding it in the ciphertext result, so it becomes decryptable with s.
2.4.2 Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS)
Previous HE schemes support linear transformations on encrypted integers or bits.
However, many machine learning algorithms, such as logistic regression and neu-
ral networks, may operate on real numbers (e.g., 123.45). In integer-based HE
schemes, these values may be processed and scaled to integers prior to encryption
(e.g., 12345 × 10−2). However during computations, rescaling was not applied to
adjust the precision of the underlying message. To ensure correctness of computa-
tions, the scheme’s modulus parameter q must be chosen large with respect to the
circuit depth. Moreover, the noise is often scaled by a factor of t, the message space
modulus, which impacts the most significant bits (MSBs) of the message during ho-
momorphic evaluations.
Cheon et al. [43] proposed a HE scheme that supports fixed-point arithmetic over
encrypted data. The scheme basis its security on the LWE problem and is constructed
based on the BGV scheme. The main intuition of the scheme is treating the noise
embedded at encryption as a part of the approximation error that occur in approximate
computations. We present the RLWE-based CKKS scheme below. We can see the
similarity between homomorphic algorithms, such as key generation, in CKKS and
the rest of BV-type schemes.
- CKKS.KeyGen(1λ, 1L): Given a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, sample
a small element s←χ and a small noise e←χ, where χ is a Gaussian distribution
overRq. Uniformly sample a←Rq. Output the secret key as sk = s and the public
key as pk = (as+ e,−a) ∈ R2q .
- CKKS.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk and a plaintext message m, uniformly
sample a random r←Rt and noise elements e1, e2 ∈ χ. Encrypt the message m
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as c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q where c0 = r(as+ e) + e1 +m and c1 = −ra+ e2.
- CKKS.Dec(sk, c): Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q and the secret key sk = s,
set s = (1, s) and decrypt by computing 〈c, s〉 = c0 + c1s ≈ m ∈ Rt.
- CKKS.Add(c, c′): For two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1) = (r(as+e)+e1+m,−ra+e2)
and c′ = (c′0, c
′
1) = (r
′(as+ e) + e′1 +m
′,−r′a+ e′2), the homomorphic addition
results in cadd = ((c0 + c′0), (c1 + c
′
1)) ∈ R2q where, (c0 + c′0) = (r + r′)(as +
e) + (e1 + e
′
1) + (m+m
′) and (c1 + c′1) = −(r + r′)a+ (e2 + e′2).
- CKKS.Mult(c, c′): For two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q , their initial homomorphic mul-
tiplication yields an long ciphertext c̃mult = (c0, c1, c2) ∈ R3q encrypted under the
secret s2. The ciphertext can be decryption as mm′ ≈ (c0 + c1s + c2s2). With
a provided evaluation key ek containing encryption of s2, the key switching tech-
nique can be used to transform c̃mult into a normal ciphertext cmult ∈ R2q that is
decryptable under s.
- CKKS.Rescale(c): For an evaluated ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q , compute c′i =⌊
∆−1ci
⌉
for i ∈ {0, 1} and a scaling factor ∆ and return the re-scaled ciphertext
c′ = (c′0, c
′
1) ∈ R2q
The CKKS scheme proposed special message encoding and decoding methods
to prepare messages for encryption. The encoding method applies a canonical em-
bedding map, which maps a vector of complex or real messages into a plaintext
polynomial in R. Encoding enables packing up to d/2 messages (z1, z2, . . . , zd/2)
in one plaintext polynomial, where d is the degree of the cyclotomic polynomial
Φ(x) = xd + 1, to enable efficient computations in SIMD manner. If the number
of messages is less than d/2, we append zeros. The other half of the total d will be
filled with conjugates during the canonical embedding. Each encoded message zi is
also scaled by a large factor ∆, say ∆ = 240, to obtain the significand. The output
of the encoding method is a plaintext m with d/2 scaled encoded messages. At en-
cryption, the plaintext m is masked with a randomized public key and a small noise,
such that c = r(as+ e,−a) + (e1, e2) +m is added to ensure the security. Choosing
a large enough ∆ ensures that the message significand is placed in the MSBs of the
encoded message, and the small noise are only added to the LSBs. If we decrypt the
ciphertext, we obtain the message Dec(sk, c) = m + e, where e is considered an
approximation error.
Homomorphic multiplication causes the scaling factor to square and increases
embedded noise. In order to maintain the same precision and prevents the noise to
blow up, the result must be rounded homomorphically. To do so, the scheme pro-














Figure 2.4: Illustration of ciphertext re-scaling in CKKS
posed a rescaling method to re-scale the ciphertext after each multiplication. This
method can b e viewed as similar to the rounding performed on the plaintexts in ap-
proximate computations. In particular, the ciphertext c can is multiplied by the scal-
ing factor, such that ∆−1c, which discards log ∆ least significant bits as illustrated in
Fig. 2.4. As a result, we obtain a ciphertext encrypting the message mmult/∆ with a
reduced noise emult/Delta, and the modulus is switched to q/Delta. CKKS uses a
technique similar to modulus switching to perform rescaling. For a circuit depth L,
choose a large modulus q0 and define a decreasing chain of moduli qL, qL−1, . . . , q0,
such that the modulus for a level l ∈ L is defined as ql = q0 · ∆l. A cipher-






(mod ql−1). Based on the definition of the






= 1∆ . The modulus switching technique is used for a different pur-
pose compared to its use in the BGV. While it preserves the underlying plaintext and
manages the noise growth in BGV, it is used in CKKS to remove the LSBs of the
ciphertext and maintain the precision. Because of this recurring discard of the LSBs,
we need to choose appropriate parameters for the modulus q0 and the scaling factor
∆ according to the circuit depth L to prevent precision loss.
2.4.3 Discussion
From studying these base HE schemes, we observe similarities in their design pat-
terns and their methods to reduce ciphertext dimension and to deal with noise.
In term of similarity, the most recent HE schemes are constructed based on the
LWE problem, or its ring variant, RLWE. The first unique characteristic is in the
way that some small noise is added when masking a secret. Another characteristic is
that the public key or the ciphertext contains a counter-part that can cancel the large
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masking element sampled from some mathematical space. These two characteristics
are clearly visible in the KeyGen and Enc algorithms of the presented HE schemes.
Homomorphic multiplication is highly inefficient because it often raises the cipher-
text dimension from an encryption of s to s2 (except GSW due to its construction)
and dramatically increases the embedded noise. Hence, the focus is on designing
techniques to reduce the ciphertext dimension and noise.
Chapter 3
Secure Evaluation of Geospatial
Query
In this chapter, we present our work to address RQ1 — how to construct efficient
protocols to support outsourced computations on encrypted data. As mentioned, es-
sential functions such as logic gates can be supported with HE primitives; hence they
can be used to evaluate common operations like equality checking. We explore the
capability and limitation of these primitives by constructing a privacy-preserving data
analytics application for processing geosocial queries on encrypted locations.
Geosocial applications collect and record users’ precise location data to pro-
vide location-based services (LBS). The position of a user or the user’s proximity
to nearby objects (or other users) is often used to support position and range queries.
For example, Query 1: Bob may ask, “Where is Alice?”, Query 2: Alice may ask,
“Which of my friends are nearby?”, Query 3: A social app may inquire, “how ge-
ographically close are Alice and Bob?”. Similar queries are also useful in location-
based crowdsourcing, where a user may wish to retrieve information or measurements
from contributing users within a region. To support these queries, periodic updates
of users’ GPS coordinates are usually shared with service providers.
As discussed in Sec. 1, location data is often considered sensitive information,
and tracking GPS coordinates can leak private information about users. For example,
we can learn where they live, work, shop, play, and much more from their mobility
trajectories [98]. Hence, the collected and processed location data should be pro-
tected. Conventional encryption protects precise locations when they are transmitted
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and stored but they must be decrypted before processing. Generally, users do not
mind sharing their coarse-grained location, e.g., the city or a larger geographical re-
gion, rather than their exact location such as the building or the zip code area they are
currently in [122]. Therefore, they may rely on a trusted service provider to apply
spatial cloaking [75, 124] via obfuscation, anonymization, or resolution reduction to
control the granularity of disclosed location according to the user’s privacy prefer-
ences. These preferences illustrate the relationships between users; e.g., parents can
learn precise location, but colleagues can only learn location at city level. This means
the service provider can learn both precise locations and relationships between users.
This is potentially a source of data leakage. Recent incidents, such as Facebook Cam-
bridge Analytica, also suggest that blindly trusting service providers to do the right
thing may not be in the users’ best interest. Many solutions also attempted to remove
this trusted third party, but such solutions often depend on precoded location mod-
els or specific encoding/decoding methods that are inflexible and not interoperable
across geographical areas.
We propose to use HE for secure evaluation of queries on encrypted location un-
der encrypted privacy preferences, without access to the secret key. We also propose
a map-agnostic location referencing method for users to define privacy preferences.
Figure 3.1 gives a system overview. Upon signing up for the service, each user
generates and uploads a secret key to a decryption service. A secret key is distributed
across k decryption servers via secret sharing. When user Alice adds a new friend
Bob, upon pairing between their devices, Alice adds to her location sharing profile
by specifying a location privacy preferenceMB for Bob. Users periodically share the
encrypted encoding of location Li,j with a service provider, where i denotes the user
ID and j denotes a timestamp. We adapt threshold HE for query evaluation on data
encrypted under multiple keys. While the location data is initially encrypted by indi-
vidual keys, we apply additive key homomorphism property to re-encrypt ciphertext
to one that is under a joint key involving relevant users.
We consider the service provider to be semi-honest, who passively observes and
aims to learn users’ location or their relations with other users. Even if we assume
the decryption servers are secure, encryption alone does not prevent leakage since
the query result can leak something about unmasked location inputs [91]. For exam-
ple, if Bob knows the exact distance to Alice, then he can perform triangulation and
figure out Alice’s location. Also, encryption does not prevent the leakage due to co-
location [123,163] which is discussed in the next section. To address these problems,
we propose a geo-hashing method that uses space-filling curves to achieve spatial
























Figure 3.1: Secure geospatial query system overview
cloaking with our optimized homomorphic algorithms. Using these techniques, our
proposed system can defend some malicious activities from users (e.g., triangulation
and co-location attacks, and collusion among users).
Our main contributions are the followings. First, we propose using a space-filling
curve to reduce the dimensionality of GPS coordinates. This not only makes query
evaluations as straightforward as string-manipulation operations, but also preserves
the notion of “closeness” between points. We systematically analyze the effective-
ness of different space-filling curves for geo-hashing location data. Furthermore, we
extend our system to geo-hash coordinate points from 3D space. This is the first ap-
plication of cryptographic processing over spatial cloaking for location referencing in
a 3D space, at the time of our research. Second, we design homomorphic algorithms
to support the three position and range queries we introduced at the beginning. We
further consider reducing the transmission cost of encrypted location data and sup-
porting computations over ciphertexts encrypted by different key pairs. Third, we
optimize and parallelize our homomorphic algorithms, achieving a speedup factor of
7 compared to the sequential version.
3.1 Geo-hashing Using Space-Filling Curves
Space-filling curves [74] reduce the dimensionality of coordinates while preserving
the position of points. In most cases, the closeness of two close points is preserved
after transformation. Because of this property, many map applications use space-
filling curves to index satellite images for efficient retrieval, e.g., Microsoft Bing
Map [142].
We analyze various space-filling curves, including Z-order, Hilbert, Column Ma-
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(b) Adjacent points may apart af-
ter transformation
Figure 3.2: Illustrations of space-filling curves.
jor, and Row Major for location referencing. We call this technique geo-hashing. As
illustrated in Fig. 3.2, these curves transform a point in the two- or three-dimensional
space into a point on a line that goes through all sub-spaces or all points of a cube.
This is done by encoding each sub-space using a number. Hence, the transforma-
tion converts a coordinate into a vector of concatenated values. Usually, space-filling
curves label each space with an incremental number, except for Z-order curve which
repeats between 0-3 in 2D (or 0-7 in 3D). Each number matches a specific level of
detail at which there is a box (or a cube) that includes points within the geographical
(or geospatial) region. This dimension reduction technique also allow more efficient
storage of location data and more efficient computation of geospatial queries.
For clarity, we consider mostly the two-dimensional cases and ignore altitude
in the rest of our discussions unless specified explicitly. In initial experiments, we
found that the locality preserving property works in most cases, but in some cases
they do not. As highlighted in the 1st order 2D space of all commonly used curves
in Fig. 3.2a, two points laying in the adjacent quadrants remain close to each other
after transformation (even though their indexes are different), except for the Hilbert
curve with a distance of 2. This problem becomes worse as we increase the order
(or level of detail), as shown in Fig. 3.2b for the 2nd order representation, that is,
Z-order curve has a distance of 3 whereas Hilbert curve has 6. We conducted further
experiments to measure the Euclidean distance of every pair of neighboring spaces
after transformation. Based on our results, Z-order and Hilbert curves outperform the
other two curves for the purpose of geo-hashing, but each one has corner cases that
make two adjacent points become far apart.
In our approach, we use Z-order curve because it shares similar efficiency for
geo-hashing as Hilbert curve, but it encodes coordinates using smaller numbers. Cor-
respondingly, smaller numbers allow us to choose more efficient parameters for our
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encryption scheme making the proposed system practical. In Z-order curve, indexing
keys (i.e., the concatenated values shown in Fig. 3.2b) are represented in Z4, hence
the name QuadKey. Correspondingly, we represent points from the 3D space in Z8
and give the name OctaKey. The level of detail can be increased by dividing an area
into four equal sub-areas, with each assigned a new QuadKey appended to the exist-
ing QuadKey string. Essentially, the longer the common prefix between the QuadKey
of two points, the closer they are. Also, a longer QuadKey provides a more precise
reference to the original coordinates.
Given the two-dimensional GPS coordinates (x, y) of a location in the WGS84
encoding, the QuadKey can be computed as QKd = {q1, .., qd} where d is the level
of detail [142]. In example, the QuadKey of (x, y) = (43.084474,−77.675372) at
d = 5 is QK5 = 03023 (or an OctaKey of OK5 = 06147 if we consider altitude).
We can also transform the QuadKey into binary representation (hence BinKey), like
BK5 = 0011001011 in 2D and BK5 = 000110000101110 in 3D. In this example,
we demonstrate the QuadKey at a small level of detail. The maximum level for
the QuadKey is 22 (same for OctaKey, but 44 in BinKey for 2D space and 66 in
BinKey for 3D space), which corresponds to the precise GPS coordinates. Note, we
will mostly use QuadKey and BinKey in the following discussions. We generate the
OctaKey and BinKey of coordinates in 3D space only for empirical evaluation.
3.1.1 Location Referencing
Geo-hashing an object’s locations using these space-filling curves provides univer-
sal location referencing without the need for predefined world models [34], hence it
better suits emerging machine-to-machine (M2M) applications such as IoT with lo-
cations commonly represented as the relative distances to known referencing points.
These referencing points are described in a predefined semantic model, which has no
explicit meaning without the corresponding geometric and topological models [41].
Assuming we can keep up-to-date the assignment of semantic location labels on each
IoT device, evaluating location queries such as “get readings from sensors within 50
meters” is still inefficient because we need to first reason about the relationship be-
tween two spaces using a topological model before calculating the distance between
two spaces using a geometric model.
Our approach uses dynamic location referencing, which works better than sym-
bolic location referencing (e.g., Room 3400 in Building 70) that is inflexible and
requires a common definition that seldom exists between different entities (e.g., due
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(d) Proximity of users
Figure 3.3: Various cases of user-controlled location privacy
to the associated cost and efforts in creating and maintaining such a common refer-
ence) [153].
Our geo-hashing technique transforms the evaluation of these location queries
as string manipulation problems. Given a list of devices devi ∈ D; each devi has
its location geo-hashed into a QuadKey QKi, and a QuadKey QKq for the point-of-
interest (PoI) at a specified level of granularity, the above example query can be
evaluated as finding the common prefix between QKq and QKi for each device devi ∈
D. A device devi is within the specified range if the common prefix is equal to QKq.
3.1.2 Spatial Cloaking
Our geo-hashing technique is based on space-filling curves similar to spatial cloak-
ing [86] that hides the location data by masking according to user’s preference. The
result is an area that conceal both the user precise location and the movement trajec-
tories in that masked area, as illustrated in Fig. 3.3a. Users should have the ability
to define their location privacy preferences according to the trust level between them
and their friends. As the masking area size increases, the risk of being discovered or
tracked decreases [17].
When the user leaves a masked area, a new masking area not overlapping with
the previous one is created. This raises a risk of leakage about the user’s transition
between two fixed-size areas. In other words, the user must have crossed a point on
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the edge shared between the two masking areas.
The problem of co-location [123, 163] is another possible privacy risk. Fig-
ure 3.3b shows the risk of co-location in a general case of overlapping masking areas.
An adversary can deduce, even with spatial cloaking, that two co-locating users are
in the overlapped area, which could be much smaller than the user-defined masking
area [123].
To prevent revealing the user location by exploiting the issue of co-locating, we
study a new technique for spatial cloaking (Fig. 3.3d) which generates a geometric
area that includes the two users. Without revealing the locations of users, this com-
mon box can be utilized to compute two users’ proximity. The box’s diagonal length
is the maximal distance between the two users. This rough proximity can be valuable
for many social applications which provide services that do not require user’s exact
location or exact distance between users. Furthermore, a user can define a geographic
area and query for the list of nearby friends or devices as shown in Fig. 3.3c. In ideal
cases, a nearby query should not expose the exact locations of the involved users or
their relationships.
3.1.3 Concealing User’s Location and Preferences
We pose three requirements on our system: 1) Both the location and the user’s pre-
ferred level of location granularity are encrypted, reducing the trust requirement on
the server to a semi-honest one. 2) Before processing any query, the location’s level
of granularity is controlled (through masking) based on the privacy preference of the
user to guarantee security even with colluding users. 3) Our system can be scaled
to support a large number of users who send and periodically update their encrypted
locations and may occasionally change their encrypted preference. Specifically, the
user does not have to provide different versions of their locations for different users.
In other words, each user periodically encrypts the precise location and sends it to
a server provider. Then, the server provider computes on the encrypted location to
answer the three stated queries and returns an encrypted result which the request
decrypts using the corresponding secret key.
To achieve these requirements, we study how to accomplish practical spatial
cloaking on encrypted location data. HE supports computations on encrypted data,
such as homomorphic addition and multiplication. We utilize SWHE which has a
limited multiplicative depth, i.e., the number of consecutive homomorphic multipli-
cations over the ciphertexts. Moreover, we decrease the communication overhead
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Table 3.1: Notation used in secure geosocial query system
Notation Description
SP The service provider
QKd,BKd The QuadKey and BinKey with d level of details
Mj The privacy bit mask defined for the j-th user
ki The AES symmetric key of the i-th user
(pki, ski) The HE key pair of the i-th user
pk∗ The Threshold HE joint public key
〈·〉 The AES encryption under symmetric key ki
[·] The HE encryption under pki (or pk∗), also as c
ρi The decryption component created based on ski
PURIFY Algorithm for creating proper prefix masks
ECPM Algorithm for extended common prefix mask
PCPM Algorithm for pairwise common prefix mask
EPM Algorithm for extended prefix mask
with a hybrid usage of SWHE and AES, and show how to support computation on
data encrypted under multiple keys.
3.2 Computing on Encrypted Location
Now we present our geosocial query system. As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, our privacy-
preserving query system consists of three main roles: system users, a service provider SP,
and multiple decryption servers. When a user Alice A wants to add a new friend
Bob B to the system, they go through a pairing phase and set up the key-pair for AES
and SWHE, kA, kB and (pkA, skA), (pkB, skB), respectively. We suppose Eva E, who
is Alice’s friend, is already in the system with key-pair kE and (pkE, skE). The rest of
notation are presented in Table 3.1.
After the key setup, all users use the Z-order curve geo-hashing to convert their
GPS coordinates (x, y) into QuadKeys QK = QK22 = (qk1, · · · , qk22); qki ∈ Z4.
They send the AES-encrypted ciphertexts 〈QK〉 = (〈qk1〉, · · · , 〈qk22〉) to SP. Also,
each user generates an encrypted privacy bit-mask for each other users according to
their relationship. For example, Alice generates 〈MB〉 = (〈mB1 〉, · · · , 〈mBd 〉);mi ∈
Z2 and 〈ME〉 for Bob and Eva respectively. This list of bit-masks is shared with SP
and only updated when the user changes the preference. On the other hand, users’
positions are periodically updated.
Upon receiving the AES-encrypted location data, SP uses the homAESdec func-
tion to transform an AES ciphertext 〈m〉 to an SWHE ciphertext [m] for the underly-
ing plaintext message m.
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During query evaluation, SP needs to manipulate ciphertexts encrypted under
different individual SWHE keys. To support multiple keys, SP employs a proxy
re-encryption (PRE) technique [8, 132] that performs key switching to transform ci-
phertexts from ones encrypted with individual keys to ones encrypted with a joint
key pk∗, aggregating Alice’s and her friends’ keys. This transformation requires all
involving users to supply SP with re-encryption keys (e.g., rkpkA→pk∗ for Alice) in
advance. In a nutshell, SP performs the re-encryption process as Enc(m, pk∗) =
KeySwitch(Enc(m, pkA), rkpkA→pk∗) to get Alice’s ciphertext encrypted under pk
∗.
The evaluation result is encrypted under the joint key pk∗. We then transform this
ciphertext to one that is decryptable with the intended user’s secret key as described
later in Sec. 3.2.4. Below, we explain each of the proposed homomorphic algorithms
in details.
3.2.1 Query 1: Where is Alice?
When Bob requests the location of Alice, SP masks the location of Alice [QKA]
by homomorphically multiplying it with Bob’s bit mask specified by Alice [MB] as
illustrated in Fig. 3.4 (a). The bit-masking works fine except 0 in the masked results
is ambiguous since it can represent either a valid result or a forbidden retrieval due to
the masking. As an example, QKA = 2300 with MB = 1100 and ME = 1111 yields
the same result. We address this problem by transferring each element of QK from
Z4 into {1, 2, 3, 4} before the encryption. The resulting QK will be converted back to
Z4 after decryption on the client device.
This query requires a multiplicative depth of one because we perform one ho-
momorphic multiplication between each corresponding qki ∈ QKA and mBi ∈ MB ,
where i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. For higher efficiency, we also prototype our proposed algo-
rithm using the standard ElGamal scheme over a group of prime order p to individ-
ually encrypt the location data. Yet, for the bit-mask, an ElGamal encryption of 0
results in a ciphertext 0, which fails to protect the privacy of the user preference.
To circumvent this inconvenience, we employ a trick to encode 0 as a random num-
ber from Zp but excluding everything that might lead to the multiplication result in
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, i.e., Zp \ {0, 1, 2−1, 3−1, 4−1, 2, 2 · 3−1, 3, 3 · 2−1, 3 · 4−1, 4, 4 · 3−1}.
After this encoding, a bit-mask element of 1 will preserve the location data while
a random number will mask it. In the decrypted results, we remove any number that is
not an element of {1, 2, 3, 4} and produce a masked quad-key string that corresponds
to a bounding box with the desired level of data granularity.
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Req_Location(A)










(a) Query 1: Where is Alice?
(b) Bob (building) (c) Eva (suburb) (d) Others (city)
Figure 3.4: System design and resulting masked views for different parties: Bob
(d = 18), Eva (d = 12), and Others (d = 10)
Before any additional query computation, the server applies the masking to pre-
serve privacy even when the friends of the user form a coalition. Figure 3.4 (b)-(d)
show the resulting bounding boxes based on Alice’s privacy preferences, who is at
the GPS coordinates (43.08460614021896,−77.67964549827582). These bounding
boxes not only hide users’ positions but also their mobility patterns.
3.2.2 Query 2: Who is Nearby?
Alice might want to find who, from her friends, is currently within a geographic
region. Based on her targeted proximity,she creates a query bit-mask [MQ] and sends
it to SP as shown in Fig. 3.5. The query bit-mask [MQ] is different from the privacy
bit mask defined in Query 1.
Location data is first masked by the privacy bit-mask defined by individual users
and masked again by the query bit-mask. The two-round masking process requires
a multiplicative depth of two. Hence, we can expect the computation time to be
roughly twice of Query 1, which only applies one-round of masking. With a slight
abuse of notation, let the ciphertexts from above processing be denoted by [QK′A] for
Alice and [QK′j ] for her j-th friend in the list. Then, the SP computes an element-wise
subtraction [QK′A]− [QK′j ].
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Periodic update of {QKB}B
Periodic update of [QKE]
Nearby([MQ])
([uB], [uE], …)
Figure 3.5: Query 2: Who is nearby?
If Alice and her j-th friend are close based on the provided query bit-mask, the
output will be zero in all the elements corresponding to the the proximity level. Then,
SP re-randomizes the resulting vector and homomorphically aggregates its elements
afterwards. The output of these calculations will be a ciphertext [uj ] which encrypts
either 0 indicating the friend is close to Alice or a non-zero positive value indicating
the friend is not nearby.
Two users are located in the same region if their masked QuadKey are the same.
Related work [118, 120, 140] uses similar intuition to provide proximity testing. SP
returns to Alice a list of encrypted results ([uB], [uE ], · · · ) corresponding to her
friends. Upon decryption, Alice will only learn from this randomized results list
whether or not a friend is nearby, but nothing more.
3.2.3 Query 3: How Close are Alice and Bob?
To determine the proximity of two users, we design an algorithm which generates the
smallest box that encloses them. By calculating the diagonal length of this box, we
learn the maximum possible distance between the two users depending on the granu-
larity they specify for each other. We hide the exact distance to prevent triangulation
attack. In addition, this box not only hides users’ exact locations in an area but also
prevents leakage due to co-location as discussed in Sec. 3.1.2. When we encode user
location data using the proposed method, we can generate this box by computing the
common prefix (CP) from the two users’ BinKeys (e.g., BKA and BKB). While Query
1 and Query 2 can be performed on either QuadKeys or BinKeys, this query requires
the location data to be encoded as a BinKeys as described in Sec. 3.1. Given the two
BinKeys, we firstly perform an element-wise XNOR on each bit to perform the bit-
matching and produce a vector V. Then, we perform a common prefix mask (CPM)
purification function (Purify, also referred to as CPM) in which bit value after the
first leftmost 0 is reset to 0 to obtain the proper prefix maskM.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode and Fig. 3.6 shows an example of our new
algorithm, which reduce the multiplicative depth L and leverage parallelization to
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of the PURIFY function
speedup homomorphic computations. This new algorithm split the binary prefix
mask V into k blocks of size dn/ke and apply the purification step on all the blocks
in parallel. Note that in this step, each block requires (dn/ke − 1) consecutive mul-
tiplications. After the first round of the purification step, all blocks have been set
according to what we need as outputs. But, we still need to either keep or reset all
bits within each block depending on the last bit in the previous block. Intuitively, if
the last bit of V1 is 1, then we keep all the bits in V2. If the last bit of V2 is 0, then we
reset all the bits in V3 to 0. This procedure is achieved through homomorphic multi-
plications with the corresponding bits. The second step requires (k − 1) consecutive
multiplications to set the bits. Hence, we derive the formula L = (dn/ke+ k− 2) to
set the scheme’s parameter for multiplicative depth.
Decreasing L, the multiplicative depth of the algorithm, is important to improve
the run-time. Our study shows that there is a trade off between the multiplicative
depth L and the total number of homomorphic multiplications performed when se-
lecting different values of k. For example, setting k = n decreases the number of
multiplications to one per block, but the depth becomes L = n − 1. The number of
blocks has to be carefully selected such that we balance between L and θ, which we
derive the latter based on k. Specifically, θ = (k − 1)(dn/ke − 1) + (dn/ke)(k −
2) + 2(n− (dn/ke)(k − 1))− 1, where [(k − 1)(dn/ke − 1) + (dn/ke)(k − 2)] is
the number of multiplications performed on fully-sized blocks in both steps of purifi-
cation, and [2(n − (dn/ke)(k − 1)) − 1] is the number of multiplications in the last
block that may not be of full size. This optimized algorithm allows us to perform the
prefix matching procedure in parallel and achieve a significant speedup in the overall
system.
When we acquire the common prefix mask M, we can calculate the common
prefix by performing a component-wise homomorphic multiplicationA⊗M. Lastly,
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Algorithm 1 Given a binary vector, transform it into a proper prefix mask.
Function PURIFY(V);
Input : A vector V = (v1, · · · , vn) as the output of XNOR(A,B)
Output: A purified prefix maskM
Vi ∈ Partition(V, k); . V = {V1, ..Vk};
foreach Vi ∈ {V1, ..Vk} do
mi,1 = vi,1 foreach vi,j ∈ Vi do
mi,j = mi,(j−1)vi,j ; . mi,j ∈M;
end
end
foreach Vi ∈ {V1, ..Vk} do
foreach vi,j ∈ Vi do










































Figure 3.7: Utilizing the properties of coordinates
the encryption of the common prefix is returned to the requester, who use it to produce
the appropriate box. In this case, utilizing this method may produce needlessly large
boxes for points that are close yet lay in differing quadrants because geo-hashing
requires each of these points to be in one quadrant at each level.
We tackle this problem by investigating the properties of the Z-order curve co-
ordinate system. When the QuadKey is converted into BinKey, each bit represents
the location of a point on the corresponding axis. We can decide if a point is on the
left- or right-half of the box using one bit on the x-axis as illustrated in Fig. 3.7a.
Likewise, we can decide if a point is on the top- or bottom-half using the bit value on
y-axis.
These characteristics are applicable at any level of detail, which we leverage to
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Algorithm 2 Calculate the Extended Common Prefix Mask (ECPM) for users’ (Alice
and Bob) given location data.
Function ECPM(A,B);
Input : Users’ geo-hashed binary vectorsA = (a1, · · · , an) and B = (b1, · · · , bn)
Output: The extended common prefix maskM
Ax[i] = A[2i] = (a2, · · · , an);Ay[i] = A[2i− 1] = (a1, · · · , an−1);
Bx[i] = B[2i] = (b2, · · · , bn); By[i] = B[2i− 1] = (b1, · · · , bn−1);
X = PCPM(Ax,Bx); .X = (x1, · · · , xn);
Y = PCPM(Ay,By); . Y = (y1, · · · , yn);
M = XY; . Bitwise
design an algorithm that significantly reduces the masking noise. Algorithms 2, 3,
and 4 describe the pseudocode. Figure 3.7b shows a running example of two BinKey
vectorsAy = (ay1, · · · , ayn) = 1011 . . . and By = (by1, · · · , byn) = 1101 . . . .
The two vectors represent the y-axis only bits extracted from the two input BinKey
A and B when calling the ECPM(A,B) function. Here, we discuss in details the
computations carried on the y-axis vectors, but same computations will be indepen-
dently performed on the x-axis binary vectors.
When a request to compute a box enclosing Alice and Bob is received, the ECPM
divides the coordinates A and B into the corresponding x-axis and y-axis vectors.
For each axis pair, the pairwise common prefix mask PCPM is computed as in Alg.
3.
In PCPM, we start with determining the common prefix mask, CPM(P,Q) for
P and Q corresponding to Ay and By respectively (same process applies to Ax and
Bx). Then, we locate the leftmost value where the two vectors differ and save this
information asC and S. Assume the two vectors differ at the j-th value, we extract the
bit value homomorphically at ayj and byj . After that, we use ayj (in EPM) to check
with the bit value at ayk where k = (j + 1, · · · , n). If ayk 6= ayj , we check ayk+1;
otherwise, we learnAy will only match up to the (k−1)-th level. Same computations
will be performed on By vector using the byj bit value. Figure 3.7b shows that Ay
and By are logically matched up to the 3rd level because ay4 6= ayj , but by4 = byj .
On the other hand, if we only use the CPM(A,B), then the two points are matched
up only to level 1. Observe when j = 2, ayj = 0, and byj = 1. Essentially, if two
points are close, they should be close to each other when we increase the level of
detail in both axes. We acquire the common prefix mask between Ay and By simply
by performing component-wise multiplication, as shown in Line 6 of Alg. 2.
In more depth, the ECPM algorithm describes the operations of prefix matching
by extracting the x- and y-axis vectors (in lines 2 and 3 of 4) from two given vectors
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Algorithm 3 Calculate the Pairwise Common Prefix Mask (PCPM) for given x-axis
(Ax,Bx) and y-axis (Ay,By) vectors pairs.
Function PCPM(P,Q);
Input : The pair of vectors (P,Q) = (Ax,Bx) or (P,Q) = (Ay,By)
Output: The pairwise common prefix maskW
C = PURIFY(P,Q); . C = (c1, · · · , cn);
si = c̄i−1 + c̄i; . S = (s1, · · · sn) denotes the leftmost position where P and Q
differ. c̄i is the complement of ci;
U = EPM(P,C, S); . U = (u1, · · · , un);
V = EPM(Q,C, S); . V = (v1, · · · , vn);
W = UV; . Bitwise
Algorithm 4 Generate the Extended Prefix Mask (EPM) for a given vector that is
based on (Ax,Bx) or (Ay,By)
function EPM (R,C, S);
Input : The vector R = P or R = Q and the two vectors C and S described in
Alg. 3
Output: The extended prefix mask E
d = ⊕ni=1(siri); . Calculate the bit inR at the leftmost position where P and Q vary
gi = d⊕ ri;∀i = 1, · · · , n; . G = (g1, · · · , gn);
hi = gic̄i; ∀i = 1, · · · , n; . H = (h1, · · · , hn); c̄i is complement of ci
ti = ci + si + hi;∀i = 1, · · · , n; . T = (t1, · · · , tn); ci ∈ C; si ∈ S;
e1 = t1; . E = (e1, · · · , en);
ei = ei−1ti;∀i = 2, · · · , n;
A and B and performing the PCPM on them. Algorithm 4 describes the computa-
tions on vectors Ay or By using the common prefix inputs between them, C, and
a selector mask S generated in Alg. 3. The EPM algorithm starts with computing
the corresponding bit values at the leftmost position j in which P and Q vectors are
different. We accomplish the following operations by utilizing a binary multiplexer
concept. Finally, we combine all masks and perform a prefix mask purification step
(also used in line 6 of Alg. 1) to reset the bit values after leftmost 0 to 0.
The result of this query is a box enclosing the locations of the querying and
responding users for a third-party (e.g., geosocial app). As shown in Fig. 3.11 (d),
the precise locations of users remain unknown to the third-party since they are hidden
within the resulting box. In fact, the smaller boxes in Fig. 3.11 (b-c) demonstrate that
precise locations of individual users are still protected in intermediary operations due
to the masking process.
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3.2.4 Threshold Decryption Protocol
After processing a query, the service provider produces a result that is encrypted un-
der a joint public key pk∗, hence the querier is not able to decrypt the result without
their friends’ secret keys. We need to transform the result to a ciphertext that is de-
cryptable by the querier’s secret key. Suppose sk∗ = ski + skj , this process reverses
the additive key homomorphism property by generating a special component ρj con-
cealing skj such that the querier can correctly decrypt the result using his/her own
secret key ski and ρj . For more technical details on this approach, we refer interested
readers to [8, 12].
The decryption protocol hence requires the friends of the querier to be online to
generate the component ρj . This design affects the practicality of the system. Instead,
we propose to delegate the decryption task to a designated trusted decryption server
which has access to the secret keys skj and is able to generate ρj on behalf of this
friend. This approach allows users to be offline and is commonly used for multi-
key HE [9]. We further improve the security of users’ secret keys by secret-sharing
these keys among multiple decryption servers [143]. As in Fig. 3.8, the secret key
ski of a user i is divided up into k shares and stored on k trusted servers, such that
S0i,1 = (ski −
∑
ri,h) and S0i,h = ri,h, where ri,h are some initial uniformly chosen
random numbers and h = {2, . . . , k}. To prevent cases where an adversary may
be able to corrupt some of the shares, we periodically refresh the representation of
these shares of the secret keys at time t by adding uniformly random noises rti,h to










rti,t, where h = {2, . . . , k}.
One can recover the secret key ski by summing the individual shares stored on all
decryption servers.
To enforce authenticated decryption, where only authenticated users can decrypt,
the decryption servers must check at first if the requester is one of the registered
system users (see Fig. 3.1). Moreover, we ensure only the intended user obtains the
correct decryption by validating using labeled ciphertexts. After the computation, the
service provider SP embeds each ciphertext in the query result CQ = (c0, c1) with an
indicator ind (e.g., the intended user’s unique id or the session key) as ĆQ = (ć0, c1),
where ć0 = c0 + H(ind) and H(·) is a hash function. To decrypt, the user sends ć0
and the indicator ind′ with the request to the decryption servers, and each decryption
server computes c0 = ć0−H(ind′) and issues decryption components ρj based on c0.
Note that the user will obtain a correct decryption if, and only if, ind = ind′.
Our protocol is designed in the dishonest majority model so that the system tol-































Figure 3.8: Securing private keys with secret-sharing
erates up to k − 1 servers being hacked. We construct a multiparty computation
protocol, similar to these [49, 145], to perform threshold-based decryption.
Key revocation is done in a simple manner, which generates a new key pair,
transforms the ciphertexts to be under the new public key, and secret-shares the new
secret key.
3.3 Evaluation and Discussion
We prototype our proposed framework in C++. We use HElib [83, 85], which im-
plements the BGV SWHE scheme [27]. We use the Number Theory Library (NTL),
which depends on the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP), to sup-
port of polynomial operations. Parallelization is done with OpenMP. We validate the
correctness of our execution through extensive testing.
Our experiment uses a cloud instance on the CloudLab.us [137] on a system with
10-core Intel E5-2640v4 at 2.40 GHz, and 64 GB RAM. We set the BGV scheme’s
security parameter λ to be 128 bits, which corresponds to the security of a scheme
with 3072-bit asymmetric key (proposed for safeguarding genomic data [13]). The
rest of the BGV scheme parameters were set according to each experiment’s require-
ments.
3.3.1 Empirical Results
We repeat each experiment 100 times and record the average computation time of
each operation as well as the standard deviation of the mean (which was relatively
small).
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We present our evaluation results in Figs. 3.9 and 3.10 in log-scale. The first set
of results (Figs. 3.9) evaluates the location queries in 2D space, where the locations
are encoded either as QuadKeys (represented as vectors of size 22 in Z4) or BinKeys
of size 44. The second set of results (Figs. 3.10) evaluates the location queries in 3D
space, where the locations are encoded either as OctaKeys (represented as vectors of
size 22 in Z8) or 66-sized BinKeys.
Figs. 3.9a and 3.10a show the performance of the system when evaluating the
commonly used position and range queries, Query 1 and Query 2. The two queries
operate on 22 encrypted digits QuadKeys in Fig. 3.9a and on 22 encrypted digits
OctaKeys in Fig. 3.10a. We set the plaintext modulus of the BGV scheme according
to the closest prime to the encoded geolocation, (t = 5) for QuadKey in Z4 and (t =
11) for OctaKey in Z8. The multiplicative depth is set to L = 3 for both experiments
since two consecutive multiplications are needed when evaluating the second query,
and an additional level for HE addition and subtraction. For 2D experiment, the run
time of Query 1 is around 0.21 s, but with parallelization, it decreases to 0.04 s.
When evaluating Query 2, it takes around 0.43 s which can be improved to 0.08 s
with parallelism. Notice that the second query is nearly double the first query in
performance due to applying two rounds of masking, one for the privacy bit-mask
and the other of the query bit-mask, where each one of them performs homomorphic
multiplication. Compared to its counterpart in the 2D space, the performance of 3D
is almost the same. This is because both of them share the same scheme parameters
except for the message space modular t, and correspondingly for a small difference
in the ciphertext space modular q, which did not affect the performance
Figs. 3.9b and 3.10b show how the system scales when performing Query 2 on
QuadKey and OctaKey for different friend-list sizes. We use the same parameter
settings from the previous experiments. Likewise, the performance of the nearby
query is similar in 2D and 3D as the number of the of ciphertexts is the same in both.
Overall, the query run time increases linearly as the size of friends list increases. Our
proposed system is scalable as it performs Query 2 under 20 s for 2D and 3D spaces
on 300 friends, which is a reasonable number of friends in social networks.
Figure 3.9c shows the evaluation of the system if we include the third query,
which computes the proximity between two friends. As mentioned in Sec 3.2.3, the
third query requires the encrypted locations to be encoded as BinKey, which doubles
the size of ciphertexts to 44 encrypted bits per location data and mask. We set the
plaintext modular t = 2 because of binary inputs and L = 21 based on our derived
formula discussed in Sec. 3.2.3. The performance of the first two queries is affected






























Size of friends list
Sequential
Parallel


































Size of friends list
Sequential
Parallel
(d) Scaling Query 2 for BinKey in 2D
Figure 3.9: Computation times for different experiments in 2D space
by the increase of both the number of ciphertexts (44 for BinKey compared to 22
for QuadKey) and their sizes, which increases to account for the larger multiplicative
depth. The third query achieves around 24 s when performed in parallel, which is
three times faster than when performed in sequential (which takes around 76 s). We
further studied the performance and found that most of the computation run time
is consumed by performing the common prefix matching CPM. Figure 3.10c shows
the performance of the three proposed queries on BinKey. Due to increasing the
dimension in the 3D experiment, we observe an decrease in performance. But, we
compute the XNOR on binary using homomorphic addition instead of multiplication.
Overall, the 2D performances are better than the one in 3D by about 3 factors.
Figs. 3.9d and 3.10d show the scalabilty when performing the nearby query on
BinKey. Each experiment uses the same corresponding parameters used in Figs. 3.9c
and 3.10c. The run time increases linearly with respect to friend-list size. In Fig. 3.9d,
Query 2 finishes in 188 s in parallel, which is around 6.5 times faster than sequential.
The estimated increase in computing time is around 4 s for every additional friend. In
Fig. 3.10d, the parallel evaluation of a list of 50 friends takes about 500 s, i.e., around
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(d) Scaling Query 2 for BinKey in 3D
Figure 3.10: Computation times for different experiments in 3D space
10 s per friend.
Figure 3.11 shows examples of different views with boxes generated by our demo
system for different parties. In all three figures, the outer bounding box is generated
by the CPM approach and it is added for comparison. In Fig. 3.11a and 3.11b, users
can see their current coordinate point as well as the cloaked area of the other user.
These boxes are generated by the ECPM algorithm. Compared to the outer bounding
box, the ECPM approach produces boxes which are two level smaller for the two ex-
ample coordinates used in these experiments; this corresponds to 1.40E+13m2 reduc-
tion in area size as shown in the figures. If both users are happy to share their masked
location with a third-party application such as Facebook for performing geosocial
features, a union of their boxes will be generated and shared.
3.3.2 Security Analysis
Our proposed protocols are secure in the semi-honest computation outsourcing sys-
tem model illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The user data privacy is protected with spatial-
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(b) Bob’s perspective (c) Others’ perspective
Figure 3.11: Perspectives of different parties produced by our demo system using the
ECPM algorithm (for the inner box) on Alice’s and Bob’s locations. We add the outer
box, which is computed by the CPM algorithm, for comparison.
cloaking and encryption. Here, we study the possible leakages and provide a formal
security analysis using the simulation paradigm [80].
We start with the following security definition for Query 1, but similar definition
applies to Queries 2 and 3. Let f = (fA, fB, fSP) be a probabilistic polynomial-
time functionality and π be a protocol computing f in the outsourcing system model.
A system user, Alice or Bob (A or B), wants the service provider SP to compute
f(Li,t,Mj) using the protocol π and the security parameter λ, where Li,t is the ex-
act location of the i-th user at a time stamp t, and Mj is the privacy mask for the
j-th user specified by the i-th user, where i, j ∈ {A, B}. Let Vπi (λ, Li,t,Mj) =
(1λ, Li,t,Mj , r
i,mi) be the view of the i-th user where ri is its internal random tape
and mi is the message received by that user. The view of the service provider is
VπSP(λ, Li,t,Mj) = (1
λ, rSP,mSP). On the other hand, the i-th user’s output is de-
noted by Outputπi (λ, Li,t,Mj) and can be computed from its own view of execution.
We say the protocol π securely computes f if the following security definition holds.
Definition 3.3.1. Let f = (fA, fB, fSP) be a probabilistic polynomial-time function-
ality. The protocol π securely computes f in the outsourcing model in the presence
of static semi-honest adversaries if there exist three probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms SA,SB,SSP such that for every possible input (Li,t,Mj) we have
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{SA(1λ, LA,t,Mj , fA(LA,t,Mj)), f(Li,t,Mj)}
c≡
{VπA (λ, LA,t,Mj),OutputπA (λ, LA,t,Mj)}
{SB(1λ, LB,t,Mj , fB(LB,t,Mj)), f(Li,t,Mj)}
c≡
{VπB (λ, LB,t,Mj),OutputπB (λ, LB,t,Mj)}
{SSP(1λ, Li,t,Mj , fSP(Li,t,Mj)), f(Li,t,Mj)}
c≡
{VπSP(λ, Li,t,Mj),OutputπSP(λ, Li,t,Mj)}
where i, j ∈ {A, B} and c≡ is computational indistinguishability against probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries with negligible advantage in the security parameter λ.
Informally, we say the protocol π is secure if we can prove that whatever is com-
puted by a party A (or B, SP) is based on its input and output only. Hence, the view
and output of a simulator should be indistinguishable from a semi-honest adversary.
Since the functions in our protocol are deterministic [80], we only need to prove that
the simulator’s Si view is indistinguishable from the user’s view Vπi . We can simplify







We analyse the security of each step in our proposed protocols based on this
simplified notion.
Theorem 3.3.1. The user’s inputs of exact location and location privacy masks are
protected against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. Suppose a user Alice pairs up with a new friend Bob, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
Let kA and (pkA, skA) be Alice’s AES secret key and SWHE key pair, respectively,
according to the setup phase described in Sec. 3.2. She defines a location privacy
mask MB for Bob and encrypts it under AES as 〈MB〉 and uploads it to her online
profile stored on the service provider SP, which contains the encrypted privacy masks
for other friends {[M1], ..., [MN ]}. Note that 〈·〉 denotes AES encryption and [·]
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denotes SWHE encryption. The privacy masks reflect how close two people are,
hence we propose to encrypt the privacy masks to hide relationship between Alice and
her friends. Then, Alice periodically updates her encrypted and geo-hashed location
data 〈LA,t〉 after time interval t to SP; in a similar way with how we periodically share
our checkin data in the background. Then, SP homomorphically converts the AES
encrypted data into SWHE ones for 〈LA,t〉 and 〈MB〉, provided the encrypted AES
key [kA]. The full view of SP is VπSP(LA,t,MB) = (〈LA,t〉, 〈MB〉, [kA], [LA,t], [MB]).
We assume all SWHE computations take place using threshold SWHE. We construct
the simulator SSP as follows:
- SSP runs AES and SWHE key generation algorithms to receive k and pk, respec-
tively.
- SSP generates AES encryptions L̃, M̃ and SWHE encryptions k̂, L̂, M̂ . These are
“garbage” encryptions.
- Output the view SSP(L̃, M̃ , k̂, L̂, M̂).
Since the output is encrypted under AES and SWHE, which are semantically secure,
we can see that the two views are computationally indistinguishable as:
SSP(L̃, M̃ , k̂, L̂, M̂)
c≡ VπSP(〈LA,t〉, 〈MB〉, [kA], [LA,t], [MB])
Hence, a semi-honest service provider obliviously evaluates on ciphertexts with-
out having access to the decryption key. The ciphertexts are protected under the
semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme. Hence, its view is limited to
what the shared ciphertexts reveal.
Theorem 3.3.2. The proposed Query 1 in Sec. 3.2.1 is secure against semi-honest
adversaries.
Proof. In Query 1, Bob requests the whereabouts of Alice. The service provider
SP checks whether Alice and Bob are friends and homomorphically processes the
request by masking Alice’s last-known encrypted location [LA,t] using the privacy
mask [MB], specified by Alice for Bob. Let [RQ1] = [LA,t] ⊗ [MB] be the query
result. The view of SP is VπSP([LA,t], [MB], [RQ1]) and we can construct the view of
the simulator SSP in a similar manner to the proof of Theorem 3.3.1. Hence, we will
have:
SSP(L̂, M̂ , R̂Q1)
c≡ VπSP([LA,t], [MB], [RQ1])
where R̂Q1 is a random SWHE encryption generated by the simulator.
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Bob’s view is VπB (RQ1), which is the decrypted result that was homomorphically
computed by SP. We construct simulator SB assuming it has access to a trusted party
who computes R′Q1 = LA,t × MB using inputs (LA,t,MB). We have SB(R′Q1)
c≡
VπB (RQ1). Since RQ1 and R
′
Q1 are computed in the same way, we can conclude that
the user’s and simulator’s views are indistinguishable.
Suppose Bob is an adversary who wants to learn Alice’s location from the com-
puted result. He can only get the masked location, which is an area determined by the
location privacy maskMB. Figs. 3.4 demonstrate the masking effect at three different
levels of the same location point. The leakage of Alice’s location information to a
friend i depends on how much Alice trusts her friend, which is reflected in Mi. Note
that not only Alice’s actual coordinates are protected within the masked area, but also
her mobility trajectories within it. The same masked area will be generated and re-
sponded to Bob’s request as long as Alice stays within this area. This is a property of
our spatial cloaking technique.
When Alice moves outside the enclosing box, our algorithm will produce a new
enclosing box of the same size adjacent to the original one. In most cases, the user
moves across one of the four edges of the enclosing box. The attack on revealing
on which point Alice moves across becomes the problem of determining a point in
a continuous line. If the location privacy mask is sufficiently strong, such as mask-
ing at the city scale (Fig. 3.4d), this problem is the same as trying to determine at
which exact point a person travels across the city boundary. Note that we focus on
providing a solution for users to control how much they are willing to share based
on their relationship with each of their friends. Leakage due to inappropriate setting
of the location privacy mask is out of the scope of our research. All later queries are
performed on the masked location data of a user; hence leakage from these queries is
at most the same as what the masked area reveals.
Let assume a malicious user who is not a friend of a targeted user but wants to
learn the target user’s location. This adversary will not learn any useful information
because the SPwill not process the request. Also, there is no applicable privacy mask
specified nor a valid joint key generated for query evaluation on the SP. On the other
hand, suppose two or more users are colluding and attempt to reveal a targeted user’s
location. The most accurate result they can obtain is based on the most granular
privacy mask specified for any of them due to the proposed geo-hashing and masking
techniques.
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Theorem 3.3.3. The proposed Query 2 in Sec. 3.2.2 is secure against semi-honest
adversaries.
Proof. A user i may also determines which of his friends are within a spatial area




i }) where j is a list of i-th user’s
friends. SP processes the query by homomorphically masking the i-th user’s location
with the query mask [L′i] = [Li,t] ⊗ [M iQ], and each friend’s locations with their
defined privacy masks for i and the query mask as [L′j ] = [Lj,t]⊗[M
j
i ]⊗[M iQ]. Then,
the query result [RQ2] is created as a list where the j-th position is the homomorphic
subtraction of the two masked locations [L′i] − [L′j ]. Since all SP sees is encrypted
data, we use similar proof as in Theorem 3.3.1 and prove the indistinguishably as
SSP(L̂i, L̂j , M̂Q, M̂i, R̂Q2)
c≡ VπSP([Li,t], [Lj,t], [M iQ], [M
j
i ], [RQ2])
The view of the i-th user is the decrypted list Vπi (RQ2) where the j-th position is
0 if the j-th user is within the queried region, and non-zero random value otherwise.
More specifically, there is a match if the two masked location data share a common
prefix. In this case, the i-th user will learn whether and which of his friends are
within a given spatial area, but their exact location is not revealed to this user. We
construct the simulator Si assuming it has access to a trusted party, who computes
R′Q2 = (Li,t×MQ)− (Lj,t×M
j




c≡ Vπi (RQ2). Since RQ2 and R′Q2 are computed in a similar manner,
we can conclude that the user’s and simulator’s views are indistinguishable.
Theorem 3.3.4. The proposed Query 3 in Sec. 3.2.3 is secure against semi-honest
adversaries.









TP)) using location data and privacy masks for users
Alice and Bob. The intuition of Query 3 is for SP to homomorphically generate
a bounding box that encloses Alice and Bob. The i-th user’s location data [Li,t];
i ∈ (A, B) is firstly masked by their location privacy masks defined for the third-
party, MATP and M
B
TP respectively. If the two users are located in adjacent areas as
illustrated in Fig. 3.11, then SP will produce a bounding box that is sufficiently large
to encloses the two users. In the query on two users i, j, the view of SP can be con-
structed in the same way as the two previous theorems (Theorem 3.3.2 and 3.3.3) as
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we prove the indistinguishably as
SSP(L̂i, L̂j , M̂TP, R̂Q3)
c≡ VπSP([Li,t], [Lj,t], [M iTP], [RQ3])
The view of the third party TP consists of the id of the two queried users i, j and
the result RQ3 such as VTP(i, j, RQ3). We can construct simulator STP who has
an ideal access to a trusted party that computed the result R′Q3 based on the input
(Li,t, Lj,t,M
i
TP). We have STP(i, j, R
′
Q3)
c≡ VTP(i, j, RQ3), which are indistinguish-
able because RQ3, R′Q3 are computed in the same manner.
There are also cases in which one user’s masked area is enclosed by another user
who specifies a stronger location privacy mask.
Theorem 3.3.5. The proposed threshold decryption protocol in Sec. 3.2.4 is secure
against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. A user i, who sends a query to SP, will receive the query result [RQ] encrypted
under the joint key pk∗ generated based on the N system users’ individual keys, as
described in Sec. 3.2.4. To decrypt, the user requires help from k designated decryp-
tion servers in which each store shares of system users’ secret keys. We assume those
servers are trusted and provide a similar function as password managers. Let Dl be
the l-th decryption server where l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Each server holds the secret share
SDl,tj of the j-th registered system user’s secret key skj at the time stamp t, created as
illustrated in Fig. 3.8. The secret shares are secure under the secret sharing protocol,
where skj can only be reconstructed if all k servers cooperate; otherwise, no individ-
ualDl has access to the secret key. Moreover, the protocol provides proactive security
by periodically refreshing the shares, such that an adversary has to compromise all
k servers in the same period of time to recover the shares needed to reconstruct the
secret key.
When user i requests decryption and provides a valid indicator ind′i, the trusted de-
cryption servers checks if the user is registered then issue decryption components
ρDlj which are specific for the ciphertext [RQ] and conceals the secret-shares, as dis-




j ). Assume having an
access to a trusted party who can compute the query request R′Q, we can construct




j ). The resultsRQ, R
′
Q are
computed in a similar manner. The components rhoDlj and the randomly generated
components ρ̃Dlj are from computationally indistinguishable distributions. Hence, we
CHAPTER 3. SECURE EVALUATION OF GEOSPATIAL QUERY 52





c≡ Vπi (ski, ind′i, RQ, ρ
Dl
j ). Suppose an external adversary
who may acquire a ciphertext and wants to decrypt. The protocol is secure against
this attack because (a) decryption servers will not authorize this unregistered adver-
sary’s request, and (b) more importantly, the protocol is designed based on (N,N)-
threshold model, which requires the adversary to contribute to the decryption with a
valid secret key. On the other hand, if the adversary is one of the system users, they
still have to validate the ciphertext by providing the correct indicator that matches the
one embedded by the semi-honest SP. They gain no valuable information because the
decryption yields garbage if there is a mismatch. If the adversary is authenticated and
was able to validate the ciphertext, the result is based on the appropriately masked lo-
cation for that user. Lastly, If SP is an adversary colludes with a user and provides the
indicator, this case is considered a malicious attack and will be considered in future
work.
Overall, the encrypted, geo-hashed locations and privacy masks are secure under
the semantic security assumption of the threshold HE scheme. The system users’
secret keys are protected under the dishonest-majority assumption for secret shar-
ing and the resharing mechanism that periodically refreshes the representation of the
stored key shares. Our protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We will
address scenarios where we have a malicious service provider in our future work.
3.4 Conclusions
We presented a new location referencing method that geo-hashes GPS coordinates
using space-filling curves into linear representations we can compute on. We con-
structed cryptographic algorithms with HE primitives to support three position and
range queries. One of these algorithms reduces masking noise significantly besides
addressing the issue of co-location. We further designed optimization techniques that
significantly reduces the multiplicative depth of the computation. Since both period-
ically updated location data and privacy preferences are encrypted, the system pro-
tects user’s location privacy from a semi-honest service provider. We also extended
the proposed solution to support location referencing in 3D space.
At the core of these algorithms, we propose an secure and optimized prefix match-
ing. Our proposed algorithm can be adapted easily to other applications that require
performing prefix matching (or essentially string matching) over two encrypted vec-
tors of numbers, such as secure machine learning or network routing.
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Initial results of this work [90] has been published in the 10th ACM Conference
on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2017). Our pro-
posed improved algorithm is included in our recent manuscript “Universal Location
Referencing and Homomorphic Evaluation of Geospatial Query” [7], which has been
accepted in the Elsevier Journal of Computers & Security.
Chapter 4
Blindfolded Evaluation of Random
Forests
To address RQ1, we explore the construction of more general homomorphic primi-
tives for secure outsourced evaluation of machine learning models. In addition to the
prefix matching algorithm proposed in the previous chapter, we research on funda-
mental homomorphic primitives for evaluating decision trees and random forest, as
an example of the machine learning models.
Decision tree is one of the most widely used nonparametric ML techniques for
classification and regression. The evaluation process is a series of comparison at each
decision node of the tree, which compares the input from a client with the threshold
of the node as specified in the model. The boolean results decide which descendant
node to traverse and eventually leads to a leaf node representing a result. Similar
to some other ML frameworks, relying on a single such tree may incur the model-
overfitting problem. A random forest (Fig. 4.1a) which aggregates the results from
individual decision trees can provide more accurate results. The final result is either
a list of classification labels together with counts associated with each label, or a
classification label that most of the trees agreed on.
In this application model, we focus on a scenario where predictive models from
multiple owners are sent to an evaluator for collaborative evaluation (Fig. 4.1b). Col-
laborative ML becomes a commonplace as it provides more accurate prediction due
to the diversity in data [88]. Medical diagnostics is one example (EU WITDOM
project) in which multiple hospitals and medical laboratories collaborate to offer a
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Figure 4.1: System models for collaborative evaluation of random forests F , consist-
ing of N decision trees: Each decision tree Ti with a depth of δ contains m decision
nodes di ∈ D, and (m+1) leaf nodes lk ∈ L. Each leaf node contains a classification
value vk ∈ V .
better diagnosis. A natural source for the evaluator is to rely on an external cloud.
But, privacy leakage can occur [72, 105] due to security breaches or insider attacks.
According to the statistics [159], there are around 2 declared breaches per week,
each affecting 500+ people. More importantly, leaking of sensitive personal data
(e.g., genome, fingerprint, eye-iris-scan) is irreversible as mentioned before. Strict
data protection regulations, such as HIPAA and EU GDPR, embrace data utility for
medical diagnosis and drug discovery but demand provable security of private data
when it is in storage and being processed.
Existing privacy-preserving protocols [24,154,166] follow the client-server model
where the server owns the random forest and the client inputs encrypted features to
start the evaluation. Comparison at each node is carried out using the secure com-
parison protocol proposed by Damgård, Geisler, and Krøigaard (DGK protocol) [51]
which takes inputs in binary and produces a list of intermediate results that are either
encryption of zero or non-zero integer. These intermediate results cannot be used di-
rectly to perform branching program and traversal through the decision tree because
the server requires the client’s help to determine whether any ciphertext decrypts to
zero. The client then generates and sends back an encrypted bit to resume the evalu-
ation on the server side. This process based on the DGK protocol is interactive and
makes the existing works to be a synchronous system design.
These state-of-the-art works [24,154,166] use additive homomorphic encryption
(HE) and cannot be easily extended to work in a collaborative setting which naturally
requires multiplication of two ciphertexts. A best-effort workaround is to have the
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client sends separate requests to each model owner, as illustrated in Fig. 4.1c. Leaving
aside the communication overhead caused by the exchange of intermediate results,
this naı̈ve extension reveals the individual decision made by each model owner to the
client.
Alternatively, model owners can outsource their models to a third-party evaluator.
This is undesirable due to concerns of security breaches. One may encrypt each
model under the key of its respective owner. Yet, such a multi-key usage is not
considered in the existing privacy-preserving decision tree evaluation protocols. This
setting rises an important question for us as in RQ2 of how to compute with multiple
keys (which we address in Chapter 5).
We propose a privacy-preserving protocol which allows multiple model owners
to delegate the evaluation of the random forests (resulted from the implicit collab-
orative effort of combining individual models) to an untrusted party. As depicted
in Fig. 4.1b, individual model owners encrypt their decision trees such that none of
them can get the decision tree of everyone else, while the Cloud remains oblivious
to the models or the query. Our technical contributions are: (1) a new secure com-
parison protocol SecComp, which directly produces an encrypted bit that is used for
branching in decision tree evaluation without need for interactions with users (2) a
new secure counting protocol SecCount, which calculates the count of each class la-
bel resulted from the evaluation of individual decision trees and performs majority
voting which makes our protocol suitable for multi-class classifications as well, and
(3) the incorporation of techniques for computing over data encrypted under different
keys. Moreover, we propose various techniques for efficiency improvement.
Note on multi-key support: For clarity, we will defer the discussion on our third
contribution for multi-key support to Chapter 5. We assume for now that all evalua-
tions are done on ciphertexts encrypted under the same key1.
4.1 Current Solutions
In this section, we review some of the technical aspects of the current solutions for
evaluating homomorphically encrypted decision trees and random forests. We mainly
focus on secure comparison protocols, such as the DGK, and the secure conditional
branching techniques.
1This key has a special structure and is composed from participants’ keys as we discuss later.
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4.1.1 Secure Comparison Protocols
A critical part in decision tree evaluation is to compute b = (x < y) as shown in
Fig. 4.1a. Given two encrypted `-bit inputs x, y, many secure comparison protocols,
such as those by Damgård et al. [51], Veugen [161, 162], operate over individual en-
cryption of bits in x = {x`−1, · · · , x0}, y = {y`−1, · · · , y0}, and rely on arithmetic
computations to determine whether the specified relation holds.
The DGK protocol [51] is widely used for comparing two encrypted `-bit inputs
without decryption. It has been proven that the comparison result bit b = 1{x < y}
is set to 1 if and only if there exists an index i ∈ (0, · · · , `−1) such that for a bit-wise
comparison xi < yi and xj = yj for all leading bits at position j > i. Thus, DGK
performs the following arithmetic computation




which produces ` results zi that can either be an encryption of zero or a non-zero
integer. One thus needs to check within a vector of encrypted integers whether there
is a zi that decrypts to zero, that is, the result is true. Veugen [162] proposed an
improvement (based on the proposition in [66]) to support the comparison relation of
both x < y and x > y by adding a single bit input. The improved DGK protocol has
the following arithmetic form.




where β = 1 − 2 · b′ and b′ $← {0, 1}, i.e., a uniformly sampled bit. If b′ = 0
then the protocol is checking x < y, otherwise x > y. This random flipping of the
comparison rule can hide the structure of the decision tree (and prevent active probing
of the threshold values in the decision nodes). Similarly, the output bit is true if there
exists encryption of zero in zi.
The DGK protocol required values to be bit-decomposed to be homomorphi-
cally compared. Veugen [161] proposed an alternative protocol to compare two en-
crypted [81,126] integers. This protocol outputs a single encrypted bit, which is also
adapted by Bost et al. [24] for secure ML. Yet, it incurs three rounds, one of those
uses the DGK protocol [51] to compare two intermediate results. It also introduces
significant communication overheads.
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Recently, two works [25, 134] have been proposed for secure comparison of en-
crypted integers. In the first work, Bourse et al. [25] proposes two protocols, one for
comparing two encrypted integers and the other for solving the Millionaires’ Prob-
lem. The latter targets a system model where two parties want to compare their own
inputs without revealing them to each other and is not applicable to the system model
we are targeting. On the other hand, the first protocol assumes both integers are en-
crypted and the evaluators should not learn them. It is based on a Fully HE scheme,
specifically the TFHE scheme [44], and requires one round of communication. For
two encrypted integers [a] and [b], the protocol utilizes a homomorphic sign extrac-
tion technique to blindly compute the sign of [a − b]. The output is 0 if a = b, a
scaling factor k if a > b. and −k if a < b. This is a base protocol that performs
secure comparison on small integers but can be extended to unbounded integers by
decomposing them into basis and performing the base protocol on each digit.
Alternatively, Qiu et al. [134] constructed a secure comparison protocol based on
Paillier scheme [126], which is additively homomorphic. The protocol only requires
one round of communication between two evaluators, Alice who has two integers [a]
and [b], such that a, b < 2`, and Bob who has access to the decryption key. To test
([a] ≥ [b]), Alice homomorphically computes [x] = [b]·[a]−1 (mod N2) then blinds
it with a random r ∈ {1, . . . , 2t} such that 2`+t < N/2. The blinded ciphertext
[z] = [x]r (mod N2) is sent to Bob who decrypts it to the value z = r(b − a).
The protocol doesn’t need to extract the sign. However, it utilizes the aspect in the
modular arithmetic where small negative values are highly likely to congruent to
values in the range [N/2, . . . , N). In particular, if a is larger and x = (b − a) is
properly blinded with a small factor r, the output z should be in [N/2, . . . , N). Bob
can return an encrypted bit [1] if z < N/2, or [0] otherwise. The protocol is limited
to comparing small integers but it is not clear how to extended to unbounded integers
without increasing the bit length of N and impacting the efficiency.
4.1.2 Secure Evaluation of Decision Trees
The protocol of Wu et al. [166] uses the improved DGK protocol to evaluate all
boolean functions in the decision nodes with the help of the client as discussed in
Sec. 4.1.1. After that, the protocol concatenates the encrypted boolean results to
assemble an encrypted binary string b0b1 · · · bm−1 that corresponds to the index of
the leaf node containing the evaluation result. The server sends this binary string
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to the client who uses an oblivious transfer2 (OT) protocol to privately retrieve the
evaluation result.
Bost et al. [24] proposed a set of homomorphic protocols for common operations
such as dot product, argmax, comparison, which are the building blocks of many ML
algorithms including hyperplane, naı̈ve Bayes, and decision tree. Their approach uses
two multiple-round secure comparison protocols, which produce a single encrypted
bit at each decision node. This allows the evaluation result to be revealed directly
on the server, instead of relying on an OT protocol [166]. However, the comparison
protocol still requires interaction between client and server. Once all Boolean func-
tions have been evaluated, the authors proposed to transform a decision tree, like the
example shown in Fig. 4.1a, into a polynomial form such as:
b0 · l3 + (1− b0) · (b1 · (b2 · l2 + (1− b2) · l1) + (1− b1) · l0)
where bi = fi(xi ≤ yi) is a boolean function to be evaluated at each decision node
di ∈ D using a secure comparison protocol and each leaf node has an assignment of
a class label lk.
The server homomorphically evaluates the above polynomial which then reveals
the correct classification value. For polynomial evaluation, leveled HE schemes such
as the BGV [27] is needed. Evaluating a polynomial of a decision tree with high depth
δ impacts the efficiency since the polynomial performs δ consecutive homomorphic
multiplications. The authors suggested to compute the multiplications in pairs; thus;
the multiplicative-depth decreases to dlog2(δ)e. We explore this idea further, develop
an algorithm to speed up the evaluation, and conduct empirical experiments to study
its efficiency.
Tai et al. [154] proposed the concept of path cost for transforming the tree into
a set of linear equations which is compatible with efficient cryptographic operation.
For each leaf node lk, it computes the sum of the boolean results bi along the path
from the root to lk as the path cost pck. For example, the path costs in the decision
tree shown in Fig. 4.1a are: pc0 = b0 + b1, pc1 = b0 + (1− b1) + b2, pc3 = 1− b0,
and pc2 = b0 + (1 − b1) + (1 − b2). The classification values vk to be retrieved by
the client via the conditional OT is randomized if and only if pck is non-zero, which
ensures that the client can only learn the result corresponding to his inputs. When
2OT protocol allows a receiver to retrieve a message mi from a sender who has a set of n messages
(m1, . . . ,mn), such that the sender does not learn the choice i ∈ and the receiver does not learn the
other messages in the set.
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Table 4.1: Notation used in the proposed system
Notation Description
C,Mi A client and i-th model owner, respectively.
F A random forest with the trees {T } of all ownersM.
Ti,w w-th decision tree of model ownerMi.
V A vector of class labels, V = {v0, · · · , vn}.
Yi,w A threshold vector of Ti,w; Yi,w = {y0, · · · , ym−1}.
X A feature vector of a client C, X = {x0, · · · , xm−1}.
pki HE public key of the i-th user.
pk The HE public key composed from different keys.
〈·〉i AES encryption with party i symmetric key ki.
[·]i HE encryption under pki, also as c.
compared with the use of OT protocols by Wu et al. [166], it avoids sending a binary
string to the client who then retrieves the final result using the concatenated index.
Recently, Joye and Salehi [95] proposed a new privacy-preserving decision tree
protocol using OT and additive HE. They proposed a secure comparison protocol by
increasing the interactive rounds in favor of reducing the number of comparisons.
The protocol of Tueno, Kerschbaum, and Katzenbeisser [158] represents a tree of
depth δ as an array. They did not use HE, but used garbled circuits, OT, or Oblivious
RAM, to evaluate the tree with only δ comparisons which is sublinear in the tree size.
Both protocol works in the two-party setting and do not support the collaborative
setting and data encrypted under different keys. Moreover, the boolean functions are
evaluated interactively, which leads to high round complexity.
4.2 Our Proposed Protocol
In this section, we propose our privacy-preserving protocol for evaluating a random
forests contributed from different model owners. We present the system model and
the different protocol phases. For clarity, Table 4.1 lists commonly used notation in
our proposed protocol.
4.2.1 System and Threat Model
We design our system model as follows. Each model owner Mi has a set of deci-
sion trees {T1, . . . , Tn}. We model a complete decision tree as T = (D,L), where
D is a set of m decision nodes and L is a set of (m + 1) leaf nodes. For clas-
sification, each leaf node lk ∈ L contains a class label vk. In the case of textual
class labels, such as different classes of blood diseases {“Anemia”, “Leukemia”, . . . ,
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“Hemophilia”} [71], we hash them into numerical values. We assume that this en-
coding is publicly known.
At each decision node di = (fi, yi) ∈ D, there is a boolean function that takes a
user input xi ∈ X , compares it with a threshold value yi ∈ Y , and produces a result,
such that bi = fi(xi < yi), as illustrated in Fig. 4.1a. Here, X = {x0, . . . , xm−1}
is a vector of features provided by the client while Y = {y0, . . . , ym−1} is a vector
of threshold values defined for all decision nodes in a tree. The collections of all (or
a subgroup of) decision trees contributed by all model owners form a random forest
F ⊆ {T1, . . . , Tn}, which is evaluated in the Cloud and produce a classification result
such that v = F(X); v ∈ V .
In our threat model, a client adversary may attempt to learn, through sent queries,
information about the random forest, such as the tree structure, threshold values, or
class labels in the leaf node. A client should learn nothing other than what is known
in public, such as tree depth δ and number of decision/leaf nodesm. Note that we can
hide the tree structure by adding dummy nodes. On the other hand, a model owner
may try to learn about models contributed by other model owners, or the client’s
sensitive data through the provided queries, or the (intermediate) evaluation result
during decryption. The (cloud) evaluator in our outsourced setting is a potential
adversary who may want to learn both of the above, i.e., the query of the client and
its final result, and the models of the owners.
4.2.2 Efficiency and Privacy Considerations
Efficient outsourcing. Despite the recent advancement, leveled HE schemes pro-
duce ciphertexts that are large in size. It is thus more efficient to use a hybrid ap-
proach [103, 117] which firstly uses an efficient block-cipher (AES) to encrypt the
data then converts the encryption from AES to HE. Let EncAES(m) be a ciphertext of
the messagem encrypted under an AES key k, the cloud encrypts the ciphertext again
using HE EncBGV(EncAES(m)). To decrypt, the Cloud homomorphically decrypts the
AES ciphertext with an HE encryption of the AES key EncBGV(k). Common HE li-
braries provides this feature, such as the homAESdec function of HElib [83]. This
transformation can be done by the Cloud for every new received ciphertext.
Hiding model structure. To preserve the privacy of model structure from the eval-
uator, the model owner can optionally introduce dummy nodes [166] to the decision
tree T to transform it to a complete tree, which has a depth δ, (2δ − 1) decision
nodes, and 2δ leaf nodes. In this case, the evaluator will obliviously evaluate each


























Figure 4.2: Overview of different phases of our proposed system
decision node (including the dummy nodes), which will add overhead on the perfor-
mance cost. One might add dummy nodes with no computation requirement, but this
method fails if a malicious evaluator launches a timing attack against the protocol
execution. Hence, for stronger security, we suggest adding dummy nodes that have
random threshold values, and the resulting branches will point to the same leaf node.
4.2.3 Overview of Proposed Evaluation Steps
Figure 4.2 illustrates the four phases of interactions between different parties. In the
first phase, each model ownerMi encrypts a set of decision trees {Ti}, includes all
the threshold values in their binary format. Delegating the encrypted models to the
evaluator can be performed as a one-time setup before servicing the clients. In the
second phase, upon receiving a feature vectorX encrypted under the key of the client,
the evaluator evaluates every decision tree in the entire random forest. Once it is done,
each decision tree outputs a class label. The evaluator will perform a secure counting
protocol to obliviously aggregate the number of occurrences for each unique class
label. The evaluator then sends the class labels with their associated counts to the
client. An alternative option is to engage with the client in an additional OT protocol
to return the final class label with the highest vote. As a part of the multi-key support
(see Chapter 5), a distributed decryption protocol is performed in the final phase to
retrieve the final result.
Similar to many existing work [154, 166], we assume each feature and threshold
value into its binary form x = {x`−1, · · · , x0} ∈ X and y = {y`−1, · · · , y0} ∈ Y .
This a required for performing the secure comparison step at each decision node.
Moreover, we assume that all data are sent at first as AES ciphertexts for efficient
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transmission as discussed. The evaluator then homomorphically decrypts them into
HE ciphertexts for homomorphic evaluations.
4.2.4 Evaluating Encrypted Decision Trees
Upon receiving the client’s encrypted feature vector X , the evaluator evaluates each
decision tree in the random forest Ti ∈ F . Below, we focus our descriptions on
the evaluation of a single decision tree and omit some indexes for clarity. The same
evaluation procedures are applied in parallel to each tree.
Secure Comparison
Given a feature x ∈ X and a threshold value y ∈ Y , the evaluator evaluates a boolean
function b = 1(x < y). We use our new protocol SecComp(x, y) which computes




(x`−1 = y`−1) ∧ (x`−2 < y`−2)∨
...
(x`−1 = y`−1) ∧ · · · ∧ (x1 = y1) ∧ (x0 < y0)
(4.1)
where ∨ is the logical OR and ∧ is the logical AND, (xj < yj) ≡ (¬xj ∧ yj) ≡
(1− xj)yj and (xj = yj) ≡ (xj ⊕ yj + 1) ≡ xj + yj + 1.
The intuition is similar to the DGK protocol [51] (Sec. 4.1.1), but we remove the
linear dependency on ` for transferring and interactively processing ` ciphertexts en-
crypting zero or non-zero integers. Our protocol can be extended to support equality
checking if needed, such that:
b′ = (x`−1 = y`−1) ∧ · · · ∧ (x1 = y1) ∧ (x0 = y0) (4.2)
The evaluator can then evaluate the comparison b = 1(x ≤ y) by simply combining
Equations. 4.1 and 4.2 to compute b = (b ∨ b′).
Existing works [24, 154, 166] are using an additional technique to randomly flip
the branches and comparison rules at each decision node to prevent a malicious client
from probing the threshold value. However, we do not apply this feature because our
comparison protocol can be evaluated without interaction with the client.
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Optimizing Secure Comparison. The multiplicative depth of SecComp increases with
the increase of bit-length ` due to the increase of consecutive homomorphic multipli-
cations performed at each bit-comparison. For example, a 4-bit comparison protocol
illustrated in Fig. 4.3(a) requires 3 OR, 5 AND, 3 bit-by-bit equality checks, and 4 bit-
by-bit less-than comparison checks. We find that for comparing two `-bit values, we
evaluate (`− 1) number of OR gates, (2`− 3) number of AND gates, (`− 1) equality
checks, and ` bit-by-bit less-than comparison checks. So, the multiplicative depth of
an `-bit comparison protocol is (3` − 2). Consecutive homomorphic multiplication
impacts the efficiency greatly.
We speed up the SecComp evaluation through parallelization at a reduced multi-
plicative depth. This is done by translating the comparison into a binary evaluation
tree as shown in Fig. 4.3(b). The evaluation tree reveals the dependencies between
computations for comparison. All the computations in the same level can be evalu-
ated in parallel. The tree is arranged in a way for balancing the computations being
assigned to each processors. The result is acquired by merging the branches of the
tree bottom up.
Further, we identify that all bit-by-bit equality checks and less-than comparisons
can be done in parallel. They become inputs for the subsequent AND and OR gates.
Recall that the bit-by-bit equality checks are performed using homomorphic addi-
tions. From the evaluation tree, we extract all parallelizable computations at each
level into a vector for easier access to different computations, as shown on the right
of Fig. 4.3(b). With these observations, evaluating SecComp is highly parallel. The
results are cached in a lookup table. The cached values are reused when repeated
evaluation of the same terms is called. For example, the second call to evaluate
(x3 = y3) ∧ (x2 = y2) is skipped.
All boolean functions can also be evaluated in parallel since they are independent.
The multiplicative depth significantly decreases in this parallelized approach. For
efficiency, the evaluation tree can be created once before the start of the protocol as
a set of instructions to evaluate any two inputs of a specific bit-length `. Using this
approach facilitates the extension to use multi-cloud instances to evaluate multiple
decision nodes in parallel.
Although the approach still requires the evaluation of ` bit-by-bit less-than com-
parison checks (rounded boxes in Fig. 4.3(b)), the evaluation tree now requires log2 `
consecutive multiplications for the OR gates and `2 for the AND gates. Therefore,
the multiplicative depth of the parallel SecComp for `-bit is (log2 ` +
`
2 + `). The
(` − 1) bit-by-bit equality checks are evaluated using homomorphic addition; there-
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Figure 4.3: An example instantiation of SecComp (Equation. 4.1) for 4-bit inputs,
and the corresponding evaluation tree and vector
fore, their evaluation does not significantly affect the multiplicative depth. For exam-
ple in Fig. 4.3(b), the evaluation tree for comparing 4-bit inputs requires 4 bit-by-bit
less-than comparison checks, 2 levels of OR logic gates and 2 levels of AND logic
gates. Thus, the multiplicative depth is 8 compared to the sequential approach which
requires 10 consecutive homomorphic multiplications.
Tree Evaluation Polynomial
Once the evaluation of all decision nodes is done in parallel, we will get a list of
encrypted bits b0, b1, . . . , bm−1. Our system evaluates the decision tree by plugging
in these bits into a polynomial [24] representing the tree, as discussed in Sec. 4.1.2.
The evaluation of this polynomial outputs a single ciphertext which decrypts to the
classification result, such that Ti(X) = v. We employ a similar speedup technique
for evaluating SecComp to reduce the multiplicative depth and to parallelize homo-
morphic operations. The system evaluates the polynomial ` times, one for each bit
of v, to assemble v in the bit-wise format for our secure counting protocol to be dis-
cussed. Lower multiplicative depth allows us to choose smaller parameters for the
SWHE scheme, hence smaller ciphertext size.
Our approach, in its worst, will only send unique class labels with their counts.
Alternative methods for evaluating the tree [154, 166] require the server to send the
entire list of class labels to the client who extracts the result through an OT protocol.
4.2.5 Combining and Retrieving Results of a Forest
After evaluating individual trees, we will get a set of decision tree results {Ti(X)}.
For a regression problem, these results are numerical values that we can compute
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the random forest result; for example, calculating the average of all values. This
can be achieved by homomorphically adding the values output from decision tree
evaluation F(X) = 1n
∑n
i=1(Ti(X)). The evaluator then sends the sum to the client
who decrypts and divides it by the number of decision trees in the random forest.
For a classification problem, we normally want to know either the count of each
class label or the class label that has the maximum count. To achieve this, we propose
a secure counting algorithm — SecCount, which counts the number of times each
unique class label has been chosen as the result.
We associate a vector of counters {z1, z2, . . . , zn} (initially all zeros) with the
vector of class labels V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. For each evaluation result vj ∈ {Ti(X)},
we perform a matching algorithm using the bit-wise representations of vj and vk:
zj = (vj,`−1  vk,`−1) ∧ (vj,`−2  vk,`−2) ∧ · · · ∧ (vj,0  vk,0)
where ∧ is logical AND,  is logical XNOR, and zj = 1 if and only if vj = vk;
otherwise zj = 0. We then calculate the sum of zk =
∑n−1
j=0 zj for each vk. In
other words, zk contains the total count corresponding to the number of decision
trees which outputs vk as the evaluation result. To maintain correctness of addition
with respect to binary message space, we use a regular binary full-adder circuit to
perform the addition. The result of the addition is the count encoded in bits and can
be decoded by performing the equation σ`−1i=0 (zk,i2
i). Note that the bit length for the
count can be set to be log2(n) instead of ` for space efficiency.
After the counting, a simple approach to return the random forest evaluation result
is to have the evaluator return directly the two vectors for the client to decrypt and
obtains the counts for each class. This incurs a high communication overhead.
Alternatively, if we only want to provide the class label with the maximum count,
the evaluator can permute the vector of counters and the vector of class labels us-
ing the same seed, such that vk and zk are correlated. This prevents the client
from learning the count of each specific class. Then, the evaluator sends the vec-
tor of encrypted counters to the client who will decrypt and send back an encrypted
permuted index corresponding to the maximum count as the input to a (1, n) OT
protocol to retrieve the class label. This approach is considered as more efficient
despite the use of OT. As a result of the random forest evaluation, we get either
F(X) = {(v1, z1), (v2, z2), . . . , (vn, zn)} or F(X) = v, which are encrypted under
a joint key of multiple parties.
After the evaluation, the evaluator produces results that are encrypted under a
key composed from participant’s keys. Hence, the client can only decrypt with the
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help of the other participants (i.e., the model owners). Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1)
encrypted under the composed key pk, the semi-honest evaluator sends c1 to all model
owners. Recall, we need to construct the component c1s from the element and the
secret sk = s to decrypt as m = c0 − c1s as discussed in Chapter 2. We will discuss
the full details of this decryption protocol in Chapter 5.
4.3 Evaluation and Discussion
We analyze the security and complexity of the proposed system. We also validate the
design through a number of empirical studies using synthetic and real-world datasets.
We report some of these evaluation results in this section and invite readers to check
the full results in our paper [9].
4.3.1 Security Analysis
Our proposed system privately evaluates the random forest and is secure against semi-
honest adversaries under the assumption that the used encryption schemes are secure.
While the use of AES introduces another assumption, it lowers the communication
overhead; otherwise, HE can be used directly. The AES ciphertexts are transformed
to HE ciphertexts under the individual participants keys, then to encryptions under a
key composed from individual keys by the cloud. In both cases, data are protected
with semantic security assumption unless the adversary compromised all the secret
keys in the second case. Beside their own inputs, the view of each model owner
in the decryption protocol consists of only the component c1 of a ciphertext that is
encrypted under the composed key. Additionally, the security against an adversarial
model owner is ensured by the encryption and by the fact that the adversary does not
have access to all ciphertext components.
Lastly, the view of a client consists of his feature vectorX and unique class labels
with their associated counts, which are already computed on the cloud. The proba-
bility of each model’s contribution to the evaluation result is uniformly distributed
over the counts. Therefore, an adversarial client will not be able to learn information
about individual models used in the random forest.
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4.3.2 Complexity Analysis
We analyze the computation and communication complexities of the proposed sys-
tem. Especially, we focus on the computation complexity of the core operations that
rely on homomorphic multiplications, since an extra step is required to reduce the
dimension of the resulting ciphertext. Let τ be the number of decision trees, δ de-
notes the maximum depth of decision trees, m be the number of decision nodes and
(m + 1) leaf nodes, and ϕ be the unique class labels known in the system. Let ` be
the bit length of features, thresholds, and class labels.
Upon receiving the client’s request, the cloud evaluates each decision tree in
the forest as discussed in Sec. 4.2. For each of the τ decision trees, the cloud re-
quires a multiplicative depth (number of consecutive homomorphic multiplications)
of 3` − 2 to sequentially evaluate the boolean function SecComp at each of the m
decision nodes in the tree. For parallel evaluation, the multiplicative depth decreases
to (log2 `+
`
2 + `). Evaluating the polynomial representation of a decision tree with
depth δ requires a multiplicative depth of δ in sequential or log2 δ when multiplying
in pairs. Note, we also include the final multiplication with the leaf node. The mul-
tiplicative depth to evaluate a single decision tree of depth δ is set to 3` − 2 + δ in
the sequential testing or log2 ` +
`
2 + ` + (log2 δ) in the parallel testing. Hence, the
sequential evaluation of a decision tree requires at most O(m` + δ) homomorphic
multiplications, while it costs O(m(log2 `+ `) + log2 δ) multiplications in parallel.
To securely count the number each of the ϕ class labels accumulates based on the
evaluation results from τ decision trees, the cloud requires ` homomorphic multipli-
cation; the computation complexity for SecCount is O(`+ ϕ+ τ).
The model owner also exchanges 2n messages with the cloud to generate and
send the decryption components. The client exchanges 2 rounds of communication
with the cloud, one during the request of evaluation, where the client sends m` AES
encrypted features, and one SWHE encryption of its own AES secret key. The other
round is when the client receives the evaluation result from the cloud in the form of
either 2ϕ ciphertexts representing each class label with its corresponding count or as
one single ciphertext of the class label with the maximum count. The latter option
requires an additional round transmitting ϕ` counts and performing a (1, ϕ) OT pro-
tocol. A comparison of the proposed system with the state-of-the-art is presented in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: A comparison with the recent work on privately evaluating one decision
tree: n is the number of feature, m is the number of decision nodes, ` is bit-length of











O((n+m)`) O(m`) - 6




O((n+m)`+ δ) O(m`+ 2δ) - 6
Tai et al. [154] O((n+m)`) O(m`) - 4
This work SWHE SecComp O(n`) O(m`) O((m+ n)`+ δ) 2
4.3.3 Empirical Study
We developed a proof-of-concept prototype for performance evaluation. Specifically,
we focus on the SecComp and SecCount protocols, which are the core of the pro-
posed system. These two protocols contain many homomorphic operations which
will dominate the run-time overhead of the overall system. The communication over-
head of our system depends on the network factors (such as bandwidth) and can be
directly estimated given those factors.
The implementation is based on the HElib [83], which implements the BGV
scheme [27] using Number Theory Library (NTL) and GNU Multiple Precision Arith-
metic Library (GMP). We run each experiment multiple times on two systems, one
with Intel Dual Core i7, 3.1GHz and 16GB RAM, and the other with Intel Xeon,
2.00GHz with 8 CPU cores. We recorded experiments’ average time and standard
deviation.
We set the security parameter λ of BGV scheme to be 128 bits, which corresponds
to a 3072-bit asymmetric key [13]. We set the plaintext modulus t = 2, which
means the plaintext messages are encoded as binary values as our client’s inputs and
threshold values are both encoded in binary. The rest of the BGV scheme parameters
are set to the defaults [83]. The multiplicative depth L of is configured3 according
to what required by the evaluated circuits in our protocol, for which we derived in
Sec. 4.3.2
Sub-protocols
First, we evaluate the SecComp protocol and compare the performance of the sequen-
tial and parallel versions. We randomize the input values with various bit-lengths in
3The number of levels in the scheme is set as (20×L) as suggested in the latest release of the HELib
library. https://github.com/shaih/HElib
























Figure 4.4: Empirical results of the SecComp protocol
each experiment. Figure 4.4 shows the evaluation results in the logarithmic scale.
As expected, the running time increases linearly with the length of inputs because
more homomorphic multiplications will be required. We speed up the evaluation of
the protocol by pre-computing a lookup table of all leaf nodes and constructing an
evaluation tree and vector to facilitate parallel computing with OpenMP library [50].
The reduction in running time is visible in Fig. 4.4. For a small input size (see 2-
bit results), the parallel approach is not significantly faster. That is because building
the evaluation tree and assigning tasks to threads using OpenMP introduce additional
time that is roughly the same as performing the comparison sequentially. The ratio
of speedup is approximately 1:log2 ` in each experiment, which agrees with the es-
timated improvement since we perform multiplications in pairs using the evaluation
tree.
In another experiment, we study the performance gain when we increase the par-
allelization from 4-core to 8-core. As shown in Fig. 4.4, there is a significant im-
provement when more processor cores are available. Comparing two 16-bit inputs
requires around 328s to complete. The running time decreases to 80s when using a
4-core system (achieving ×4 speedup) and to 37s when using an 8-core system (×8
speedup). Note, the rest of the experiments are run using an 8-core system.
We also test the performance of SecCount through three different experiments.
In the first experiment, we set the number of class labels to 2, mimicking a binary
classification problem, and calculate their counters based on one classification result.
Figure 4.5a shows that the running time increases with the bit-length of the class
labels and classification results. For example, the protocol counts labels and results
in 31s if their bit-length is 16, while it only needs 6s if the length is 8 bits. Similar
to SecComp, this is due to the increase of homomorphic multiplications. Hence,
we parallelize the evaluation of this protocol using OpenMP. The parallel version
achieves approximately a speedup by a factor of ×2 when we calculate the counter
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(c) Varying # of results (labels=2)
Figure 4.5: Evaluation of different aspects of the SecCount protocol
of 2 class labels simultaneously.
In the second experiment (Fig. 4.5b), we investigate the performance for a clas-
sification problem that has multiple class labels. Specifically, we vary the number
of class labels ϕ for each experiment and set the number of results to 5ϕ. We aim
to test the performance of the SecCount protocol when the number of inputs (both
labels and results) scales up. In this experiment, we fix the bit-length of each input to
8 bits. The third experiment, as shown in Fig. 4.5c, we consider a different number
of classification results but fix the number of class labels to two. From the three ex-
periments, we demonstrate the feasibility of the SecCount protocol and validate the
technique to speed up the evaluation process.
Decision Trees and Random Forests
Next, we investigate the performance of evaluating the entire decision tree, consisting
of the secure comparison protocol at each decision node and operating on the poly-
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nomial representation of the tree. Our experiments are over complete trees since they
represent the worst case. There are m = 2δ − 1 invocation of the secure comparison
protocol. We use randomized values (for features, threshold values, and class labels)
of 8-bit long.
Figure 4.6a shows the results. The running time grows with the increase of the
decision tree depth as the number of decision nodes increases. Correspondingly, this
means there will be more invocations of SecComp. The performance achieves a
speedup of factor ×7 when evaluating a tree in parallel. The improvement is largely
due to our parallel evaluation of SecComp and processing of the polynomial repre-
sentation of the tree discussed.
We also study the performance of evaluating a forest of trees which have a depth
of δ = 2. We use synthetic data with bit-length of 8 to construct all the tree in
the random forest. We vary the number of trees in each experiment. We provide
experiments on real-world datasets in our paper [9].
Figure 4.6b shows the performance. The most expensive part of evaluating the
random forest is SecComp at each decision node of each tree. For complete trees, it
takes τ(2δ − 1) SecComp invocations where τ is the number of trees. In this experi-
ment, no parallelism has been exploited to support concurrent evaluation of decision
trees. The parallelization is only applied to speed up the building blocks, i.e., Sec-
Comp at each decision node, the polynomial evaluation, and SecCount. There is
significant speedup (in the ratio of 1:4.5) between the sequential and parallel evalu-
ation of the random forest. The parallel evaluation of random forest with 3 decision
trees requires around 250s. In total, it is approximately one-fifth of the time 1307s
needed in the sequential evaluation.
4.4 Conclusions
We proposed a semi-honest protocol that supports privacy-preserving evaluation of
random forest in an outsourcing setting. In particular, we integrated hybrid homo-
morphic encryption and multi-key encryption to reduce the communication overhead
in homomorphic computations on data encrypted using different keys. We also de-
veloped two sub-protocols. The first is a secure counting protocol that goes beyond
the state-of-the-art approaches to compute the result of the random forest. Our se-
cure comparison protocol achieves a lower round complexity compared to existing
work. We discussed optimization techniques based on the execution path to speed
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(b) Evaluation of random forest
Figure 4.6: Empirical results using synthetic data
up the evaluations of the comparison protocol and the polynomial associated with
the decision tree. With these new features and improvements, we also developed a
proof-of-concept prototype for asserting the feasibility of our protocol through ex-
periments. We demonstrated that collaborative evaluation of multiple models in an
outsourcing setting is feasible.
Finally, this work [9] has been published in the IEEE Transactions on Dependable




In this chapter, we tackle the second research question RQ2 — how to compute on
data encrypted under different keys? This question was a result of exploring different
system models through our conducted work in Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, the
outsourced computation system model, as illustrated in Fig. 1.1c.
Outsourcing computations in the coopetitive [59,174] models (i.e., cooperation in
the presence of competition) enables data owners delegate computations on their data
to a private or public cloud. Existing work [23,24,39,169] on outsourcing homomor-
phic computations to the Cloud often focus on computations performed on data from
one data owner. In this chapter, we focus on a more challenging computation model
in which multiple parties delegate their sensitive data or functions to the Cloud. As
an example of this model in the real-world, consider the Genome-wide Association
Analysis (GWAS) scenario. Many bio-banks may need to collaborate to perform
GWAS to study a certain disease using the collection of their genome datasets. How-
ever, due to the immense sensitivity of these data, they want to encrypt the data with
their respective keys and outsource them to the Cloud for evaluation. The Cloud is
an evaluator of some predefined functions and should not learn anything from the
encrypted data. Data owners, bio-banks in this case, also do not want to reveal their
data to others.
To ensure user data privacy, encrypting data using a single key might not suit
many application scenarios in the coopetitive model. Specifically, it requires higher
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Figure 5.1: Timeline featuring recent developments in HE schemes
security assumption because a trusted entity has to manage the generation and distri-
bution of this single key to all participates and maintain the secret key. Instead, can
we realize a secure computation model in which data are encrypted using different
keys of the corresponding owners? This cloud-friendly computation model has been
discussed in previous literature [117, 144]. However, it has not been realized due to
the challenges in supporting homomorphic evaluation on data encrypted under dif-
ferent keys, in addition to issues in key management and lack of efficient decryption
protocols. We focus on the system model in Figure 1.1c and assume inputs are en-
crypted under their owners’ keys, but we do not define under which key the result
[f(x, y)] is encrypted for now.
5.1 Survey of Current Techniques
Spanning over the last 40 years, there are many homomorphic encryption schemes,
each provides different supports for performing arithmetic operations on homomor-
phically encrypted data. Figure 5.1 shows a timeline of different types of HE schemes
(improved based on [1, 167]), including recent schemes that support homomorphic
computations on encrypted data under multiple keys.
In order to understand the current solutions, we review and categorize these tech-
niques according to how the multiple keys are used to secure data and how homo-
morphic computations are supported. We develop a taxonomy of these surveyed
techniques in Fig. 5.2 and roughly divide them into two categories:
Single-key techniques: A subset of these techniques is based on a single key,
where ciphertexts are encrypted under a key owned by a single party at all times
and decrypted using the corresponding secret key or can be made decryptable un-
der another key. Most existing works on HE assumed data encrypted under a single
key. Also, all HE schemes we reviewed in Section 2.4, including BGV, BFV, CKKS,
GSW, were designed based on the assumption of a single key. However, it is clearly
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Figure 5.2: Taxonomy of techniques for secure computation on encrypted data
impractical in our coopetitive system models illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Another example
of single key schemes but offering additional functionalities is Proxy Re-Encryption
(PRE) technique [18, 168] that transforms a stored ciphertext ci = Enc(pki,m) into
a ciphertext cj = ReEncrypt(rki→j , ci) that is decrypted by authorized user’s secret
key skj . Also, there are Identity-based encryption (IBE) [20] and Attribute-based
encryption (ABE) [139] schemes that provide access control mechanisms where data
can be decrypted by authorized keys generated based on the user’s identity or at-
tributes.
Multi-key techniques: On the other hand, multiple keys may be involved in the
encryption of ciphertexts and required to contribute to its decryption. Threshold HE
(ThHE) [12] and Multi-key HE (MKHE) are examples of these techniques. An ex-
ample of the latter allows the ciphertext ci, encrypted under pki, to be extended to an
additional key pkj such that c̄ = Enc({pki, pkj},m). The message can be retrieved
when using the two corresponding secret keys m = Dec({ski, skj}, c̄). Our pro-
posed hybrid approach [5] combines the advantages of both threshold and multi-key
HE with a goal to reduce computation complexity and ciphertext size.
Since we are interested in supporting computation with different keys, we provide
more details on the multi-key approaches in the following sections. For simplicity,
we describe the notation used throughout this section in Table 5.1.
5.1.1 Threshold HE (ThHE)
Threshold encryption is a common approach to support homomorphic computations
on inputs from different data owners without compromising data privacy. It generates
a joint key in a key setup before any computation. This joint key can be changed or
revoked at any point but with the cost of rerunning the key setup and re-encrypting
all input data. In a threshold encryption scheme [12, 19, 57, 58], a set of users can
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Table 5.1: Notation specific to multi-key approaches
Category Notation Description
ThHE-specific
N Total number of users in the system.
T Required number (threshold) of secret shares to decrypt.
pk∗ A joint public key generated from individual public keys {pk1, . . . , pkN}
sk∗ A joint secret key, secretly shared among N users.
ek∗ A joint evaluation key generated corresponding to pk∗.
MKHE-specific
K A bound on number of keys we can extend a ciphertext under.
K Total number of keys, such that K ≤ K
p̄k An extended public key concatenated as (pk1, . . . , pkK)
s̄k An extended secret key concatenated as (sk1, . . . , skK)
ēk An extended evaluation key generated corresponding to p̄k.
c̄ An extended ciphertext encrypted under p̄k, also denoted as [[·]]
Distributed decryption ρi The decryption component constructed by the i-th user in distributed decryption.
encrypt their data under a joint key but have to cooperate for decryption. Shamir’s
secret sharing [143] forms the base of threshold schemes. Mainly, a secret s is divided
into shares si and distributed among N users, such that no single user knows the
secret s. The secret is reconstructed if and only if a predefined number of shares (say
a threshold T ) are provided. This threshold encryption scheme follows the design
of Shamir’s (T,N) threshold scheme. The threshold value T is chosen according
to the security model and requirements. For example, if all N users in the system
are required to participate in decryption, the threshold T is set to T = N . This
setting follows a dishonest-majority assumption, where T ≥ N/2 system users may
be corrupted. In this case, even with N − 1 corrupted users, it is not possible to
decrypt. This assumption can be relaxed to a honest-majority assumption, which
implies that the number of dishonest users is less than N/2 and a subset of users can
decrypt. On the other hand, if every user in the system has the right to independently
decrypt, the threshold is set to T = 1 which corresponds to threshold broadcast
encryption [32, 55, 79].
A ThHE scheme combines threshold functionality with the ability to compute on
encrypted data under a joint key. There are three main components in ThHE schemes:
a distributed key setup protocol, a homomorphic encryption function, and a dis-
tributed decryption protocol [141]. Formally, we can define a general ThHE scheme
as tuple of PPT algorithms ThHE = (Setup,KeyGen, JointKeyGen,Enc,Eval,Dec).
- ThHE.Setup(1λ)→ pp: Given a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm outputs
a set of public parameters pp. These parameters are implicitly provided for the
subsequent functions.
- ThHE.KeyGen(pp)→ (pk, sk): Given the public parameters pp, each user i runs a
local key generation algorithm and outputs a key pair (pki, ski), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
- ThHE.JointKeyGen(pk1, . . . , pkN ) → pk∗, ek∗: Given the input of N public keys
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(pk1, . . . , pkN ), the interactive algorithm outputs a joint public key pk
∗ and the
evaluation key ek∗, if required.
- ThHE.Enc(pk∗,m) → c: Given a joint public key pk∗ and a message m, the en-
cryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
- ThHE.Eval(pk∗, f, c, c′) → ceval: Given a joint public key pk∗ and two ciphertexts
c, c′, the evaluation algorithm outputs the evaluated ciphertext ceval = f(c, c′).
- ThHE.PartDec(ski, c)→ ρi Given a ciphertext c encrypted under pk∗ and a secret
share of the key ski, perform the partial decryption algorithm and output a partially
decrypted message ρi.
- ThHE.Combine(ρ1, . . . , ρT )→ m: Given a set of partial decryptions (ρ1, . . . , ρT )
for some threshold set, combine decryption components to perform the final de-
cryption and output the message m.
In earlier threshold schemes in the literature [49, 58], the joint key pair may be gen-
erated first by a trusted dealer, then the public key and shares of the secret key are
distributed among users. Alternatively, the public key can be generated from users’
individual public keys, as implied in ThHE.JointKeyGen, and they need to collaborate
to decrypt with their individual secret keys at the end of computation. The two algo-
rithms ThHE.PartDec and ThHE.Combine are the routines performed in distributed
decryption, which we discussed as a common technique in Sec. 2.3.4. Another way to
decrypt may utilize the key switching technique (Sec. 2.3.1) to re-encrypt the cipher-
text result from an encryption under the joint key to one under the intended user’s key.
This method avoids performing distributed decryption and enable the user to directly
decrypt with their own secret key. Mouchet et al. [113] proposed two versions of key
switching, depending on whether parties have access to the shares of the new secret or
public key, based on their construction of multiparty HE cryptosystem. In the rest of
this section, we overview two types of ThHE schemes based on the defined security
assumptions, dishonest-majority (or anytrust model with (N,N ) threshold setting),
and honest-majority (specifically, with a (T,N ) threshold setting).
(N,N ) threshold HE
Many HE schemes can be extended to a threshold setting by leveraging the additive
homomorphism of the key space. This property enables the establishment of a joint
key from individual keys that are generated and owned by individual users without a
trusted party. By direct aggregation of the users’ public keys, we can effortlessly set
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up a (N,N ) threshold encryption scheme following the dishonest-majority model. In
other words, threshold HE transforms the setting from computing with different keys
to computing with a single joint key.
Both ElGamal and Paillier schemes can be extended to a threshold version [49,
58, 128]. The aggregation of public keys in the former is less complex than the
latter. Specifically in the multiplicatively homomorphic ElGamal scheme, assume
we have a set of N users where each user i has an independently generated key
pair (pki = g
si , ski = si), where g is a group generator. Then, the joint key is
computed as pk∗ =
∏N
i=1 pki = g
∑N
i=1 si = gs
∗
. A user can encrypt data under the
generated joint public key pk∗ with a uniform random r for semantic security as c =
(c0, c1) = (g
r,m·(gs∗)r). Homomorphic computations can be done on the ciphertext
using the homomorphic primitives of the scheme. Decryption of ciphertexts must
be performed with the help of all N users to remove the element grs
∗
from c1. In
particular, each user i uses their own secret key si to construct a component ρi =
(c0)





. Then, each user i takes turn and uses their component ρi to partially remove
their secret key si by computing ĉ1 · ρi = m · grs
∗ · g−rsi . After partial decryption
by all parties, we yield a plaintext message m.
In a similar manner, (R)LWE-based HE schemes can also be extended to a thresh-
old setting. Asharov et al. [12] proposed a threshold variant of the BGV scheme [27],
which we leveraged for our secure random forest protocol in Chapter 4. The threshold
variant of the BGV scheme is designed as a 3-round MPC protocol, where the joint
public key pk∗ and the joint evaluation key ek∗ are generated in the first two rounds,
and the distributed decryption is performed in the third round. The algorithms of the
threshold BGV scheme are defined as follows.
- AJL+.Setup(1λ, 1L): Given the security parameter λ and a multiplicative depth
L, run BGV.Setup and output pp = (R,χ,B, q, t,a) as the public parameters of
scheme. Let a be the uniform common random string (CRS).
- AJL+.KeyGen(pp) → ((pk1, sk1) . . . , (pkn, skN )): Given the public parameters
pp, uniformly sample a set of N secrets si←χ and errors ei←χ, where i ∈
{1, . . . , N} and output the set of key pairs (pki, ski) such as pki = (asi + tei, a)
and ski = si.
- AJL+.JointKeyGen(pk1, . . . , pkN ) → pk∗, ek∗: Given the input of N public keys
(pk1, . . . , pkN ), aggregate the first component of pki to generate the joint public
key as pk∗ = (
∑
(asi + tei), a).
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- AJL+.EvalKeyGen(sk1, . . . , skN ): Given a set of N secret keys ski = si, jointly






0 ≤ α, β < d are the indices of coefficients of the secret keys.
- AJL+.Enc(pk∗,m) → c: Given a joint public key pk∗ and a message m, the en-
cryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) where c0 = r(as∗ + te∗) +m
and c1 = ra.
- AJL+.Eval(pk∗, f, c, c′) → ceval: Given a joint public key pk∗ and two ciphertexts
c, c′, the evaluation algorithm outputs the evaluated ciphertext ceval = f(c, c′).
Similar to the base BGV scheme, evaluation can be either homomorphic addition
or multiplication. The latter requires the joint evaluation key ek∗ to perform relin-
earization via key switching.
- AJL+.PartDec(ski, c) → ρi Given a ciphertext c encrypted under pk∗ and a secret
share of the key ski, generate a decryption component as ρi = (c1si + te′i).
- AJL+.Combine(ρ1, . . . , ρN , c)→ m: Given decryption components (ρ1, . . . , ρN ),
decrypt the ciphertext as (c0 −
∑
ρi) = (c0 − c1
∑
si) = (c0 − c1s∗) = m̃
(mod t) = m.
Formally, given a set of N public keys pki = (bi, a) = (asi + tei, a), where the
element a ∈ Rq is a shared common random string (CRS) and si is the i-th user’s
secret key. We generate a joint public key pk∗ = (
∑N
i=1 bi, a) such that we obtain
(a
∑N
i=1 si + t
∑N
i=1 ei, a) = (as
∗ + te∗, a). Note that only the first component b
of the individual public keys is aggregated such that the underlying secret keys si are
homomorphically added under the RLWE assumption. If we add both components
of all the public keys, the joint key will be pk∗ = (as∗ + te∗, Na). Subsequently,
a ciphertext encrypted under the joint key will be c = (c0, c1) = (ras∗ + te∗ +
m,Nra). Obviously, the decryption c0 − c1s∗ will fail because (Nras∗ 6= ras∗).
As mentioned, homomorphic multiplication requires additional evaluation keys
to perform relinearization that brings the quadratic ciphertext in (s∗)2 back to be lin-
ear in s∗. Recall that the evaluation key encrypts the powers of base of the secret key
(s∗)2 = (s1 + · · ·+ sN )2. Since the secret key is shared among N users, they cannot
simply calculate the sum of the square of their individually generated secret keys si,
because (s21+· · ·+s2N ) 6= (s1+· · ·+sN )2. The generation of this evaluation key ek∗
is trickier than the public key due to its fundamentally complex structure. It requires
all N parties to cooperate in a 2-round setup phase to compute the joint evaluation
key from their secret shares. Let α, β ∈ {0, d − 1} be the indexes of coefficients
of the secret s∗, which is a polynomial with degree d − 1, and let ` ∈ {0, blog qc}.
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In the first round, every party will broadcast {Enc(pk∗, t`si[α])}, which is a set of
encryption of all the powers of base t of the i-th secret share’s coefficients. Note if
we aggregate the shares from all parties, we will obtain {Enc(pk∗, t` · s∗[α])}. In the
second round, each party performs a pairwise multiplication between the coefficients
of the aggregated encrypted secret key s∗ and the coefficients of its secret shares si,
yielding ek∗ = {Enc(pk∗, t` · s∗[α] · si[β])}. Combining the shares from all parties
in the second round outputs the joint evaluation key {ek∗}, such that for a←Rq,
the evaluation key is ek∗ = (as∗ + te + t` · s∗ · s∗, a). To avoid making circular
security assumption, the secret (s∗)2 should be encrypted under a different secret s∗,
hence we can generate L joint keys, one for each level l ∈ L, and encrypt (s∗l−1)2
corresponding to level l − 1 under pk∗l as discussed in Sec. 2.4.1.
To decrypt, each user contributes their partial key si by computing the component
ρi = c1si + tei. Then, all users collaboratively produce a component that contains
the sum of all secret keys shares, that is
∑N
i=1 ρi = (c1
∑N




∗ + te∗) = ρ∗. Refer to the decryption process Dec(sk, c) = c0 − ρ∗, the
message can be decrypted correctly when computing c0 − (c1s∗ + te∗).
(T,N ) threshold HE
Threshold HE scheme proposed by Asharov et al [12] targets the anytrust model
where N − 1 participants may be compromised. However, some applications may
need to relax this assumption to an honest-majority one to avoid single point of failure
by enabling only a subset of keys to decrypt. Desmedt and Frankel [58] proposed a
threshold version of ElGamal scheme [65] where only T users out of N are needed
to decrypt. The scheme leverages Shamir’s linear secret sharing [143]. Given a
threshold T and a large prime p as parameters, a trusted dealer performs a key setup
as follows. The dealer uniformly sample a secret key s∗ mod p and set it as the
constant term of a random polynomial f(x) mod p, such that f(0) = s∗. The degree
of this polynomial is determined as T −1 if we want T users to reconstruct the secret.
The dealer then uses this polynomial to generate N secret shares si = f(i) mod p
as unique points for each user i ∈ {1, N}. Finally,broadcast pk∗ = gs∗ as the joint
public key and keep both s∗ and f(x) secret from the users. The intuition is that
Lagrange interpolation can be used to reconstruct the secret s∗ if at least T points
(shares) were provided.
Each user can encrypt a message mi as (ai, bi) = (gri ,migris
∗
) using the public
key gs
∗
and a random value ri. However, at least T users are required to use their
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secret shares to decrypt. This construction of threshold ElGamal requires a trusted
dealer to generate and distribute the secret in the key setup. Pedersen [128] improved
the scheme later by removing the need for this trusted dealer at key setup and enabled
validation of the secret shares for robustness. However, the decryption still requires
a trusted key authority to generate the unique polynomial and decrypt.
Threshold schemes proposed after were based on different encryption schemes [48,
146], not necessarily homomorphic, and removed the need of this trusted dealer by
relying on Diffie-Hellman key generation instead, such as in threshold RSA [52,135].
Boneh et al [21] proposed the first (T,N ) threshold HE scheme based on the LWE
problem. In this scheme, the decryption key is split into N shares among the partic-
ipants. Shamir’s linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) technique is also leveraged
here to allow T key shares to sufficiently decrypt according to a defined threshold
access structure. Moreover, a universal thresholdizer was proposed to extend general
HE schemes to threshold HE schemes. Specifically, a universal thresholdizer split
a given cryptographic key into N valid shares that can be used as individual public
keys.
Discussion
Key management in ThHE schemes is essential to system security. In the key setup,
the joint key is often generated based on participants’ individual keys before any
computation. Each user encrypts their inputs under this one joint key to produce
compact ciphertexts, which means the ciphertext size is independent of the number
of users N . The security depends on the fact that no single user has the decryption
key, which can only be constructed if a threshold set of users cooperated. The joint
key can be revoked when a user is added or removed at any point, but this requires
running the threshold key setup again and re-encrypting all inputs with the new joint
key. It may be a better choice to leverage ThHE schemes in outsourced computations
if participants do not change often. If they do, the efficiency quickly degrades because
the joint key needs to be updated accordingly. In this case, a more flexible approach
is needed to allow computation with multiple keys “on-the-fly” when required.
Potentially, we investigate if the key homomorphism can be used to directly trans-
form ciphertexts from encryptions under individual keys to ones encrypted under a
joint key without prior key setup. For example in the threshold BGV scheme [12],
let [m]A = (c0, c1) = (ra(sA) + teA +m, ra) be a ciphertext encrypting a message
m under Alice’s public key pkA. A cloud evaluator may perform joint homomorphic
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evaluation on this ciphertext for Alice and Bob such that the result is encrypted under
their joint key pkAB . Using Bob’s public key pkB = (asB + teB, a), the cloud can
construct a component ξB = (rasB + teB) which is the encryption of zero if the
randomness r is known. Then, the cloud can add this component to the ciphertext
as [m]AB = (c0 + ξB, c1) = (ra(sA + sB) + t(eA + eB) + m, ra), which is an
encryption under pkAB .
Unfortunately, this approach has two major flaws that breach the security of the
scheme. First, the encryption randomness r may need to be fixed and shared with
the cloud similar to the CRS element a. Recall that the BGV scheme encryption
algorithm depends on r to randomize the ciphertexts. Fixing this element renders
a deterministic encryption scheme which loses its semantic security property. i.e.,
encrypting the same message at different times will yield the same ciphertexts. The
second flaw is more vital since this technique relies on disclosing the randomness r
to the cloud evaluator. Obviously, this breaks the security of the scheme. Specifically,
given a ciphertext [m]A, the cloud evaluator can easily decrypt it by constructing a
component (rasA) using the public key pkA and compute m̃ = c0−rasA = m+teA
(mod q), which removes the large element rasA and yield m = m̃ (mod t).
Due to these security issues, ThHE cannot be simply modified to support on-
the-fly computation with different keys. Alternatively, a multi-key technique targets
this problem and extends HE schemes to dynamic transformation of ciphertexts by
concatenating the different public keys and treating them as one key. We review this
technique in depth in the following section.
5.1.2 Multi-key HE (MKHE)
A more dynamic approach to support multiparty computation with multiple keys is
multi-key HE. The first notion of multi-key HE (MKHE) schemes was introduced
by López-Alt et al. [106] to support the homomorphic evaluation on ciphertexts en-
crypted under different keys. Compared to ThHE schemes, this type of HE schemes
remove the need of a key setup phase to generate a joint key from individual keys
prior to any computation. Instead, a cloud evaluator can dynamically extend ci-
phertexts from encryption under individual keys to ones under the concatenation of
individual users’ keys (pk1, . . . , pkK). However, both ThHE and MKHE schemes
are similar in requiring users to cooperate and run a distributed decryption proto-
col when retrieving the evaluated result. In general, an MKHE scheme is a tuple
of PPT algorithms MKHE = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Extend, EvalKeyGen,Eval,Dec).
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We formally define each algorithm as follow.
- MKHE.Setup(1λ, 1K) → pp: Given a security parameter λ and a bound K on the
number of keys, the setup algorithm outputs the public parameters pp.
- MKHE.KeyGen(pp) → (pk, sk): Given the public parameters pp, the key genera-
tion algorithm outputs a public key pk, a private key sk.
- MKHE.Enc(pk,m) → c: Given a public key pk and a message m, the encryption
algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
- MKHE.Extend({pk1, · · · , pkK}, c)→ c̄: Given a set ofK public keys pk1, · · · , pkK
where K ≤ K, and a ciphertext c, the output is the extended ciphertext c̄ under the
concatenated public key p̄k.
- MKHE.EvalKeyGen(p̄k) → ēk: Given a concatenated public key p̄k generate the
corresponding evaluation (relinearization) key ēk.
- MKHE.Eval(p̄k, f, c̄, c̄′) → ceval: Given two extended ciphertexts c̄, c̄′ under the
same concatenated public key p̄k, the evaluation algorithm outputs the evaluated
ciphertext c̄eval = f(c̄, c̄′).
- MKHE.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK), c̄) → m: Given a set of concatenated secret shares
(sk1, . . . , skK) and an extended ciphertext c̄, the interactive decryption algorithm
performs decryption and outputs the message m
López-Alt et al. [106] proposed the first multi-key HE scheme based on NTRU
HE scheme [150]. In the LTV scheme, two ciphertexts encrypted under two diff
public keys pk1, pk2 can be added and correctly decrypted to the sum using the joint
corresponding secret keys sk1sk2 as long as the additive noise is not too large. Naive
decryption in LTV requires involved secret keys to be constructed based on the eval-
uated circuit, e.g., the ciphertext c21c2 is decrypted with the secret keys sk
2
1sk2. The
size of the decryption key grows based on both the number of involved keys and the
depth of the circuit which affects the scheme’s efficiency. To make keys independent
of the circuit, key switching can be applied on the evaluated ciphertext such that it be-
comes decryptable with the original secret key, e.g., the ciphertext c21c2 is decrypted
with sk1sk2 instead of sk21sk2.
After the LTV scheme [106], many works propose MKHE constructions with dif-
ferent capabilities and security assumptions. We categorize these schemes as single-
hop if the extended ciphertext cannot be further extended to additional keys after
being homomorphically evaluated because of inherent scheme limitations. Other-
wise, we categorize them as multi-hop MKHE schemes, which dynamically extend
ciphertexts to additional keys.
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Single-hop MKHE
Clear and McGoldrick [45] proposed a compiler for a multi-identity homomorphic
IBE scheme based on the GSW scheme [78] (see Appendix A.2). This compiler pro-
duces ciphertexts that are encrypted under different identities, instead of only sup-
porting single-identity in the original GSW scheme. Identities can be viewed as an
analog to keys in HE schemes; hence, a multi-key HE scheme can be also obtained
in this way. Mukherjee and Wichs [115] improved this MKHE scheme and built a
general two-round MPC protocol on top of it, including the first introduction of a
detailed distributed decryption protocol.
In the improved multi-key variant of the GSW scheme, a ciphertext C1 encrypted






X2 is specifically included to provide information needed to eliminate any lingering
elements when decrypting with the concatenated keys sk1sk2. The dimension of the
extended ciphertext increases quadratically with the number of involved keys because
we have to add additional copies of the ciphertext C diagonally and provide an auxil-
iary element X for each additional key. Figure 5.3a illustrates the extension process
to K keys in this scheme. Homomorphic evaluation on extended ciphertexts per-
forms the usual GSW addition and multiplication. The only difference is performing
on ciphertexts with higher dimensions based on the number of involved keys.
Compared to the LTV scheme [106], the GSW-based scheme does not limit the
maximum number of keys the ciphertext can be extended to. Yet, the scheme is still
not robust because no additional keys, or even further homomorphic evaluations, can
be supported on evaluated ciphertexts. Moreover, the ciphertext size expansion is
significant, which affects the overall practicality of the scheme.
Multi-hop MKHE
An MKHE scheme is multi-hop if an extended ciphertext can be further evaluated
or extended to additional keys after being homomorphically evaluated.The MKHE
schemes adopted a new design that is multi-hop and overcomes the limitations of
earlier single-hop MKHE scheme in CM [45] and MW [115].
Building on the single-hop MW scheme [115], two concurrent works [28, 130]
proposed techniques to extend it to the multi-hop setting. Peikert and Shiehian [130]
proposed a leveled scheme based on [115] that has a new ciphertext structure and
extension function as illustrated in Fig. 5.3b. The new construction introduces an








































(b) Multi-hop MK-GSW [130]
Figure 5.3: Single-hop and multi-hop MK-variants of the GSW scheme
element F which is a commitment of the plaintext message under a public parameter.
With this new design, it is possible to further extend the ciphertext C̄ to K additional
keys. Note in the Fig. 5.3, some elements in the extended ciphertexts have been
substituted from C1 to F . The new scheme is multi-hop because the element F
is tied to the same public parameter rather than a new key at every key extension
process. Hence, there is no need to provide additional elements encrypted under a
specific key to construct a canceling term for any lingering elements as done in the
single-hop scheme.
The size of the ciphertext grows quadratically with the number of involved keys.
Hence, the scheme is limited by a bounded number of keys. An alternative scheme is
introduced by authors [130] to obtain smaller ciphertexts. Specifically, the extended
ciphertext remains as a GSW encryption, but the additional extension information
is embedded in its corresponding public key instead. This scheme yields smaller
ciphertexts but larger public keys, which reduces the space overhead since the number
of evaluated ciphertexts is likely to be more than the number of extended public keys.
Both schemes are leveled, which support homomorphic evaluations up to a predefined
level, but they can be made fully through the bootstrapping technique.
Brakerski and Perlman [28] proposed a fully MK-variant of GSW scheme to
overcome the single-hop limitation in [115]. Ciphertexts in the single-hop scheme
cannot be further extended without being decrypted and encrypted again. This pro-
cess can be done homomorphically via bootstrapping, as discussed in Sec. 2.3.2.
Hence, the Brakerski-Perlman method depends on the use of bootstrapable NAND
gates for evaluation. Note that a NAND gate has a function completeness property,
which means we can support any other operation by combining a set of NAND gates.
Let C1 and C2 be two ciphertexts encrypted under two different keys pk1 and pk2.
Evaluating a bootstrapable NAND on the two ciphertexts homomorphically performs
NAND(Dec(sk1,C1),Dec(sk2,C2)) and yields the extended ciphertext C̄ that is en-
crypted under the concatenated keys (pk1, pk2). As observed, we must provide as
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inputs the secret keys sk1, sk2 encrypted under their corresponding public keys to en-
able homomorphic decryption. Therefore, a circular-security assumption is required.
Moreover, the size of the ciphertexts can be significantly reduced in this scheme.
The decryption process can be sufficiently done with one single column vector of
the GSW ciphertext. Since we need to perform decryption first in the evaluation, the
scheme proposes to keep the last column of the ciphertext and discard the rest. Hence,
the size of the ciphertexts grows linearly, instead of quadratically, with the number
of involved keys. There is no bound on the number because ciphertexts are refreshed
after each evaluation, which keeps the noise level reduced. However, the bootstrap-
ping can be slow, and the efficiency of the scheme may degrade as the number of
bootstrapable gates increases.
Chen et al. [42] introduced the first multi-key variant of the BGV scheme that
is based on the RLWE assumption. This Chen-Zhang-Wang (CZW) scheme extends
the BGV scheme [27] to a multi-hop MKHE setting (i.e., the extended ciphertext can
be extended to further keys after the homomorphic evaluation). The scheme supports
extending a ciphertext to a fixed number of keys. Similar to other RLWE-based
schemes, the CZW scheme requires a generation of evaluation keys to perform key
switching technique after each homomorphic operation. In the proposed scheme, the
evaluation keys are generated as ring-GSW ciphertexts such that they can be extended
to multiple keys which correspond to the extended ciphertext. We describe below the
main functions of the CZW scheme.
- CZW.Setup(1λ, 1L, 1K): Given the security parameter λ, a multiplicative depth L,
and a bound K on the number of keys, run the BGV.Setup function. Output the
public parameters pp = (d, q, t, χ, ψ,a) where a←R`q is the CRS vector.
- CZW.KeyGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, run BGV.KeyGen to generate
a key pair (sk, pk) as sk = s←ψ, and pk = (b = −as+ te, a) where a←Rq and
e←χ.
- CZW.EvalKeyGen(sk): Given the secret sk = s, generate a helper component ek′
as a set of ciphertexts encrypting each bit of secret key s and their encryption
randomnesses under a Ring variant of GSW (ring-GSW) scheme, where messages
are ring elements instead of bits. For 0 ≤ i < `, output the ring-GSW ciphertexts
Θi = ring-GSW.Enc(pk, gi · s), Ψi = ring-GSW.Enc(pk, g−1(s)[i]). Similarly,
provide ring-GSW encryptions of the randomnesses ri, r′i used in Ψi and Θi such
that Fi = ring-GSW.Enc(pk, ri) and F ′i = ring-GSW.Enc(pk, r
′
i). Output the
helper element as ek′ = {(Θi, Fi), (Ψi, F ′i )}i∈{0,...,`−1}.
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- CZW.Enc(pk,m): Given a messagem ∈ Rt and a public key pk, perform BGV.Enc
to obtain the ciphertext as c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q where c0 = rb + m + te0 and
c1 = ra + te1. Assume each participant has a unique index i and initiate an
ordered set S = (i) for the ciphertext. Output the fresh BGV ciphertext as the
tuple ĉ = (c,S, L), where L is the initial level.
- CZW.Extend((pk1, . . . , pkK), ĉ): To extend a BGV ciphertext to one encrypted
under a set of K users’ keys, simply set the ciphertext c as a concatenated K sub-
vectors c̄ = (c′1, . . . , c
′
K) ∈ R2Nql , such that c
′
i = ci if the index i ∈ S , and c′i = 0
otherwise. Update the index set S and the level correspondingly.
- CZW.Eval(p̄k, f, c̄, c̄′): Given two extended ciphertexts c̄, c̄′ ∈ R2Kql encrypted
under the same concatenated key p̄k, perform homomorphic addition as c̄add =
c̄ + c̄′ (mod q) and homomorphic multiplication as c̄mult = c̄⊗ c̄′ (mod q).
- CZW.Relin({ek′1, . . . , ek′K}, c̃mult): Given a set of helper elements, generate an
evaluation key ēk for the extended initial ciphertext product c̄mult as follows. For
each user 1 ≤ k ≤ K, extend each ring-GSW encryption in ek′k to the other set of
keys {pkj 6=k}1≤j≤K to obtain ēk
′. Then, homomorphically compute ēk = ēk′⊗ēk′,
which encrypts s̄k2. Use this extended evaluation key to perform relinearization as
c̄mult = BGV.Relin(ēk, c̄mult).
- CZW.Dec((sk1, . . . , skK), c̄): Given an extended ciphertext c̄, and the secret key s̄
concatenating all the secret keys of users in the set S . Decrypt as (〈c̄, s̄〉 (mod q))
(mod t) = (
∑K
i=1〈c′i, si〉 (mod q)) (mod t).
The scheme supports extending the ciphertexts to at most K keys. Let K ≤ K be
the number of participants who wish to compute with their keys. Each participant is
assigned a unique index i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such their index is recorded in an ordered set
S for each ciphertext under the corresponding key. Let c1 ∈ R2q be a BGV ciphertext
encrypting m1 under the public key pk1. The set for the ciphertext c1 is populated
with the index 1 as S = (1) since the encryption is under the first participant’s key
pk1. Extending the ciphertext to a second key pk2 is done by constructing a new
ciphertext with two slots as c̄1 = (c′1, c
′
2) ∈ R4q . Each slot holds a sub-ciphertext
corresponding to the index set. In particular, we define c′1 = c1 ∈ R2q as the original
ciphertext since the index 1 ∈ S. The second sub-ciphertext is initiated as zero
c′2 = (0, 0) ∈ R2q because the index 2 /∈ S. The index set is updated after the
extension to include the new index S = (1, 2). In a similar manner, we can further
extend this ciphertext to additional K keys as illustrated in Fig. 5.4a. The size of
the ciphertext increases linearly with the number of keys such that for a ciphertext
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Figure 5.4: The MK-variant of the BGV scheme [42]
encrypted under K keys, we have c̄ ∈ R2Kq .
Homomorphic evaluations can be performed on the extended ciphertexts. Given
two ciphertexts c̄1, c̄2 ∈ R4q encrypted under the same set of keys, their sum is ob-
tained through slot-wise homomorphic addition c̄add = c̄1 + c̄2 ∈ R4q . Note that
sub-ciphertexts in different slots do not interact directly with each other. Rather, slot-
wise operations are performed and the final result can be aggregated at the decryption
step as shown in the example in Fig. 5.4b. On the other hand, homomorphic multi-
plication is done by performing tensor-product of the two ciphertexts. The initial
product is a long ciphertext c̄mult = c̄1 ⊗ c̄2 ∈ R16q that is encrypted under s̄ ⊗ s̄
instead of s̄. We need to apply key switching to convert c̄mult to an encryption under
s̄ and reduce its dimension to R4q . As mentioned in Sec. 2.3.1, this process requires
providing an evaluation key ek, which encrypts the long secret key s̄ ⊗ s̄. To facil-
itate the generation of the evaluation key corresponding to the extended secret key,
the scheme proposes a ring-GSW scheme, which allows encrypting ring elements.
Specifically, each participant provides a GSW encryption of their secret key si such
that each row can be viewed as a BGV ciphertext. Then, these ciphertexts can be
extended to their concatenated keys. Lastly, one homomorphic multiplication is per-
formed to obtain the encryption of s̄ ⊗ s̄ under the extended key that is used in the
key switching procedure.
The decryption process can be done with a two-round distributed decryption pro-
tocol similar to previous schemes [28, 115, 130]. It requires all participants, whose
indexes are in S, to collaborate in a distributed decryption protocol. Each participant
uses their secret key ski to decrypt the corresponding sub-ciphertext c′i. Observe that
decryptions of zero sub-ciphertexts are canceled, and the final result can be obtained
through the aggregation of the decrypted BGV sub-ciphertexts.

















Figure 5.5: Collaborative homomorphic evaluation with multiple keys
5.2 Proposed Hybrid MKHE Approach (MKHE+)
The proportional increase in ciphertext size remains a bottleneck for efficient MKHE
schemes. The size of a ciphertext grows corresponding to the number of involved
parties’ keys. We proposed a new hybrid approach (we refer to it as MKHE+) based
on the BGV scheme [27]. The scheme supports homomorphic computation over
ciphertexts encrypted under multi-key and produces small ciphertexts. The approach
targets a coopetitve system model, shown in Fig 5.5, whereN parties contribute their
prediction models to provide joint prediction services for their clients. The group of
N model owners are likely to remain the same during the evaluation for each user.
Hence, they generate one joint key using the threshold HE approach to encrypt their
models under this joint key. On the other hand, a client’s request can be dynamic
as a client can come and go; therefore, a client can encrypt their data under their
own key. At evaluation, the ciphertexts can be extended “on-the-fly” to two keys.
More specifically, each encrypted model is transformed from a ciphertext under the
joint key to one under a concatenation of the model owner’s joint key and the client’s
key. Similarly, the ciphertexts under the client’s key can be extended to two keys, the
client’s key and the model owners’ joint key.
The hybrid approach combines Threshold HE and Multi-key HE to remove the
requirement of generating a joint key for every client with the model owners. It also
produces short extended ciphertexts since the number of involved keys is 2 instead of
K + 1 especially when K > 2. We present this hybrid MKHE+ scheme as follows.
- MKHE+.Setup(1λ, 1L, 1K): Given the security parameter λ, a multiplicative depth
L, and a bound K on the number of keys, run the BGV.Setup and output pp =
(R,χ, q,a, t) where a←R`q is the CRS vector.
- MKHE+.KeyGen(pp: Given the public parameters pp, choose a←a and generate
a key pair (pkMi , skMi) for each model owner Mi where i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
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(pkCi , skCi) for each client C. Then for the set of model owners, generate a joint
key pkM in a threshold manner as in AJL+.JointKeyGen.
- MKHE+.Enc(pk,m): Each model owner encrypts their model under the joint key
pkM and delegates them to the evaluator (if in outsourced system model, see
Fig. 1.1c). The client encrypts their input under their public key pkC .
- MKHE+.Extend((pkM, pkC), c): When evaluation is requested, the evaluator first
extends each ciphertext under the set of the two keys p̄k = (pkM, pkC) using the
algorithm CZW.Extend((pk1, . . . , pkN ), c) described in the CZW scheme.
- MKHE+.EvalKeyGen(skMi , skC): Given a set of model owners’ secret keys and the
client’s secret key, first generate a joint helper element ek′M (in a threshold manner)
and a helper element ek′C as in CZW.EvalKeyGen.
- MKHE+.Eval(c̄1, c̄2): Computations now can be done on extended ciphertexts c̄, c̄2
that are encrypted under the same extended key p̄k. The homomorphic addition of
two extended ciphertexts is performed as element-wise addition, and the homomor-
phic multiplication is performed as the tensor product. Multiplication increases the
dimension exponentially. Hence, the relinearization technique must be applied.
- MKHE+.Relin(ek′M, ek
′
C , c̄mult): Given two helper elements, generate the extended
evaluation key ēk for the extended initial ciphertext product and apply the key
switching technique as described in CZW.Relin to reduce the dimension and allow
further homomorphic operations.
- MKHE+.Dec((skM, skC), c̄): Given an extended ciphertext that is encrypted under
the extended key p̄k = (pkM, pkC), invoke the distributed decryption protocol
between the model owners and the client to perform the decryption as the following
algorithm, Dec(s̄, c̄) = (〈cC , sC〉+
∑N
i=1〈cM, sMi〉 (mod q)) (mod t).
5.2.1 MKHE+ Construction
As an example, we use our secure evaluation of random forests protocol in Chapter 4
to showcase utilization of this hybrid scheme. We construct a four-round protocol that
consists of four different phases: key setup, encryption, evaluation, and decryption.
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 give an illustration and overview of these four phases.
Key setup In this phase, we generate key pair (pkMi , skMi) for each model owner,
and key pair (pkCi , skCi) for each client. Moreover, we generate the correspond-
ing evaluation helper elements ek′Mi and ek
′
Ci , which encrypts auxiliary information
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Figure 5.6: Illustration of the four main phases for secure collaborative evaluation
protocol with multi-key support
about the secret key. These elements are used to produce the evaluation key ek, which
is required to perform key switching after each homomorphic evaluation in the multi-
key BGV scheme.
In this system setting, the N model owners do not change frequently; hence, we
set up a joint key pkM once before the start of the protocol as shown in Fig. 5.6(a).
The joint key is generated, in a threshold manner, as the sum of the model owners’
individual keys. It is used to encrypt the models before sending them to the Cloud.
Note that the encrypted model cannot be decrypted unless all the model owners col-
laborated since the corresponding secret key skM is shared among them. The joint
key can be revoked or updated, but this requires running the threshold key setup again
and encrypting the models with the new joint key. This threshold key setup differs
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Setup phase.
Model owner Mi ∈M: (1) Generate SWHE key pairs (pkMi , skMi) and evaluation helper
element ek′Mi
(2) Generate with the other model owners the joint key pkM =
∑N
i=1 pkMi and the





(3) Provide a threshold bit y ∈ R2 and two possible output bits A,B ∈ R2.
(4) Define a model as the polynomial Ti = bi·A+(1−bi)·B, such that bi = 1(x 6= yi).
Client C: (1) Provide an input bit x ∈ R2.




Model owner Mi: (1) Encrypt the threshold and class labels bits yi, A,B using the joint
public key pkM, and output [yi]M, [A]M, [B]M.
(3) Send (pkM, ek
′
M, [yi]M, [A]M, [B]M) to the evaluator.
Client C: (1) Encrypt the bit x using the SWHE public key pkC , and output [x].
(3) Send (pkC , ek
′
C , [x]) to the evaluator to start the evaluation.
Evaluator: (1) Encrypt the value 1 under the model owner’s key pkM, and output [1]M.
(2) Extend the ciphertexts [y]M, [A]M, [B]M, [1]M from encryptions under pkM
to ones under the extended SWHE key p̄k = {pkM, pkc} using the extension
function CZW.Extend, and output [[y]] = {0, [y]M}, [[A]] = {0, [A]M}, [[B]] =
{0, [B]M}, [[1]] = {0, [1]M}.
(2) Similarly, Extend ciphertexts [x]C from encryption under pkC , yielding
[[x]] = {[x]C , 0}.
Evaluation phase.
Evaluator: (1) Evaluate [[b]] = CZW.Add([[x]], [[y]]); the result is [[b]] = [[1]](x 6= y).
(2) Evaluate each decision tree Ti using [[b]], and output [[vi]] = Ti(x, yi).
(3) Perform secure counting protocol among results, yielding F(x) = [[vk]] where zk
is maximum.
(4) Send the second ciphertext cM of the encrypted result F(x) to each model owner
Mi to help with decryption.
Decryption phase.
Model owner Mi: (1) Construct ρi = c1sMi from each ciphertext cM = (c0, c1) using their
secret share sMi .
(2) Add a large “smudging” error tei to the component, such that ρi = c1sMi + tei.
(3) Send this new component ρi back to the evaluator.





(2) Send the encrypted result F(x) with the aggregated decryption component ρ to the
client.
Client C: (1) Decrypt the ciphertext F(X) that is encrypted under the extended key p̄k =
{pkC , pkM} using the provided component ρ and the client’s own secret key skC to
obtain the final result.
Figure 5.7: An overview of secure decision tree evaluation phases using the proposed
approach for multi-key support
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from the one proposed by Asharov et al. [12] because, at the end of their protocol,
the evaluation key ek that is used in evaluation is directly generated. However, in
our approach, we need first to generate the evaluation helper element ek′ that can be
extended later to multiple keys.
As mentioned, ek′ must encrypt information on the bits of the secret key sM. The
secret key sM is shared among N parties; therefore, we can generate the evaluation
helper element by homomorphically adding the individual ek′Mi . The homomorphic
addition can be achieved by using performing a fast full adder on the encrypted bits.
The full adder algorithm contains a homomorphic multiplication, which is not the
most efficient design. We briefly discuss optimization in Sec. 5.2.2.
On the other hand, each client C independently generates their own key pair
(skC , pkC). The output of the key generation step also includes a generated evalu-
ation helper element ek′C .
Encryption The model owner Mi encrypts each threshold value yi and the class
labels A,B under the joint key pkM. The model owner sends the encryptions and
the evaluation helper element (pkM, ek
′
M, [yi]M, [A]M, [B]M) to the evaluator. The
evaluator then encrypts, under the joint public key pkM, the value 1 which is a part
of the model Ti. On the other hand, the client encrypts the input bit x ∈ {0, 1}
under their public key pkC and sends the encryption [x]C ∈ R2q to the evaluator for
evaluation. When the client C requests an evaluation, the evaluator first extends each
ciphertext under the set of the two keys p̄k = {pkM, pkC} as described in the ex-
tending algorithm Extend({pkM, pkC}, c) in Sec. 5.1.2. The extended client’s ci-
phertext is [[x]] = {[x]C , 0} ∈ R4q . Other ciphertexts are extended similarly to obtain
[[y]] = {0, [yi]M}, [[A]] = {0, [A]M}, and [[B]] = {0, [B]M}.
Evaluation For each model Ti in the joint model F = {T1, . . . , TN}, compute the
encrypted boolean value [[bi]] as the sum of the two extended ciphertexts [[x]], [[yi]],
such that [[bi]] = [[x]] + [[yi]] = {[x]C , 0}+ {0, [yi]M} = {[x]C , [yi]M} ∈ R4q .
After that, the obtained boolean value is used to evaluate the model Ti(x) =
[[vi]] = [[bi]] · [[A]]+([[1]]− [[b]]) · [[B]], such that [[vi]] = {[x]C , [y]M}·{0, [A]M}+
({0, [1]M}− {[x]C , [y]M}) · {0, [B]M}.
The homomorphic multiplication of two extended ciphertexts c̄, c̄′ ∈ R4q is per-
formed as a tensor product c̄ ⊗ c̄′ ∈ R16q , which increases the dimension exponen-
tially. The key switching technique is then applied with the help of the evaluation
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key ek to reduce the dimension, such that c̄mult = KeySwitch(ek, c̄⊗ c̄′) ∈ R4q , and
perform further homomorphic operations.
After evaluating each model {T1(x), . . . , TN (x), the results are aggregated using
a secure count protocol (its implementation is omitted due to space limitations). The
output of the protocol is the encryption of the class label with the highest count.
Decryption After the evaluation, the evaluator produces the result that is encrypted
under the extended key p̄k = {pkM, pkC}. To decrypt the extended ciphertext result
c̄ = {cC , cM}, we need the corresponding extended secret key s̄ = {sC , sM}. Note
that the secret key sM is secretly shared among N model owners, hence we pro-
pose the following decryption algorithm, Dec(c̄, s̄) = 〈cC , sC〉+
∑N
i=1〈cM, sMi〉 =
(m′C + teC) + (m
′
M + teM) = m̄+ tē ≈ m (mod t).
In the collaborative system design, the client will not be able to decrypt the re-
sult without model owners’ secret shares of the key. Hence, the evaluator invokes
a decryption protocol to obtain a decryption component needed to perform the part∑N
i=1〈cM, sMi〉 from the decryption algorithm shown above.
In our protocol, the evaluator performs a partial decryption on the result such
that it transforms it to a ciphertext under the client’s key. As shown in Fig. 5.6(c),
the evaluator sends cM,1 to all model owners. Upon receiving cM,1, each model
owner Mi will construct ρi = cM,1sMi + teMi , where eMi is a large smudging noise,
and return it back to the evaluator. After collecting the components from all model
owners, the evaluator send the extended encrypted result c̄ to the client along with
the aggregated value ρ =
∑N
i=1 ρi = cM,1sM + teM. The client then computes:
m′ = 〈cC , sC〉+ (cM,0 − ρ)
= (cC,0 − cC,1sc) + (cM,0 − cM,1sM + teM)




≈ m (mod t)
5.2.2 Security and Complexity Analysis
Security analysis Our proposed approach is secure in the semi-honest setting, where
the system users follow the protocol specification and do not deviate from it. The
semi-honest cloud evaluates on encrypted models and client inputs, which are pro-
tected under the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme.
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The decryption protocol follows the dishonest-majority assumption where all the
users are required to participate in decryption to retrieve the final classification result.
Note that the Cloud invokes a threshold decryption protocol to generate a decryption
component from the model owners. This step generates the decryption component
for the partial ciphertext cM encrypted under pkM, but the result remains encrypted
under the client’s key, who performs the final decryption.
Complexity analysis We analyze the space and communication complexities of the
proposed approach. The size of the extended ciphertext expands at most two concate-
nated ciphertext, i.e., a constant of size 2. For communication, the one-time threshold
key setup requires at most N interactions between model owners. The collaborative
evaluation of the models based on the client’s input requires two interactions. The
decryption protocol requires 2N interactions with the model owners.
Optimizations The threshold key setup is performed in an MPC setting. While the
design is secure, it is not efficient due to the full adder circuit that consists of homo-
morphic multiplication. As an optimization, we can make a small security trade-off
by using a trusted party. The trusted party generates a key pair (pkM, skM), and the
evaluation helper element ek′ directly from the secret key skM = sM. To produce
the secret shares of the secret key for each model owner {M1, . . . ,MN}, we sample
N small secrets such that skMi = (sM −
∑N
j=1 sMj ); i 6= j.
5.2.3 Comparison with Related Work
We provide a comparison of the different MKHE schemes in Table 5.2. We also
include four recent MKHE schemes [36, 37, 104, 170], proposed after our research
and the schemes discussed in Sec. 5.1.2 and are based on the BGV, BFV, CKKS, and
TFHE schemes. Note, our construction can be improved based on the work proposed
in [104], but we leave this as a future work.
As observed from the table, we can improve the ciphertext size from growing
quadratically in early works [60, 106, 115, 130] to growing linearly with the number
of keys in the recent works [28, 37, 42, 104]. The majority of schemes are multi-hop,
which means an extended ciphertext can be further extended to additional keys after
homomorphic evaluations. Most schemes [37, 42, 115, 130] also require key genera-
tion to use a public parameter in the CRS model. Moreover, the RLWE-based MKHE
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Quadratic - × × X × ×
MW [115] Quadratic 2 × × X × ×
PS [130] Quadratic 2 X X X × ×
BP [28] Linear 2 X × X × X




Linear 2 X X X X ×
Ours [5] Constant 4 ∗ X X X X ×
YKHK [170] Linear 2 X X X X ×
LZYH+ [104] Linear 2 X X X X ×
CDKS [37] BFV, CKKS Linear 2 X X X X ×
CCS [36] TFHE TLWE Linear 2 X X X × X
∗ Two extra rounds are for the ThHE setup phase to generate the joint key.
schemes [5, 37, 42] support packing multiple messages in one ciphertext which en-
ables SIMD evaluations.
5.3 Conclusions
Many secure computation applications require stronger security models where data
are protected under different keys. In this chapter, we explored current solutions
that support this model of computation. We categorized them, based on the number
of keys involved in the encryption, to single-key and multi-key approaches and high-
lighted the limitations in the multi-key approaches. We proposed a new approach that
combines the threshold and multi-key HE to support collaborative computation on ci-
phertexts encrypted under different keys. We applied our design to the collaborative
ML setting discussed in Chapter 4. In general, our proposed approach (1) removes
the need of key setup between a client and the set of model owners, (2) reduces the
number of encryptions of the same model, and (3) reduces the ciphertext size with
dimension reduction from (N+1)×2 to 2×2. We presented the detail design of this
approach and analyzed the complexity and security. Finally, we compared between
our construction and related MKHE schemes.
Our work [5, 6] has been accepted at the International Workshop on Privacy En-
gineering (IWPE’19), co-located with IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P’19) and presented in the S&P’19 poster session. The proposed techniques
were also leveraged in our other work [9] published in the IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC 2019). Additionally, our comprehensive





So far, we have conducted research to leverage HE primitives in developing crypto-
graphic protocols for common building blocks, such as string matching and compar-
ison, to address RQ1. We also designed techniques to support homomorphic compu-
tations with multiple keys to tackle RQ2. We applied our protocols and techniques to
application-specific protocols as examples. Now, our goal to expand the impact of the
powerful HE support to real-world use cases. In this chapter, we address RQ3 and
explore the integration of HE primitives and protocols to existing data processing
frameworks in order to enable large-scale distributed data processing and machine
learning (ML) on encrypted data.
Nowadays, many data analysis tasks are outsourced to the Cloud for its com-
pelling economic efficiency and wide accessibility. Cloud computing becomes cru-
cial for performing big data analysis and supporting ML at scale through massive
parallelization of tasks across large clusters of computing nodes. In data centers,
a large number of computing resources and tasks are managed by distributed data
processing frameworks, such as Apache Hadoop, Apache Spark [173], and Apache
Flink [33]. These frameworks provide data and programming abstractions for the
development of data analytics algorithms. Cluster management and scheduling al-
gorithms that facilitate efficient resource management and task allocation are also
provided.
While efficiency in data processing is achieved, outsourcing computation to the
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Cloud often raises privacy concerns when the data is sensitive, such as health data, lo-
cation data, or financial data. As discussed, some of these data, such as the fingerprint
pattern or genome data of a person [125], are irreplaceable once leaked. Many cloud
providers apply conventional cryptographic techniques to protect data in-transit and
at-rest, but still do not provide protection when data is in-use. This is because con-
ventionally encrypted sensitive data must be decrypted before the Cloud can compute
on it. This means that the Cloud needs access to a secret key and that during the time
of computation, the private data can potentially be accessible, which leads to security
breaches and insider attacks [70, 131].
Alternatively, private data can be homomorphically encrypted, which allows com-
putations to be performed directly without decryption. With this capability, HE
enables privacy-preserving outsourced storage and computation services with very
low communication overhead. Many existing work support secure query process-
ing [127,133,157] and MapReduce processing [61,155,156] jobs on encrypted data.
The schemes combine a variety of encryption schemes, such as randomized functions
(RND), deterministic encryption (DET), order-preserving encryption (OPE), and par-
tial HE to support job processing. Some of them [156, 157] rely on a trusted hyper-
visor to process some of the work (e.g., convert between encryptions). Others [61]
avoid the trusted party by involving both the server and client in the computation and
leveraging secret-sharing and MPC protocols.
None of the current solutions study the leverage of recent LWE-based HE schemes,
which support both addition and multiplication and provide post-quantum security
guarantee. In practice, HE still suffers from large computational overhead and ci-
phertext expansion. Moreover, there is a considerable learning curve for developers
to use different HE libraries. For these reasons, we propose our secure distributed
data processing framework, SparkFHE. Our framework integrates HE capabilities
with the robust cluster-computing framework, Apache Spark.
6.1 Cluster Programming vs. Distributed Dataflow
Huge datasets require systematic ways to parallelize data processing tasks across
large clusters of computing nodes. When data is encrypted, parallelization across a
cluster is even more important because ciphertexts are large in size and computation
may have to be applied on every ciphertext element. Existing solutions often face
a limitation on computation and space complexity as data volume grow. Message-

















(b) Distributed Dataflow model
Figure 6.1: MapReduce and Distributed Dataflow models
passing API (e.g., OpenMPI [73]) allows low-level control of how parallelization
takes place but solutions are often optimized for a specific application and not trans-
ferable to other applications. Developers of the application have to manually deal
with low-level distributed system details, such as managing resource orchestration
and task allocation.
The MapReduce model [56] was one of the most successful programming ab-
straction for parallelizing large-scale data processing tasks. It is adopted by many
widely used frameworks, such as Apache Hadoop. Within the MapReduce model,
data processing tasks are modeled as jobs which will be sent to and performed by
a worker node. As the name suggested, there are two types of jobs: map(f ), which
transforms data by applying a given lambda function f producing some intermediate
results, and reduce(f ), which often aggregates or summarizes these intermediate re-
sults. As a drawback in this model, processed data is sent back to storage until it is
fetched again for the next transformation or cached if reuse is possible. As illustrated
in Fig. 6.1a, data is moved to where computation is taking place from a distributed
file system (DFS) and then back to DFS after each processing. This design will pro-
duce heavy data movement overhead, which is not ideal for large-scale and stream
data processing [151].
In contrast, the distributed dataflow (DDF) model [3] describes the data process-
ing tasks in a DDF graph (or a directed graph) in which vertices are data to be pro-
cessed and edges are functions or operation to be applied on the input data. A DDF
graph is like an execution plan, or a recipe, specifying how data should be trans-
formed by applying the given lambda functions f . As illustrated in Fig. 6.1b, worker
nodes are given a DDF graph and load the input data from DFS. Then, they transform
the data according to the DDF graph. Hence, data transformations can be modulized
into small autonomic functions so that recovery from failure is fast and caching is
efficient. Moreover, data transformations are mostly in-place, which minimizes sig-
nificant data movement overhead, especially when the dataset size is large. Final
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results are typically aggregated or summarized before sending back to storage.
In our work, we focus on DDF frameworks due to their superior benefits com-
pared to the MapReduce models. Apache Spark [173] is a well-known, open-source,
and highly-efficient cluster programming framework for large-scale data process-
ing. At its core, Spark has a data abstraction called resilient distributed dataset
(RDD) [171], which is a DDF graph for modeling how data can be transformed by the
specified lambda functions f , as shown in Fig. 6.1b. Based on the technique of micro-
batching RDD [172], Spark supports processing of stream data and iterative programs
which is an important feature for enabling Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS).
The MLlib package [110] of Spark supports many well-known ML algorithms for re-
gression and classification problems. Building on RDD, Spark introduces DataFrame
and Dataset as abstractions to support query processing for (semi-)structured data.
As a result of these abstractions, Spark hides the complexity of distributed systems
allowing data partitioners to focus on the design of the data processing algorithms.
6.2 Proposed SparkFHE Framework
SparkFHE is a new distributed data processing framework, which can be deployed
as a Cloud infrastructure to secure the outsourced computation. SparkFHE integrates
HE to protect user’s outsourced private data and enable homomorphic data analysis
or evaluation of ML algorithms on the ciphertexts while they are stored in distributed
file systems. The result of these computations is also encrypted and can be only
decrypted with the data owner’s secret key.
At its core, SparkFHE integrates HE into Apache Spark to achieve two goals:
(1) leveraging the capabilities of HE to enable Spark to perform computation on en-
crypted data without decryption, and (2) mapping homomorphic algorithms to the
DDF model [3] to accelerate and scale-up homomorphic computation through par-
allelization across large clusters of computing nodes. To our best knowledge, these
have not been done previously. Also, our proposed designs are not limited to Spark
but transferable to other DDF frameworks, such as Apache Flink.
SparkFHE inherits Spark’s data and programming abstractions (RDD, DataFrame,
and Dataset) which hide the complexity of underlying distributed systems. RDD is
like a recipe containing ‘step-by-step’ information on how to transform the input
data and produce results. Spark uses RDD to maximize in-memory processing which
minimizes data movement overhead. Minimizing data movement is particularly im-
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portant for efficient homomorphic computations, because in these cryptosystems ci-
phertext objects tend to be relatively large compared to the size of the underlying
plaintext objects, and the data movement overhead can quickly cancel any benefits of
parallelization.
6.2.1 SparkFHE Architecture
We aim to achieve our two main goals with functionality and usability in mind. First,
building on the top of Spark’s data abstractions, we introduce a new programming ab-
straction to hide the complexity of underlying homomorphic operations. Our frame-
work supports homomorphic operations in both batching and non-batching modes,
where the former enables ciphertext packing technique [148] that provides optimized
performance in a Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) manner. With the new
set of operators for HE computation, a data partitioner is able to write Spark jobs
to compute on encrypted data in a similar way as on unencrypted data. Figure 6.2
shows a functional view of SparkFHE and gives an example of using the MapRe-
duce model to calculate a dot-product over an RDD object containing two vectors of
encrypted numbers in the non-batching mode. The main differences between com-
puting on ciphertexts and plaintexts are the use of our new SparkFHE operators which
are highlighted in blue. We provide these operators through the SparkFHE API layer,
which has wrappers for all common languages that Spark supports. Second, we want
to make SparkFHE agnostic to the underlying HE libraries (currently, we support Mi-
crosoft SEAL [100] and HElib [84]). When writing a Spark job, a data partitioner can
select the desired HE library and scheme directly from the high level languages (such
as Java and Python). To support multiple HE libraries and schemes, we introduce our
data abstraction for ciphertexts and plaintexts which will be dynamically cast to the
correct type according to the selected HE library.
Figure 6.3 shows the architecture design of SparkFHE. We modulize the desired
functionalities into six main components (shaded).
- libSparkFHE is the core of SparkFHE. This C++ shared library implements
primitive functions and complex homomorphic algorithms (e.g., the evaluation of
a decision tree). These functionalities are exposed, through the two API mod-
ules sparkfhe-api-java and sparkfhe-api-python, to high-level lan-
guages for writing Spark jobs. Currently, we use SWIG to auto-generate native
code interfaces: JNI wrappers for Spark and Python wrappers for pySpark.
- sparkfhe-examples contains example Spark code demonstrating how these
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Figure 6.3: SparkFHE architecture (proof-of-concept demo, https://bit.ly/2Vas8pN)
functions might be used to write various Spark jobs.
- sparkfhe-addon contains scripts for configuring cluster environments and sub-
mitting Spark jobs, and parameter files for initializing a crypto object with the ap-
propriate parameter selection. Also, we introduce new data types such as ciphertext
vector to extend the functionalities of the Spark core. These new data types are reg-
istered into the Spark core through our sparkfhe-plugin which will be loaded
at runtime.
Once a Spark job is submitted to the application manager such as Mesos [87],
the Spark job will be performed by executors (or workers). In our proof-of-concept
prototype, we use HDFS as the distributed file system and Mesos/YARN as the appli-
cation/resource manager. Experimental evaluations are conducted on the Cloudlab.us
cluster [63].
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Listing 6.1: Basic homomorphic operations
1 SparkFHE . i n i t ( FHELibrary . SEAL , FHEScheme . BFV) ;
2 SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . g e n e r a t e k e y p a i r ( c r y p t o p a r a m s f i l e ( FHELibrary .←↩
SEAL) , p u b k e y f i l e p a t h ( ) , s e c k e y f i l e p a t h ( ) ) ;
3
4 P l a i n t e x t i n P t x t = new P l a i n t e x t ( 1 ) ;
5 C i p h e r t e x t o u t C t x t = SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . e n c r y p t ( i n P t x t ) ;
6 P l a i n t e x t o u t P t x t = SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . d e c r y p t ( o u t C t x t ) ;
6.2.2 Programming Abstractions
One of the main contributions of SparkFHE is the new programming abstraction that
help hide the complexity of homomorphic encryption. In this section, we introduce
these programming abstractions.
Basic homomorphic operations Listing 6.1 shows a code snippet of three basic
homomorphic operations in Java, as an example. Typically, these operations are exe-
cuted on the client-side to generate a key pair, encrypt input data, and decrypt results.
First, we initialize a crypto object with a specified HE library (such as HELib [82]
and Microsoft SEAL [101]) and HE scheme (such as BGV [27], BFV [26, 68], and
CKKS [43]). This crypto object exposes all the homomorphic functions defined
within our C++ shared library. The desired HE scheme is specified in the crypto
parameter file. The parameter file contains other crypto-related parameters, such as
security level, plaintext and ciphertext moduli, and a desired multiplicative depth.
These parameters are required in generating a key pair, as shown in the second func-
tion call. With SparkFHE, encryption and decryption are very straightforward, as
shown in the example. The secret key is included in the crypto object when generat-
ing the key pair. Normally, only a public key and an evaluation key are provided to
instantiate a crypto object. We also introduced new data types for storing plaintexts
and ciphertexts. These objects are library-agnostic and will be cast to the specific HE
library dynamically at need.
Primitive arithmetic functions A unique capability that we bring to Spark is the
ability to compute on encrypted data without decryption. Listing 6.2 shows code
snippets of how to homomorphically evaluate arithmetic functions, such as addition,
subtraction, and multiplication, within Spark over RDD. First, we need to prepare
the Spark core for computing on encrypted data. In addition to the usual initial-
ization, such as creating a Spark context and session, we set up the JVM through
our SparkFHEPlugin.setup() (provided by the sparkfhe-plugin module as in
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Listing 6.2: Basic arithmetic functions with RDD
1 J a v a S p a r k C o n t e x t j s c = new J a v a S p a r k C o n t e x t ( ) ;
2 SparkFHEPlugin . s e t u p ( ) ;
3 SparkFHE . i n i t ( FHELibrary . SEAL , FHEScheme . BFV, pk , sk ) ;
4
5 L i s t<Tuple2<C i p h e r t e x t , C i p h e r t e x t>> p a i r s = new A r r a y L i s t <>() ;
6 p a i r s . add ( new Tuple2<>(0, c t x t 1 ) ) ;
7 p a i r s . add ( new Tuple2<>(1, c t x t 2 ) ) ;
8 JavaPairRDD<C i p h e r t e x t , C i p h e r t e x t> pairedRDD = j s c . p a r a l l e l i z e P a i r s ( p a i r s←↩
) ;
9
10 JavaRDD<C i p h e r t e x t> sum ctxt RDD = pairedRDD . map (
11 t u p l e −> {
12 r e t u r n SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . f h e a d d ( t u p l e . 1 ( ) , t u p l e . 2 ( ) ) ;
13 } ) ;
14 P l a i n t e x t sumPtx t = SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . d e c r y p t ( sum ctxt RDD . f i r s t ) ;
Fig. 6.3). This setup includes loading C++ shared libraries, registering new data
types for encrypted objects, and introducing interface functions to the Spark core.
Then, we initialize a SparkFHE object with the HE library, HE scheme, and a key
pair generated by the client. The secret key, sk, is supplied here only for debugging
purposes: it allows us to decrypt the result as shown at the end of Listing 6.2. In the
actual computation being outsourced to the Cloud, the Cloud will not have the secret
key; thus it cannot decrypt anything. After the initialization steps, we create an RDD
object that pairs the two ciphertexts. In this example, we assume these two cipher-
texts are provided. A user can produce ciphertexts in trusted environment using the
code snippet shown in Listing 6.1. Next, we schedule a worker node to map a lambda
function to the paired RDD object. The operation to be applied is a straightforward
homomorphic addition over the two elements within the tuple. In a similar manner,
homomorphic subtraction and multiplication can be evaluated by switching fhe add
to fhe subtract and fhe multiply, respectively.
Composite arithmetic functions Primitive arithmetic functions are useful build-
ing blocks for data partitioners to write custom data analysis algorithms. For ex-
ample, data partitioners can implement a function to compute dot-product of two
vectors of encrypted numbers using the provided homomorphic multiplication and
addition, as illustrated in Fig. 6.2. In this example, t is an RDD object of tuples (e.g.,
Tuple2<Ciphertext, Ciphertext>). Implementing in this way requires el-
ements within the two vectors to be passed back and forth through the native code
interface, which increases overhead. On the other hand, the advantage is that data
partitioners can customize optimization strategies as they desire within their Spark
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Listing 6.3: Calculating dot-product with abstraction.
1 JavaRDD<C i p h e r t e x t> c o l l e c t i o n = p a i r e d c t x t r d d . m a p P a r t i t i o n s ( r e c o r d s −> ←↩
{
2 L i s t<C i p h e r t e x t> v = new L i n k e d L i s t<C i p h e r t e x t >() ;
3 C i p h e r t e x t V e c t o r a = new C i p h e r t e x t V e c t o r ( ) ;
4 C i p h e r t e x t V e c t o r b = new C i p h e r t e x t V e c t o r ( ) ;
5
6 w h i l e ( r e c o r d s . hasNext ( ) ) {
7 Tuple2<C i p h e r t e x t , C i p h e r t e x t> r e c = r e c o r d s . n e x t ( ) ;
8 a . add ( r e c . 1 ) ;
9 b . add ( r e c . 2 ) ;
10 }
11 v . add ( SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . f h e d o t p r o d u c t ( a , b ) ) ;
12 r e t u r n v . i t e r a t o r ( ) ;
13 } ) ;
14
15 C i p h e r t e x t r e s = c o l l e c t i o n . r e d u c e ( ( x , y ) −> {
16 r e t u r n SparkFHE . g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) . f h e a d d ( x , y ) ;
17 } ) ;
applications.
To reduce the overhead, we support some common functions directly within our
shared library and expose them through the sparkfhe-api. Using the supported
functions, computing dot-product can be achieved as shown in Listing 6.3. In this
code snippet, we omit the initialization steps for simplicity and refer to the complete
code1. Given a paired RDD object containing tuples of encrypted numbers, we map a
lambda function to each partition within the RDD object (i.e., the mapPartitions
function). This lambda function is the dot-product provided in our shared library. The
ratio of parallelization depends on the number of slices we want to partition the input
dataset and the number of assigned worker nodes. Mapping the dot-product function
on each partition of the RDD object give us only the result of each partition. To
calculate the dot-product result for the entire dataset, we use a reduce function to
homomorphically sum results from all partitions. Implementation in this approach
reduces the overhead of passing around ciphertexts between the native code inter-
face. Also, this design allows us to optimize these basic functions using low-level
parallelization techniques such as GPU or FPGA acceleration.
We also integrate some common functions, such as dot-product, into Apache
Spark (through sparkfhe-plugin) to ease the development. The official Spark
implementation only supports vectors of numerical values, so to support homomor-
phic operations, we introduce new data types for ciphertexts such as Ciphertext
and CtxtVector. Using these new data types, we provide a directly support of
1Complete code for Listing 6.3, https://bit.ly/2DIXB7w
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Listing 6.4: Using an integrated function in Spark core
1 JavaRDD<C t x t V e c t o r> d a t a = j s c . p a r a l l e l i z e ( A r r ay s . a s L i s t (
2 C t x t V e c t o r s . dense ( o n e c t x t , o n e c t x t , o n e c t x t )
3 ) ) ;
4 C t x t V e c t o r i n p u t V e c t o r = C t x t V e c t o r s . dense ( o n e c t x t , o n e c t x t , o n e c t x t ) ;
5 D o t P r o d u c t dp = new D o t P r o d u c t ( i n p u t V e c t o r ) ;
6
7 JavaRDD<C t x t V e c t o r> r e s u l t 1 = dp . t r a n s f o r m ( d a t a ) ;


















Figure 6.4: Level of abstraction (optimization in shaded boxes).
dot-product calculation inside Apache Spark through the DotProduct class. Spark
application developers can write new data processing logic using this abstraction2, as
illustrated in Listing 6.4.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the three different levels of programming abstraction: data
partitioners can build custom algorithms as a Spark application directly using prim-
itive functions, or using the composite function provided in our shared library or
integrated in the Spark core. The different levels of abstraction provide flexibility in
the development of further data analysis algorithms.
Vectorized operations on batched ciphertexts To further accelerate HE evalua-
tions in our SparkFHE framework, we provide support for ciphertext packing tech-
nique [148] to operate in batching mode. With this technique, data partitioners can
pack a large vector of messages into one ciphertext and enable vectorized operations
in a Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) manner. Our framework supports basic
and composite arithmetic functions in batching and non-batching modes. In addition,
we provide new programming abstractions for batched ciphertexts. For example, the
encoding abstraction fhe encode is added to encode input vectors or matrices into
plaintexts before encrypting them. The matrix encoding in particular, which pack the
2Complete code for Listing 6.4, https://bit.ly/2I6DAJn
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rows of matrix into one plaintext, is compatible with the state-of-the-art encrypted
matrix multiplication algorithm [94]. Furthermore, abstractions for shifting, rotating,
and masking are supported to allow data partitioners to extract or compute on specific
slots within a batched ciphertext.
6.2.3 Modeling Algorithms as Dataflow Graphs
In this section, we show how to construct complex algorithms using the supported
programming abstractions as building blocks and representing these algorithms in
dataflow graphs. As aforementioned, the Spark core uses the dataflow graphs as
‘recipes’ to evaluate these algorithms. We choose three example algorithms, private
set intersection (PSI) [35,40], logistic regression [38,97], and random forest [165], to
demonstrate the capability of the dataflow programming model. The implementation
of PSI follows a straightforward MapReduce model. The implementation of logis-
tic regression requires support for iterative programs. Lastly, the implementation of
random forest requires complex data types such as trees and nodes.
Private set intersection Chen et. al. described an efficient implementation of pri-
vate set intersection (PSI) using HE. The PSI algorithm securely finds the common
subset from two different sets without revealing anything other than the intersection
itself. We describe how to represent this algorithm as a dataflow graph that can be
directly implemented as a sequence of functions in RDD. The pseudocode for our
PSI algorithm is shown in Fig. 6.5a. The server’s input set is an encrypted matrix X
of size (m× n). The client’s input set is an encrypted vector Y of size m. Note that
the number of rows in X and Y must agree. To determine if an element is common
between the two sets, we apply element-wise homomorphic subtraction (line 3 in
Fig. 6.5a). Specifically, each element yi ∈ Y is subtracted from each element in the
i-th row of X , i.e., zi,j = (xi,j − yi); i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n], such that the output is 0
if and only if the two elements are equal. To coalesce the n subtraction results to one
for each yi ∈ Y , we compute
∏n
j=1(zi,j). The output is a vector R of m ciphertexts
that indicates whether or not yi is a common element in both X,Y . Finally, each ci-
phertext ri ∈ R is blinded by a random value γ to prevent leaking information about
the unmatched elements of the server’s set.
This algorithm can be directly implemented in SparkFHE. The dataflow graph
in Fig. 6.5d represents the implementation of the PSI algorithm using RDD. We start
with the implementation in a non-batching mode, then extend it to the batching mode.


















































































































for i in range(1, 𝜏) do
    for j in range(1, n) do 
        B[i] ← FHE.SecComp(Y[j], T[i].X[j]) 
    end for










(1 - b1)((1 - b2)v1 + (b2)v2) + (b1)v3
This decision tree can be evaluated as:
b1 = (y1 < x1)







































































































































Figure 6.5: Pseudocode and the corresponding dataflow graphs for three example
algorithm. All the RDD graphs are mapped to Spark code base as demonstrated in
the links.
At first, we create an RDD of type CtxtRowMatrix to hold the row-partitioned
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encrypted server’s dataset X . On the other hand, n copies of the client’s encrypted
vector Y is stored in an RDD of type CtxtVector so that each RDD partition
has the encrypted vector. These two new data types are prototyped based on the
plaintext versions RowMatrix and Vector to enable working on ciphertexts. Next,
a mapPartition is applied to perform element-wise homomorphic subtraction on the
row-wise partitioned datasetX and the vector Y . The result from this mapping phase
is mapped to an RDD of type CtxtMatrix, which reduces this encrypted matrix
to an encrypted vector by applying element-wise homomorphic multiplication. This
vector encrypts the result of matching each element in the client’s dataset yi ∈ Y
with each element in the server’s dataset xi ∈ X . Finally, in the reduce step, a
multiplication is performed on each element in the vector with a random element γ
to blind the result as discussed.
With minor modifications, the implementation of the PSI can be easily executed
in the batching mode. Let τ be the count of the available slots in one ciphertext. In
the basic case where m ≤ τ , each column in the server’s dataset Xj ∈ X can be
packed into one ciphertext, obtaining a vector of n batched ciphertexts. Similarly,
the entire client’s dataset Y is packed into one ciphertext and replicated n times such
that each RDD partition has a copy. Note, if m > τ , the data are packed in ndmτ e
ciphertexts. Both client’s and server’s encrypted datasets are stored in RDDs of type
Ciphertext, which is a datatype we introduce as well to allow Spark to compute
on ciphertexts. Figure 6.6a shows the changes applied to the PSI to map computations
on batched ciphertexts to RDDs.
Logistic regression Our second example is logistic regression, which is one of the
most widely used ML models for classification problems. The algorithm is based
on the probability of predicting the target variable (or class label) from a set of
discrete or categorical values Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, based on an encrypted dataset
X = {x1,1, . . . , xm,n}, consisting of a set of continuous numerical values. Train-
ing the model requires many iterations to minimize the prediction error. Hence, we
demonstrate in this example Spark’s ability to support iterative algorithms.
To estimate the probability of class labels, we first need to compute the dot prod-
uct between a weight vector Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn}, which is initialized to encrypted
zeros, and each row from the dataset Xi = {xi,1, . . . , xi,n}. The predicted values
are in the form of real values. Then, we use Sigmoid function f(x) = 1
1+e−x to
map these real values into probabilities. Due the difficulty of evaluating the Sigmoid
function homomorphically, we follow the suggestion in [38] and use an alternative
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function 0.5 + 0.197x2, which maps a given real value into another in the range be-
tween 0 and 1. A threshold value is set to predict which class a data belongs, and the
estimated probability is classified based on this threshold. The main objective of the
training algorithm is to minimize a ‘cost function’ that measures the inaccuracy of
the current model. Gradient descent is a commonly used optimization strategy that
fine-tunes the weight vector by multiplying the predicted probability to the learning
rate parameter iteratively to minimize the cost function.
Representing the logistic regression training process (gradient descent) as a dataflow
graph (in Fig. 6.5e) shows how to map the iterative learning algorithm to RDD.
The given encrypted dataset X is partitioned into β slices in RDD of the data type
CtxtRowMatrix, where RowMatrix data type represents row-wise partition of
the dataset. Likewise, the encrypted vector of the training class labels Y , which con-
tains the ground truth for each record in X , is partitioned into β slices in RDD of
the data type CtxtVector. The weight vector Ω is initialized to encrypted zeros
of size n. In the first transformation, a dot-product is performed to multiply each
element from the weight vector with every feature in the RDD. The results are then
aggregated to get the predicted value. In the next transformation, the evalPoly opera-
tion evaluates the polynomial approximation of the Sigmoid function on the predicted
value to normalize it between 0 and 1. The next mapPartition subtracts the nor-
malized value from the corresponding ground truth class label. This is the first step
of the gradient descent algorithm to minimize the cost function. Then, on the next
transformation, each element from the previous mapPartition result vector is multi-
plied with the entire column from the RowMatrix RDD. Finally, a reduce function is
performed to combine all the mapPartition values and generate one CtxtVector of
size n. The entire process repeats for a specified number of iterations.
The same training process can be implemented with packing. Given the slot count
τ , we can pack each column Xj in the dataset X into one plaintext, such that we
obtain a total of ndmτ e plaintexts. The class labels Y are packed into one ciphertext.
The weight vector Ω is packed into n plaintexts, where each plaintext has one weight
ωi repeated in all slots. After encryption, the ciphertexts are stored in RDDs of type
Ciphertext. The rest of computations is illustrated in Fig. 6.6b.
Random forest As we discussed in Chapter 4, random forest is one of the com-
monly used techniques for classification. Let F be a random forest of d decision
trees {T1, · · · , Td}. Each decision tree Ti ∈ F consists of m decision nodes and
m + 1 leaf nodes. For classification, each decision node dj is associated with an
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(b) Logistic regression
Figure 6.6: Dataflow graphs in the batching mode
encrypted threshold xj ∈ X , and each leaf node contains a class label from the set of
unique class labels V = {v1, · · · , vn}. The random forest algorithm requires com-
plex data types, as it consists of trees and nodes. We provide implementations of
these data types within our C++ shared library, and show here the dataflow graph
representing the random forest evaluation over RDD using these new data types.
The random forest evaluation is shown in the pseudocode in Fig. 6.5c. To evaluate
the algorithm over RDD, we illustrate the dataflow graph in Fig. 6.5f. We start with
creating an RDD for each user’s input, i.e, the random forest F and the feature vector
Y . The random forest RDD holds d partitions, one for each decision tree, which is
represented as the Tree data type. Note that each tree T contains encrypted thresholds
X and class labels V . The RDD created for the feature vector contains the encrypted
vector of the features. Later, each decision tree partition is paired with the feature
vector in order to evaluate the tree. The tree evaluation takes place across two map-
Partition transformations, which refers to mapping a function to each partition. In the
first transformation, the Boolean function bj = fj(yj < xj) at each decision node is
evaluated. Then, the tree’s polynomial form is evaluated in the second transformation
to obtain the classification result Ti(Y ). Finally, majority voting for the forest F is
performed as a reduce action to output each class label with its encrypted count. We
provide in our C++ shared library the implementations of common functions such as
secure comparison and secure counting, which are useful in ML.
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Table 6.1: Set of parameters used in evaluation, where λ is the security level, η is
the polynomial modulus degree, log(q) is the ciphertext modulus bits, and p is the
plaintext modulus.







SEAL-CKKS 8192 210 - 4096
HElib-BGV 5461 500 1032193 756
HElib-CKKS 16382 300 −1 4095
6.3 Evaluation and Discussion
To evaluate our proposed framework, we constructed a proof-of-concept prototype
and conducted experimental evaluations and security analysis. We present and dis-
cuss the results of the analysis in this section.
6.3.1 Empirical results
We deployed our SparkFHE framework on Cloudlab.us [63] and performed all our
empirical results on a system with 8-core Intel Xeon E5-2630 at 2.40GHz, 125GB RAM,
and Ubuntu 18.04.2 on Cloudlab.us [63]. We investigated the performance gain of
Spark for HE algorithms in a controlled environment, avoiding network fluctuation.
We set the parameters for each supported library/scheme as shown in Table 6.1. We
also report, in the table, the number of available slots offered by each parameter set
to be used to pack multiple plaintexts in one ciphertext in the batching mode.
Our proposed SparkFHE framework provides support for computation with dif-
ferent HE libraries and schemes. As a benchmark, we analyze the performance of
basic HE functions (e.g., KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Encode, Decode) and provided
primitive HE arithmetic algorithms (Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication). Fig-
ure 6.7 shows the running times for four cases with supported libraries (Microsoft
SEAL and HElib) and schemes (BFV, CKKS, BGV).
In all four cases, the key generation step is performed only once and takes around
1 second to generate a key pair. The running time also includes the internal abstrac-
tion layer functions to store the keys on the client’s side. The following four HE
functions are also performed once, for each ciphertext, on the client’s side before
uploading the encrypted data to the cloud for evaluation. On the other hand, the HE
primitive arithmetic algorithms take place on the cloud side on two ciphertexts. Each
one of them takes around 1 millisecond to be performed in parallel within Spark.







































Figure 6.7: A comparison of homomorphic functions in different supported schemes
Table 6.2: Performance times (ms) for element-wise HE primitives on vectors en-
crypted with SEAL-BFV
HE Function
Vector size (N ) N = 10 N = 100 N = 1000
# of workers 2 4 8 16 2 4 8 16 2 4 8 16
Element-wise
Addition
No Batching 3.21 3.28 3.50 2.73 3.14 2.66 3.05 3.25 4.65 4.44 4.26 3.22
Batching 1.81 1.72 1.86 1.78 1.80 1.70 1.84 1.76 1.82 1.65 1.71 1.79
Element-wise
Multiplication
No Batching 2.52 2.63 2.19 2.17 2.14 1.84 2.10 2.16 2.11 1.77 2.19 2.07
Batching 1.35 1.45 1.38 1.34 1.37 1.34 1.40 1.35 1.39 1.30 1.29 1.48
Next, we inspected the performance gain of running element-wise vector HE op-
erations (i.e., addition and multiplication) within Spark. We vary both the vector size
and number of workers (processors) and compare performances both with and with-
out batching. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show experiment results for the SEAL-BFV and
HELIB-BGV schemes, respectively. Our observation shows that only a little perfor-
mance gain is achieved when the vector size is relatively small. For the vector sizes of
10 and 100, the performance is affected as we increase the number of workers. The
performance gain is observed for a vector of 1000 ciphertexts. On the other hand,
we can clearly see that computation on batched ciphertexts is more efficient (approx-
imately ×1.5 faster) compared to computing on individually encrypted ciphertexts.
We evaluated the performance gain by SparkFHE based on two well-known met-
rics in parallel computing in our evaluations, strong and weak scaling [99]. For a
problem size N (of encrypted data) and a number of processing units p, let Ts de-
notes the elapsed time to process the problem in the serial program (i.e., on a single
processing unit) and Tp denotes the processing time in the parallel program. With a
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Table 6.3: Performance times (ms) for element-wise HE primitives on vectors en-
crypted with HELIB-BGV.
HE Function
Vector size (N ) N = 10 N = 100 N = 1000
# of workers 2 4 8 16 2 4 8 16 2 4 8 16
Element-wise
Addition
No Batching 3.24 2.71 3.02 3.06 3.18 3.26 3.08 3.01 4.94 4.47 3.54 3.62
Batching 1.54 1.65 1.66 1.74 1.65 1.62 1.57 1.63 1.69 1.63 1.70 1.61
Element-wise
Multiplication
No Batching 2.36 1.91 2.36 2.24 2.26 2.08 2.16 2.05 2.01 1.89 2.05 2.29








































Figure 6.8: Speedup rate in strong scaling (N = 103)
speedup of the system be S = Ts/Tp, we have:
- Strong Scaling: The behavior and speedup when the problem size N is fixed, and
more processors p are added. Perfect scalability should show a linear decrease in
computation time as p increases.
- Weak Scaling: The behavior and speedup when the increase in the problem size N
and processors p is proportional, and the problem size per processor is fixed. Ideal
scalability should show fixed computation time as p and N increase.
Figure 6.8 shows the results based on strong scaling. For a fixed problem size of
103 individually encrypted values, the running time decreases, as shown in Fig. 6.8b,
and we observe a speedup in Fig. 6.8a as the number of workers increases. For exam-
ple, the speedup is around 10 times when using 30 workers to perform dot product.
Therefore, the framework demonstrates good strong scaling. Note, no speedup was
observed for the batching version of this problem because encrypting 103 data with
SEAL-BFV yielded one batched ciphertexts.
On the other hand, Fig. 6.9 illustrates the weak scaling results. We assigned
100 encrypted values per processor and increased them proportionally. We observe




















































































Figure 6.10: Parallel speedup and efficiency (N = 106 and N = 107 “batched”)
an approximately fixed running time in both batching and non-batching versions.
For example, to perform the dot product function on two vectors of 2000 encrypted
values using 20 workers, it takes around 10 seconds without batching and 1 second
with batching. It takes approximately the same time to process 2600 encrypted values
using 26 workers, which indicates the framework achieves good weak scaling.
Figure 6.10 illustrates the performance of processing batched ciphertexts as the
problem size scales up to 106 and 107 encrypted values. We calculate the parallel
speedup in Fig. 6.10a and the efficiency in Fig. 6.10b. We can see that we achieve
more speedup for the larger 107 dataset compared to the speedup when processing
the 106 dataset. The efficiency is closer to 1 when the speedup grows linearly. In
our case, we see a high efficiency when using 6 workers, but the parallel efficiency
decreases as the speedup growth becomes sublinear.

























Figure 6.11: Different programming levels performance (N = 103)
Lastly, we inspected in Fig. 6.11 the data transfer overhead when using different
levels of programming abstractions (see Figure 6.4) in the SparkFHE framework. We
measure the running time for homomorphically evaluating the dot product and total
sum functions on 103 individually encrypted values with the SEAL-BFV scheme in
our framework. In dot product, we observe that using the function from the shared li-
brary offers approximately×3 speedup compared with no abstraction; that is, writing
the dot product function as a separate map and reduce lambda functions as discussed
in Sec. 6.2.2. Moreover, the integrated version offers around ×15 speedup compared
with no abstraction and ×5 speedup compared with using the one in the shared li-
brary. On the other hand, using the total sum function integrated Spark offers around
×1350 speedup compared with no abstraction and around ×270 speedup compared
to using the one provided in the shared library. Hence, integrating the HE algorithms
in the Spark core provides optimal efficiency and lower data transfer when computing
on encrypted data in SparkFHE.
6.3.2 Security analysis
Our proposed SparkFHE supports distributed data analysis on encrypted data. It is
secure against semi-honest adversaries. The data in the system is encrypted under the
client’s key before uploading them to the cluster master running SparkFHE. The clus-
ter nodes are provided with the public and evaluation keys required for homomorphic
evaluation but have no access to the decryption key. Those nodes’ view consists only
of ciphertexts, which are protected under the semantic security of the underlying HE
schemes. In the simplest case, assuming computing with one key, the client sends
the request with the data encrypted with his public key and receives the encrypted
result decryptable with his private key. Therefore, the client’s view consists of his
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data, and the evaluation result intended for him. Other cases that include computa-
tion with multiple keys will follow similar security analysis discussed in Chapter 4
and Chapter 5.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed our research work to address RQ3. We develop the
SparkFHE framework to achieve two goals. First, we incorporate HE into Spark
so that Spark can perform analytics on large encrypted datasets. Second, we lever-
age efficient parallelized data processing in Spark, through data abstractions (RDD,
DataFrame, and Dataset) and in-memory processing, to accelerate heavy encrypted
computations. Our propose framework offers these functionalities: (1) a crypto ab-
straction layer that allow Spark application developers to utilize the capabilities of
HE without its complexity and helps make the underlying HE libraries interoperable;
(2) programming abstractions for augmenting Spark jobs so they can be evaluated ho-
momorphically; (3) a set of homomorphic algorithms commonly used in data analyt-
ics and ML on encrypted data; (4) mappings of homomorphic algorithms to Spark’s
data abstraction (RDD) so that they can be accelerated effectively in a cluster envi-
ronment. We also discuss three use-cases of SparkFHE and show the workflow of
three examples, including private set intersection, privacy-preserving logistic regres-
sion, and privacy-preserving evaluation of random forests. We validate our proposed
framework and show that it is scalabeable and efficient.
Our work [89] has been accepted at the Privacy Preserving Machine Learning
(PPML’20) Workshop, co-located with Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS’20).
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we investigated techniques for secure outsourced computation on
encrypted data using homomorphic encryption (HE). To support a wide range of se-
cure data analytics and machine learning applications in the cloud, we proposed cryp-
tographic protocols for the commonly used algorithms to serve as building blocks.
In particular, we developed homomorphic algorithms to perform equality checking,
comparison, and counting on encrypted data. We demonstrated the leverage of the
proposed algorithms in two applications, a secure geospatial query application and a
secure outsourced evaluation of random forests.
We also explored a more complex outsourced system model where multiple par-
ties want to outsource and jointly compute on their data but keep them encrypted
under their own keys. To provide multi-key support for our proposed protocols, we
first studied the state-of-the-art cryptographic techniques and schemes that support
computation with different keys. We proposed a hybrid technique (MKHE+) that
combines the advantages of threshold and multi-key HE schemes to reduce compu-
tation complexity and ciphertext size compared.
Lastly, we proposed a new secure data processing framework, SparkFHE, which
integrates HE into Apache Spark to achieve two goals: (1) leveraging the capabilities
of HE to enable Spark to perform computation on encrypted data without decryp-
tion, and (2) mapping homomorphic algorithms to the distributed dataflow model
to accelerate and scale-up homomorphic computation through parallelization across
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large clusters of computing nodes. Our proposed designs can be applied to other dis-
tributed dataflow frameworks, such as Apache Flink. The proposed building blocks
and multi-key support can be integrated into the SparkFHE framework to provide a
practical solution for secure outsourced computations on encrypted data.
7.2 Future Work
In order to further improve the work described in this dissertation, we plan to inves-
tigate the following tasks in the future.
Providing security against malicious adversaries Our proposed cryptographic
protocols are secure in the semi-honest security model. In specific applications, such
as secure evaluation of random forests, we partially addressed possible attacks where
malicious adversaries may probe the system to leak information about the random
forest structure. We may add dummy nodes with random threshold values and ran-
domly switch the branches at each tree to improve the model’s security against such
attacks. In future work, we plan to rigorously address other forms of malicious at-
tacks on the proposed protocols where adversaries deviate from the protocol specifi-
cation.
Improving MKHE+ approach We proposed a hybrid technique, MKHE+, to
enable efficient homomorphic computations on data encrypted with different keys.
MKHE+ is based on the BGV scheme, but it is worthwhile to extended it to other
RLWE-based schemes such as BFV and CKKS. Moreover, we plan to improve our
approach by redesigning the extended ciphertext structure and evaluation key gen-
eration to be comparable with the state-of-the-art work. In particular, the current
structure of a ciphertext extended under two keys (pkA, pkB) consists of four cipher-
text elements as c̄ = {(cA,0, cA,1), (cB,0, cB,1)} ∈ R4q . It can be further reduced to
three elements as c̄ = {cAB,0, cA,1, cB,1} ∈ R3q where cAB,0 = cA,0 + cB,0. We will
study the feasibility and impacts of these changes on our hybrid approach.
Achieving dynamic multi-key support Our current work in MKHE+ targets a
setting where a group of participants (e.g., model owners) are always involved in the
computation. Moreover, the number of groups in our system is static, and the number
of involved keys is fixed at the setup step. For example, the system model targeted
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in our demonstration has two groups, model owners and clients. We need to address
a more dynamic setting where groups may change as more participants join, so the
evaluator can compress ciphertext sizes “on-the-fly” to be encrypted under fewer keys
when appropriate. We need to investigate the use of key switching to realize that and
study the ciphertext’s new structure after dynamic changes are applied.
Integrating ML algorithms in SparkFHE The proposed SparkFHE framework
provides support to perform distributed data analysis on encrypted data. We demon-
strated how to model three machine learning (ML) algorithms as dataflow graphs that
map homomorphic algorithms to Spark’s resilient distributed data (RDD). The con-
structed dataflow graphs can be used to apply those ML algorithms on encrypted data
in SparkFHE. Our evaluations showed superior performance when using the algo-
rithms integrated into Spark. Therefore, we plan to provide FHE support for different
ML algorithms in the Spark’s machine learning library (MLlib), such as logistic re-
gression and decision trees, and integrate them into Spark. To achieve this support,
we need to study and develop the required data types and primitives for these algo-
rithms.
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toring polynomials with rational coefficients. Mathematische annalen,
261(ARTICLE):515–534, 1982.
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Similar to the BGV scheme, the BFV scheme [26, 68] is also designed based on the
original BV scheme [29]. Yet, instead of the modulus switching, it introduces an
approach, called scale-invariant, to reduce noise accumulated through homomorphic
multiplications. The BFV scheme also adopts the original BV’s key switching tech-
nique for relinearization, which brings back the initial ciphertext product to be an
encryption under s as explained in the previous subsection. We describe the RLWE-
based BFV scheme as follows.
- BFV.KeyGen(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, sample a secret s←χ, an element
a←Rq, and a small noise e←χ. Set the secret key as sk = s and the public key
as pk = (as+ e,−a).
- BFV.Enc(pk,m): Given a public key pk = (as+ te,−a) and a message m ∈ Rt,
sample a random r←Rt and noise elements e1, e2←χ. Scaled up the message by




m. Encrypt the scaled message as c = (c0, c1) ∈
R2q where c0 = r(as+ e) + e1 + ∆m and c1 = −ra+ e2.
- BFV.Dec(sk, c): Given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q and the corresponding






- BFV.Add(c, c′): To add two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1) = (r(as + e) + e1 +
∆m,−ra+ e2) and c′ = (c′0, c′1) = (r′(as+ e) + e′1 + ∆m′,−r′a+ e′2), compute
cadd = ((c0 + c
′
0), (c1 + c
′
1)) ∈ R2q .
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- BFV.Mult(c, c′): To multiply two ciphertexts c, c′ ∈ R2q , compute first the cipher-
























. The ciphertext is encrypted under the element s2 and need
to be transformed to one under element s through the key switching technique. We
denote this process by cmult = KeySwitch(c̃mult, ek).
The intuition behind scale-invariance is that elements’ features should not change
when scaled with a common factor. Given two messagesm andm′ scaled by a shared
factor ∆. If we aggregate ∆m+∆m′ and scaled back by 1∆ , then the result is roughly




be the factor used to scale up the message, since q is significantly larger than t, at
encryption then add an initial noise term as described in BFV.Enc. If we decrypt, we
need to scale back by the factor tq to retrieve the message m. As a result, the noise is
significantly reduced by this scaling down operation. Observe the following proof of





∈ Rt, where we compute 〈c, s〉
as follows.
〈c, s〉 = c0 + c1s = (r(as+ e) + e1 + ∆m) + (−ra+ e2)s
= (ras− ras) + (re+ e1 + e2s) + ∆m
= ẽ+ ∆m




















≈ m (mod t)
We can use the scaling aspect to effectively reduce the noise after homomorphic eval-
uations – namely multiplication, which causes the embedded noise in the ciphertext
to grow (i.e., e2). Moreover, multiplying two ciphertexts results in squaring the scal-
ing factor, such that we get ∆2(mm′). To address this issue, the ciphertext must be
scaled down by a factor of tq after each multiplication to reduce the noise and brings
the result scale back to ∆(mm′). Note, we could have multiplied the ciphertext by
the factor 1∆ =
1
b qt c
. However, this will incur twice the rounding error. We may
not effectively reduce the large noise in the ciphertext scaled during multiplication;
hence, we directly scale by tq instead. Homomorphic addition does not require a scal-
ing step because the sum of two ciphertexts directly obtains ∆(m+m′) and does not
impact the shared factor.
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Unlike modulus switching, we observe right away that scale-invariance requires
one modulus q instead of a set of decreasing L + 1 moduli {qL > qL−1 > . . . , q0}.
The modulus switching used in the BGV scheme performs a gradual scaling after
each multiplication to map a ciphertext from Rqi to Rqi−1 . This causes the cipher-
text to be scaled by a factor of qiqi−1 . This means the noise magnitude after each
multiplication remains constant, but at the cost of changing to a smaller modulus q.
A.2 Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW)
Gentry et al. [78] proposed another LWE-based HE scheme that works on matrices
and further simplifies the scheme construction compared to the BV variants. Based
on the concept of eigenvectors and eigenvalues, we can construct an HE scheme as
Cs = ms (mod q), where C is a ciphertext matrix, s is a secret vector (eigenvec-
tor), and m is a scalar message (eigenvalue).
Given two ciphertexts C and C ′ encrypted with the same secret s, additive and
multiplicative homomorphism are realized right away by computing Cs + C ′s =
(m + m′)s (mod q) and C · C ′s = (m · m′)s (mod q), respectively. However,
this scheme is insecure as it can be easily broken because finding an eigenvector
for a given matrix is as easy as solving a system of linear equations. To address
this problem, the GSW scheme is built on the approximated eigenvectors method,
where a small noise e is added to protect s under the LWE assumption, such that
Cs = ms + e (mod q). In this scheme, we can view Cs as the decryption of some
ciphertext C containing a message m with a secret key s associated to a public key
A.
Like other LWE-based schemes, the public key in GSW is generated from an
LWE instance over Zq. For a given secret vector s′ and a uniformly chosen matrix
B, we set the public key as A = (Bs′ + e,B) and the secret key as s = (1,−s′).
When the secret key s is provided at decryption, we have As ≈ 0 because As =
(Bs′ + e,B)(1,−s′) = Bs′ + e − Bs′ = e ≈ 0. This operation removes the
masking matrix B in the ciphertext. To encrypt a message m under the public key
A, we sample a random matrix R, to ensure semantic security of the scheme, and
compute C = AR+m such that the decryption Cs = (AR+m)s = ARs+ms =
ms + eR, where eR is small when R has entries in Z2. If s is an integer vector and
m is restricted to the message space {0, 1}, we can determine the original message
from (ms + e) with high probability. Specifically, if m = 0, then Cs is close to 0;
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or an integer vector otherwise.
Homomorphic evaluations are performed as natural matrix operations. The prod-
uct of multiplying two GSW ciphertexts does not contain a long secret s2. Therefore,
it does not require the complex relinearization operation used in the previous BV
variant schemes. Yet, homomorphic multiplication still increases the noise. With-
out optimizations, the noise growth for multiplying two ciphertexts is exponential
and bounded around (n′ + 1)B2 for some bound B, which shows a significant noise
increase comparing to homomorphic addition that is bounded by 2B.
To achieve a better noise management, the scheme encrypts messages as bits
m ∈ {0, 1} and applies a flattening technique to transform a given matrix integer
entries to bits through bit decomposition. Hence, the noise growth becomes linear
and bounded by (n′ + 1)B as a result of multiplying with small values in Z2. A
variant of GSW [10] later suggested the use of special gadget matrix for a simpler
design with a tighter bound on the noise growth. The gadget matrix G is a diagonal
matrix containing powers of two g = (1, 2, 4, . . . , 2dlog qe) and associated with a
function G−1(·) such that GG−1(a) = a for any given a ∈ Zq. It also proposed a
bootstrapping technique for GSW to support arbitrary homomorphic evaluations. We
describe the main functions of this GSW variant as follows.
- GSW.Setup(1λ, 1L): Given a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, choose
a lattice dimension n, an error distribution χ bounded by Bχ, and a modulus q
such that the LWE problem holds. Set n′ = n log(q) and choose a random matrix
B←Zn−1×n′q . Output the scheme public parameters as pp = (q, n, n′, χ,Bχ,B).
- GSW.KeyGen(pp): Sample a secret vector s′←Zn−1q and the noise vector e←χn
′
.
Set b = s′B + e ∈ Zn′q . Output the secret key sk as s = (1,−s′) ∈ Znq and the
public key pk as A = (b,B) ∈ Zn×n′q , observe that sA ≈ 0 with respect to some
small noise.
- GSW.Enc(pk,m): Let m←{0, 1} be a message bit and pk be a given public key.
To encrypt the message, choose a random matrix R←{0, 1}n′×n′ compute the
ciphertext as C = AR+mG ∈ Zn×n′q , such that the property sC ≈ msG holds.
- GSW.Dec(sk,C): To decrypt a given ciphertext C with the associated secret key
sk, define a vector w = (0, . . . , 0, dq/2e) ∈ Znq . Then compute x = sCG−1(wT ) ∈
Zn′q . Output the decrypted message as m̃ =
∣∣∣⌊ xq/2⌉∣∣∣.
- GSW.Add(C,C ′): To add two ciphertexts C = (AR + mG),C ′ = (AR′ +
m′G), directly output Cadd = C + C ′ = A(R + R′) + (m + m′)G ∈ Zn×n
′
q ,
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such that sCadd ≈ (m+m′)sG.
- GSW.Mult(C,C ′): To multiply two ciphertexts C,C ′, utilize the gadget matrix
and output Cmult = C ·C ′ = CG−1(C ′) ∈ Zn×n
′
q .The product matrix satisfies
sCmult ≈ sCG−1(C ′) ≈ msGC ′ ≈ (m ·m′)sG.
Due to the construction of the GSW, there is another way to decrypt and retrieve
the message bit m ∈ {0, 1}. More specifically, if we view a GSW ciphertext C =
AR + mG as two aggregated parts, a randomized public key AR and a message
m masked by a gadget matrix G represented in the powers-of-2 form. Then the i-th
column ci of this ciphertext contains the encryption of m2i and can be decrypted by
computing 〈ci, s〉(mod 2). The collection of entries are required for homomorphic
evaluations, but decryption can be done using a single column. The penultimate
(i.e., second-to-last) column corresponds to encryption of m2l−2, which decrypts to
plaintext in the interval (q/4, q/2] appropriate for decoding the message bit. Hence,
extracting the penultimate column is sufficient to use for decryption. To illustrate,
we provide a proof of correctness for the GSW decryption as follows. Let w =
(0, 0, . . . , dq/2e) be the penultimate column of the gadget matrix G corresponding
to the power 2`−2 and compute x as following.
x = sCG−1(wT ) = s(AR +mG)G−1(wT )
= msGG−1(wT )
= mswT
This process extracts the penultimate column of the GSW ciphertexts, which is suffi-
cient to for decryption. Compute m =
∣∣∣⌊ xq/2⌉∣∣∣ and retrieve the message m̃ ∈ {0, 1}
after checking whether it is closer to 0 or q/2. Using a single column from the ci-
phertext to decrypt certainly has its benefits. One of them is reducing the size of
the ciphertext results transmitted over the network especially in cases we discuss in
Sec. 5, where ciphertexts are extended to multiple keys and may suffer exponential in-
crease in their size. More importantly, this property provides a mechanism to decrypt
a ciphertext without fully revealing information about the embedded secret key. We
review in Sec. 5 how this property is exploited to build a secure proxy re-encryption
that is based on the GSW scheme.
